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THE COSSACKS IN THE THIRTY YEARS WAR

VOLUME II: 1625-1648

by

ALEXANDER BARAN and GEORGE GAJECKY

ROME 1983

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PREFACE

After a number of years we present our second volume. The delay was caused by the large number of documents to be prepared as the research base for our work. The volume of archival materials exceeded our expectations and demanded more preparation than for our first volume.

Since the appearance of our first volume, many new sources, particularly studies and monographs about The Thirty Years War, have appeared in commemoration of the three hundred and fiftieth anniversary of this event. The voluminous work of the Czech scholars, *The Bohemian Documents which Illustrate the Thirty Years War*, under the chief editorship of J. Koci, deals extensively with the Cossack presence in Silesia, Bohemia and Moravia during the war. Also the publication of selected Spanish documents by V. Meysztowicz shows that the Cossack problem had international ramifications. Some general studies and collections of essays were published, among them the works of Pagés, Steinberg and Rabb. The most important of these new studies were the works of the Czech scholar J. Polišensky. In his monographs Polišensky includes the peoples of Eastern Europe within this all-European conflict and focuses on their contributions. Unfortunately, Polišensky operates within limited possibilities due to the nature of the regime of his country and cannot communicate fully. Nevertheless, his new emphasis is welcome and we wish to include our work in the same mainstream.

A few Polish historians have also contributed several works in this direction. W. Magnuszewski describes the life and career of the famous mercenary leader, S. Strojnowski. Z. Wojcik discusses the Cossack mercenary activities in France, while W. Serczyk provides a new interpretation of social interrelations of Cossack life. It is within this framework that our own work has evolved and from this context that our own attempts at interpretation of the Cossack mercenary phenomenon, both in western Europe and in Ukraine have emerged.

During our preparatory work we confronted the problem of transcribing the names of Cossack leaders. Since most of them were Ukrai-

nian, we decided to use the Ukrainian form “-sky” instead of the Polish form “-ski”, e.g. Dubytsky and Ivanytsky in place of Dubitski and Ivanitski; the exceptions are I. Kalinowski and M. Moczarski, for the sake of consistency with transcription in Volume One.

In the preparation of this volume we have received valuable assistance from many sources. We wish to express our sincere gratitude to Dr. Theodosius Gajecky and Prof. Lawrence Braceland, S.J., for their help in deciphering certain complicated documents, and to Prof. Paul Call and Ms. Luba Fedorkiw for editorial assistance.

ALEXANDER BARAN
GEORGE GAJECKY

CHAPTER I

WALLENSTEIN AND THE COSSACKS

In 1624, the first stage of the Thirty Years War ended and along with it the participation of Cossacks in the Imperial Army. By the end of the year, all Cossack detachments left the Empire.¹ This lapse, however, did not endure for long. In 1625 they were called to renew their service by the new Imperial commander-in-chief, Albert Wallenstein (Waldstein).

Wallenstein was a unique and interesting figure. He was a man of ruthless ambition, of strong opportunistic tendencies, and was perhaps the greatest military genius of the seventeenth century. He was born in 1583 into a noble Bohemian family. Protestant by birth, he later became a Roman Catholic and a dedicated Imperialist. He gained the Emperor's favor in 1618 when he absconded with the provincial treasury of Moravia and delivered it to the Emperor while the province supported the Protestant cause. His rise to power was assisted by a sagacious marriage to a widow with a great fortune and his frequent and generous donations to the Imperial war chest. By 1625, Wallenstein became Prince of Friedland and a member of the ruling Hapsburg regime. As well as this rise to power, Wallenstein's military career hinged on the timely reactivation of hostilities.²

¹ Only those Cossacks who did not display any concern for their previous contracts and privileges remained in the Empire. Without setting any conditions, they voluntarily joined the Imperial Army. Later, together with the Croatians Grentzers and the Hungarian Hussars they created a new type of military formation for Western Europe the "Light Cavalry."

² Wallenstein has an extensive English bibliography from which we list only the longer monographs: Liddell Hart B.H., *Wallenstein - The Enigma of History*, in "Great Captains Unveiled." Blackwood-Edinburgh-London, 1927; Watson F., *Wallenstein, Soldier under Saturn*, New York: Appleton-Century, 1938; Mitchell J., *The Life of Wallenstein, Duke of Friedland*, London, 1837; Mann G., *Wallenstein*, New York: Holt Rinehart, 1976 ... Among the foreign editions, an important one is: Pekař J., *Valdštejn, Dějiny Valdštejnského spiknutí*, Praha, 1934.

The Thirty Years War started to boil again. The victories of the Emperor and Maximilian of Bavaria during 1623-24 convinced their enemies that they could not win against the armies of the Emperor and the Catholic League without a formal alliance and mutual cooperation. Cardinal Richelieu, prime minister of France and the chief enemy of the Hapsburgs, signed a formal alliance with the United Provinces against Spain (June 10, 1624). This alliance was later joined by England, Sweden, and Denmark. Thus in early 1625, the Hapsburg Empire, despite its victories, was again surrounded by even more formidable foes.³

Maximilian and Ferdinand were anxiously searching for new troops to protect themselves from the attack of the anti-Hapsburg coalition. At this critical time Wallenstein proposed to Ferdinand the recruitment and outfitting of an army of 50,000 men, from his own funds, with guaranteed winter quarters. Further payment, however, would be covered by the Imperial treasury. The Emperor could not refuse such an alluring offer and in mid-April 1625 accepted Wallenstein's proposals. He only asked Wallenstein to reduce the force to 20,000 men fearing that a greater army would make Wallenstein a rival.⁴

As we mentioned, the Emperor authorized Wallenstein to organize and conduct his new army only in mid-April; however, he ordered recruiting to begin as early as March, soon after Wallenstein delivered his proposals. One of Wallenstein's most important proposals was to recruit several thousand Cossacks as protection against an eventual attack of Bethlen Gabor's *hussars* (light cavalry) from Transylvania and to possess light and manoeuvrable troops to secure the heavy manoeuvres of larger armies.⁵

Wallenstein predicted correctly that the upcoming phase of the Thirty Years War would depend more on the manoeuvrability of indiv-

³ Wedgwood C.V., *The Thirty Years War*, New York: Anchor Books, 1961, p. 182-8.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 192-3.

⁵ Welykyj A.G., *Litterae Nuntiorum Apostolicorum Historiam Ucrainae illustrantes*, Romae: Basiliani, 1960, vol. IV, pp. 169-170, 180-181 "Di Vienna delli 17 stante avisano, che il Principe di Transilvania haveva fatto intimare una Dieta da tenersi in Cassovia con intervento di tutti li suoi Stati et procurava aiuti dal Gran Turco per rinovar la guerra all'Imperatore ... Perilche Sua Maestà Cesarea haveva deliberato di far assoldare altri m/20 Cosacchi, quali dovessero far piazza d'arme in Silesia et unirsi con quelli del Prencipe di Valstain ..."

idual troops than on large battles of great armies. He wanted to safeguard the movements of his heavy-armed forces from the unexpected attack of the enemy's light cavalry and its guerillas. The only solution was to hire an easily movable force of light cavalry and a mobile infantry. At this time in Europe the only light troops were the Hungarian Hussars, the Croatian Grenzers and the Ukrainian Cossacks. The Hungarians, however, were only cavalry men and therefore, fought on foot unwillingly. Croatians also served mainly as cavalry and disliked stationary battles. They preferred raiding and were difficult for the military command to control. The Cossacks, according to an old Zaporozhian custom, fought mainly on foot. They used horses more for manoeuvring and transportation. However, for raiding the steppes they always needed some light cavalry training, which became very useful in their mercenary activities during the first phase of the Thirty Years War, when the Cossacks were used primarily as light cavalry but could simultaneously be employed as a light infantry force as well. For this reason Wallenstein's first choice was the Cossack recruitment.

Taking Wallenstein's advice, the Emperor asked for Cossacks to enter his service and only later searched for Croatian and Hungarian light troops. The Cossacks were officially invited to take a new part in the war by Imperial and Spanish envoys who in March demanded them from the Polish Diet.⁷ But these Cossacks did not wait for the official reply of the Diet. Upon learning of the desires of the Imperial envoys, they rode to Silesia and awaited the Emperor's recruiting agents.⁸ Three months passed before the arrival of the Imperial agents. In the meantime, the Cossacks were demanding provisions from the local populace and threatening to serve in Mansfeld's Protestant army if the Emperor did not enroll them soon.⁹

At the same time in Ukraine about 30,000 Cossacks began preparations to ride out and join the Emperor's service. They were awaiting

⁶ Golobutskii V.A., *Zaporozhskoie Kozachestvo*, Kiev: G.I.P.L., 1956, p. 109-191.

⁷ Welykyj, v. IV, p. 170. "La Dieta di Varsavia andasse avanti prosperamente ..., ove si trovan anco Ambasciatori di Spagna e dell'Imperatore, quali solecitano soccorso per l'Imperio, dimandando l'Imperatore m/X Cosacchi, che quantoprima saran levati alli confini della Silesia."

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 169.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 172.

official summons and the promised monetary allowance before setting out for the Silesian frontier.¹⁰ The Silesians panicked when news of this development reached them. The situation became more critical for them when many of these Cossacks started to leave Ukraine in small bands and began to arrive at their frontier settlements. On May 5, the Prague authorities reported that over 10,000 Cossack mercenaries were stationed on the Silesian frontier.¹¹ They brought panic also to the Polish inhabitants by demanding quarters and provisions from them for the interim period. In similar circumstances the king or the Diet would send emissaries to disarm or disband the Cossacks,¹² but in this instance the Cossack presence was useful for the king's plans. King Sigismund III wanted to appoint his son Charles Ferdinand as Bishop of Breslau, and the presence of a massive Cossack force made the reluctant Silesians accede to his demands and accept Charles Ferdinand as bishop of their see.¹³

The Cossacks were aware that under these circumstances they would be unable to maintain themselves for a long period of time and tried to obtain regular contracts from the Hapsburg administration. But they found closed doors everywhere. Finally, in mid-June the Emperor hired 6,000 Cossacks, because he needed them instantly in Northern Germany against Mansfeld and the King of Denmark.¹⁴ The rest were told to return home.¹⁵

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 175. "Et che tenevano nova, che nella Polonia si trovassero radunati da m/30 Cosacchi per venirsene in Germania et anco in Italia al servizio di Casa d'Austria."

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 178-179. In three letters from Prague, Vienna and Wroclaw it is written that there were 20,000 Cossacks, but, in our opinion this number was somewhat exaggerated by the frightened Silesians. From later recruitment statistics it appears that the approximate number of Cossacks in Silesia was 11,000.

¹² See: Vol. I, p. 88.

¹³ Welykyj, vol. IV, p. 178-179.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 187. "Di Vienna delli 28 passato (Giugno) altro non scrivono, eccetto che l'Imperatore faceva assoldare altri m/6 Cosacchi, dicevasi per mandarli contro il Mansfeld."

¹⁵ It should be stressed that the uncertain policy of the Hapsburg administration concerning military recruitment brought much misery to their own people. By refusing or adjourning the Cossack enlistment and cheating the mercenary troops of their quarter annual payments the Hapsburg officials left the troops no recourse but to live off the land and to requisition provisions from the population.

Ferdinand explained his actions to Sigismund in his letter of July 11. He stated that he began negotiating with the Protestant Electors of Brandenburg and Saxony and did not want to destroy his chances of success by employing Cossack mercenaries. This would have been misconstrued by the Protestants as a hostile act.¹⁶

Unfortunately these negotiations fell through and the Emperor ordered the re-employment of the Cossacks. Thus 5,000 new Cossacks were added to the Imperial roster. To their command were appointed two exiled veterans of the previous Cossack campaigns, Captain Nicholas Moczarski and Captain Idzi Kalinowski.¹⁷ Even though Wallenstein requested these Cossacks for himself, they were not attached to his troops but were sent to serve as a specific unit under Colonel Pappenheim.

Who was Pappenheim and why were these Cossacks attached to him? The answer is easy to find! The Emperor needed a fast victory in Northern Italy, which could be achieved only by Pappenheim and his light cavalry.

Pappenheim was a young officer who served his apprenticeship in the Spanish army. He was personally courageous and an avid student of light cavalry tactics in modern military operations.¹⁸ Early in 1626, Pappenheim proposed to the Viennese authorities that with a force of 6,000 cavalry men he would remove the French from Northern Italy. The Hapsburg administration accepted his proposal and sent him into Italy. His cavalry force was composed mostly of the Cossacks under Moczarski and Kalinowski.¹⁹ This move was resented by Wallenstein who wanted the Cossacks in his force and he made his dissatisfaction known. Nevertheless, the Cossacks were invaluable to the Hapsburg cause in Italy. They helped the governor of Milan, Prince Feria, to begin the siege of Genoa, defended the Province of Lombardy from French attacks at Lake Como, and conducted raids

¹⁶ See: Vol. I, p. 129-130.

¹⁷ Dzieduszycki M., *Krótki Rys Dziejów i Spraw Lisowczyków*, Lwow: Sch-nayder, 1843-44, vol. II, p. 388; Haus-Hof-Staats Archiv, Wien, Polen I, Karton 54, Conv. 1626, fol. 4-11v. Moczarski and Kalinowski were two Cossack Captains, who along with their troops illegally left Poland in 1623 to join the Imperial service. For this reason in 1624 the Polish Diet forbade them to return home. In the same year their squadrons were demobilized, and as exiled Cossack officers Moczarski and Kalinowski were forced to remain in Vienna.

¹⁸ Wedgwood, p. 206-209, 276-291.

¹⁹ Dzieduszycki M., *op. cit.*, p. 388-9.

against the Venetians. Finally, they contributed greatly to Pappenheim's victory at Riva over the French army under Marquis de Couvres.²⁰

At the same time, the Emperor satisfied Wallenstein's demands for additional Cossack troops, and in the beginning of February 1626, sent his personal envoy, Count Matthew Arnoldini, to Warsaw. There he was to work for a greater cooperation with the Polish government and especially to obtain permission to recruit many Cossacks, in spite of the fact that Poland needed them for their own war with Sweden in Pomerania and as protection from Tatar and Turkish attacks in Ukraine.²² We learn from the letter of the Warsaw nuncio that the Zaporozhian Cossacks were interested in Imperial service and agreed with the Imperial plan to cross over via Transylvania to Austria but were stopped at the last moment by the Polish Diet which feared conflict with Bethlen Gabor, Prince of Transylvania.²³ On the other hand, many senators expressed their view that if the Cossacks crossed over into the Empire inconspicuously and in small groups, the Polish government would "turn its head".²⁴ Thus Wallenstein was assured that some Cossacks would be recruited and sent to strengthen his forces.

Wallenstein, meanwhile, was engaged in military operations. While General Tilly was busy fighting the armies of the King of Denmark and Christian of Brunswick, another Protestant army under Mansfeld, financed by the Dutch and English, advanced into central Europe to join up with the forces under Bethlen Gabor. Wallenstein was the only one who could stop them from achieving their goal. On April 25, 1626, at Dessau Bridge on the Elbe River, he not only stopped Mansfeld but massed his artillery and so depleted his enemy that Mansfeld had to withdraw to Brandenburg and replenish his force. There he

²⁰ Khevenhiller F.C., *Annales Ferdinandeae, oder Wahrhafte Beschreibung Kaisers Ferdinandi des Andern... von Anfang des 1578 bis 1637*, Leipzig/Weidmann, 1724, vol. X, p. 969.

²¹ Haus-Hof-Staats Archiv, Polonica, Karton 54, Conv. 1626, fol. 4-v.; Welykyj, Vol. IV, p. 209, 224.

²² Welykyj, *op. cit.*, p. 224-225.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 227. "Li Cosacchi Zaporoviensi, forse sollecitati dalla Maestà Cesarea, hanno offerto a questa Maestà di passar in Imperio. E stato ciò ricusato per dubio, che faccino danni nel Regno. Hanno replicato, che passerebbono per la Transilvania con dar prima il guasto a quella provincia. Che medesimamente è stato riprovato dal consiglio d'alcuni Senatori, perchè venendo Gabor compreso nella pace con Turco, non vogliono esser primi a romperla."

²⁴ *Ibid.* "Tuttavolta quando detti Cosacchi passino modestamente e senza danno d'alcuno, Sua Maestà è per chiuder l'occhio."

built up his army and was further reinforced by a Danish corps under Johann Ernest of Weimar. Mansfeld renewed his offensive during the summer of 1626, crossed Silesia and in August reached Moravia. From there he eventually went to northern Slovakia.²⁵

The Imperial regime was so greatly encouraged by the initial victories of Wallenstein and Tilly that following the Battle of Dessau Bridge they cancelled the upcoming Cossack payment.²⁶ This caused the delays on the Silesian frontier and prevented Wallenstein from stopping Mansfeld's advance during the summer. Wallenstein desperately needed the Cossacks or some other light cavalry. Despairing of obtaining them through regular channels, he sent his own emissary, Colonel Colloredo, to Poland to engage an appropriate number of Cossacks for his force.²⁷ But before Colloredo returned with the Cossacks, Wallenstein had to follow Mansfeld with only 2,000 light cavalry composed of various Grentzer and small Cossack groups. Thus, Wallenstein, without mobile troops had to besiege and dislodge all the garrisons that Mansfeld left behind him to delay the Imperial army. Wallenstein wrote bitterly to the Imperial Chancellery: "If only I had 8,000 or 9,000 Cossacks and the same number of Hungarians and sufficient provisions that I need - then with God's aid I'd surely sweep out Bethlen and Mansfeld the first chance I got and then I'd march into Prussia to chase out the King of Sweden from Poland."²⁸ He also notified the Emperor that henceforth he would recruit his own light cavalry when need arose and when the Imperial government would not do so for him.²⁹ Wallenstein was further irritated by the news that Mansfeld was reinforced by 2,500 of Bethlen's Hussars and 2,000 Turkish light cavalry which had begun attacking his advancing columns. In spite of these difficulties, he followed Mansfeld to Nitra in western Slovakia.³⁰

Colloredo's mission to the Polish authorities was unsuccessful, although he made the Polish Diet an interesting proposition on behalf of his general. Wallenstein actually proposed to send to Poland his

²⁵ Poliřenský J.V., *The Thirty Years War*, Los Angeles: Univ. California Press, 1971, p. 170-171.

²⁶ Welykyj, *op. cit.*, p. 228.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 244.

²⁸ Watson F., *op. cit.*, p. 199.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 200.

³⁰ Poliřenský, *op. Cit.*, p. 170.

Colonel Carboni with fifteen squadrons of Imperial cavalry to aid the Poles against the Swedes but demanded an equal amount of Cossack light cavalry for himself. These Cossacks would be paid by Wallenstein and the Imperial troops by the Poles.³¹ The grand marshal of Poland, Nicholas Wolski, was amenable to the idea but the Polish senators opposed it and the proposal was rejected.³²

But all was not lost. The Cossacks heard of Colloredo's mission and crossed over into Bohemia in small detachments, where Baron Di Dohna, the Silesian commander, enrolled them into the Imperial army and sent them on to Wallenstein.³³ Di Dohna also enlisted 4,000 Cossacks for himself and kept them under his direct control to pacify Silesia where many of Mansfeld's adherents surfaced and also to discourage the enemy garrisons from extending their sway over the countryside.³⁴ The fortunes of war changed for Wallenstein in September. Bethlen and Mansfeld were unable to agree upon a further plan of operations. Bethlen left the battlefield in October and returned to Transylvania while Mansfeld left for Venice to seek new financing for his campaign. On this journey Mansfeld died somewhere in Dolomite Alps.³⁵ Wallenstein declared the campaign of 1626 over and returned to western Hungary.

In this situation Wallenstein saw no further need to keep the Cossacks for winter quarters and told Di Dohna to dismiss the 4,000 Cossacks without paying them their last quarter annual payment, since they had not served long enough to earn it.³⁶ The Cossacks refused to leave without their earnings and referred to their contract signed in the name of the Imperial commander-in-chief. As a result, Wallenstein changed his mind and wrote Di Dohna that if the Cossacks wanted to remain in his service they were to leave for the Imperial headquarters.³⁷

Di Dohna, however, needed the Cossacks to keep Silesia and North

³¹ Liva V., *Prameny k Dějinám Třicetileté Války*, Praha: Naše Vojsko, 1952, vol. IV (1625-1635), p. 157.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 161.

³⁴ Welykyj, *op. cit.*, p. 252; Liva, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

³⁵ Polišíenský, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

³⁶ Welykyj, vol. IV, xp. 252.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 253. "... dato novo ordine a detto Sig. di Dona circa al licentiar li Cosacchi, che se loro faranno difficoltà a non voler esser licentiatii, o pure corranno paghe per tre mesi, come han soluto domandare ancorche non habbino servito, che in detti casi non li licentii, ma li mandi in Ungaria al Campo."

Moravia free of Mansfeld's garrisons and local rebels. Di Dohna, along with Colonels Pachman, Colloredo, and Montecuccoli were investing enemy strongholds at Oppeln and Krnov and blocking the way to Mansfeld's cavalry that was returning to Holland after the death of their commander.³⁸ In these battles, according to our documents, Cossacks suffered heavy losses. Although they were then reinforced by 1,000 Cossacks from Pappenheim's force which had returned from Italy, they were nonetheless decimated in the Silesian battles.³⁹

Most of the Cossacks under Moczarski and Kalinowski who served under Pappenheim returned to Poland earlier. Pappenheim left Italy at the end of September 1626 to subdue a peasant uprising in western Austria while Moczarski and Kalinowski were recalled to Poland to fight the Swedes. They led 4,000 Cossacks to Silesia where they awaited their final payment. When delays occurred they began plundering the populace. Upon their return, the Polish Diet disciplined thirty officers including Kalinowski and placed Moczarski in sole command.⁴⁰

But the Cossacks who served under Di Dohna remained another eighteen months in Imperial service.⁴¹ They suffered more casualties than any other Cossack detachment in the war. Their numbers remained constant, however, because of reinforcements; 1,000 Cossacks from Pappenheim's force and 1,500 from the 1625 levy that remained in the Imperial service.⁴²

Finally, in January, 1628 the remaining 5,000 Cossacks in Silesia asked for their pay and to return home.⁴³ The money did not arrive for a long time because Di Dohna and Wallenstein disagreed over the terms of the final settlement.⁴⁴ The sum was at last paid in June and by July 2, 1628 the Cossacks had gone.⁴⁵ There were no more Cossacks in the eastern part of the Hapsburg Empire, but in the West 2,000 Cossacks joined the Croatian Grentzers and became a regular

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 254-257.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 257, 264-265; Dzieduszycki, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 400.

⁴⁰ Dzieduszycki, vol. II, p. 400-1.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 401.

⁴² Welykyj, *op. cit.*, p. 264, 265, 279, 303.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 303.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, "Di Praga li 24 passato scrivono esservi stata qualche dissensione tra il General Valstheim et il Bulgravio di Dona, per causa delli m/5 Cosacchi, che si trovano nella Silesia e vogliono esser pagati et licentati, ma poi detti Signori si sono pacificati ..."

⁴⁵ Dzieduszycki, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 454.

light cavalry force of the Hapsburg army. In the 1630's they were known as the Isolani's cavalry.

The Danish phase of the war ended in 1628. It seemed that the Emperor had won the war and the Holy Roman Empire would renew itself along constitutional lines. But this did not occur. Instead, Ferdinand II, on March 6, 1629, proclaimed his unfortunate Edict of Restitution which turned the Constitutional struggle back into a religious one and united the enemies of the Empire in a new Protestant coalition.⁴⁶ The coalition was also joined by France, and its Chancellor, Cardinal Richelieu, became financier and the chief instigator of this coalition. However, the new Protestant leader and the supreme commander of the Protestant army was the Swedish King, Gustavus Adolphus. Gustavus, a strategic genius and an international hero, became a worthy opponent of Wallenstein.

Gustavus was also interested in Cossack mercenaries and in Cossack warfare, and was eager to establish negotiations with the "Rulers of the Steppe." Twice in 1626 he sent emissaries to the Cossacks via Moscow, and both times the Muscovite administration stymied his efforts by detaining Swedish messengers and aborting their mission.⁴⁷

Unable to communicate with the Cossacks via Muscovy, Gustavus transferred his attention to Transylvania and Constantinople. With the help of Bethlen Gabor and the English and Dutch envoys, in 1629, he secured the support of the Orthodox Patriarch, Cyril Lukaris, to influence the Cossacks to revolt against the Poles and to enter into an alliance directed against the Catholic powers.⁴⁸ The following year, during the famous insurrection of Taras Fedorovych Triasylo, he decided to approach the Cossacks directly. His envoy Jacob Russel, in June, 1631, reached the "registered" Cossacks and their new hetman, Ivan Kulaha Petrazhytsky, who was a loyalist, and turned over the envoy to the Poles. This created a great scandal and aroused much indignation in Warsaw, especially in the Polish Diet. The Swedish ambassador was publicly insulted and threatened, and the ensuing uproar helped the Hapsburgs recruit a substantial force of mercenaries for the Imperial service.⁴⁹ Evidently the negotiations between Gustavus and the Cos-

⁴⁶ Wedgwood, *op. cit.*, p. 235-238.

⁴⁷ Krypiakevych I., "Kozachchyna v Politychnykh Kombinatsiakh 1620-1630r," *ZNTSh*, vol. CXVII/CXVIII (1913), p. 70.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 75-88.

⁴⁹ Haus-Hof-Staats Archiv, Polen I, Karton 54, fasc. 1631, fol. 24-27, 49-49v; Karton 55, fasc. Martz 1632, fol. 13-13v, 34-35, 36-37, 42-43v.

sacks were never successful; nevertheless, the Swedish King remained an admirer of "the Rulers of the Steppe," until the end of his life.

In the meantime, in 1629, Gustavus Adolphus decided to invade Germany to defend the Protestants from the consequences of the Edict of Restitutions. Ferdinand based his defense of Wallenstein's army, because the Army of the Catholic League under Tilly was completely exhausted.⁵⁰ Wallenstein began rebuilding his army and started to advertise for light cavalry, mainly "Cossacks and Grentzers".⁵¹

In January, 1630 Cossack detachments appeared on the Silesian border and offered their services.⁵² Wallenstein was too busy to engage them, and thus three months later when they began creating problems and volunteering for Tilly's army,⁵³ he sent his Irish adjutant, Jacob Butler to Silesia. Butler left with his brother Walter, who served as colonel of light cavalry, went to the Cossacks and engaged fifteen squadrons. They were commanded by Colonels Ivanytsky, Jarocky and Virutsky and by Captains Cilinsky and Kulish.⁵⁴ This Cossack force, 6,000 strong, was brought to Count Schaumburg's group that was besieging Frankfurt on the Oder. The Cossacks were placed under the command of Colonels Herbertstein and Walter Butler and took part in the siege. After the capture of Frankfurt, the Cossacks under Butler returned to Silesia, reinforced by a detachment under Captain Dubycky and were placed under General Tiefenbach's command.⁵⁵

Therefore, in the second half of 1630, the Cossacks under Butler formed more than half of the Imperial army in Silesia. His command consisted of three Cossack regiments and a fourth regiment which was predominantly Cossack. Butler also reinforced his depleted ranks with new Cossacks, and throughout 1631 his forces were actually a small Cossack army.⁵⁶

The summer of 1630 brought painful changes to the Empire. Bowing to the wishes of the Electors who feared Wallenstein's power, the Emperor removed him from command. Wallenstein, embittered

⁵⁰ Wadgwood, *op. cit.*, p. 242-247.

⁵¹ Dieter A., "Die Politik Maximilians von Beiern und seiner verbundenen 1618-1651," in series: *Briefe und Akten zur Geschichte des Dreissig-jährigen Krieges*, München, 1964, Band V, teil II, Nr. 95, S. 272-273.

⁵² Welykyi, *op. cit.*, vol. V, p. 45, 47; Liva, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, p. 249.

⁵³ Welykyi, vol. V, p. 48.

⁵⁴ Dzieduszycki, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 467-468.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 469; Welykyi, *op. cit.*, vol. V, p. 64.

by Imperial intrigues, withdrew to Bohemia and ignored the defense of the Empire.⁵⁷ The Imperial army fought the Swedes but, without the dynamic leadership of Wallenstein, slowly disintegrated. Winter came and with it quartering and provisioning difficulties. The Cossack command decided to return home with a greater part of the army.⁵⁸ Only Colonel Ivanytsky stayed behind - he fell in battle with the Swedes.⁵⁹ A small part of the Cossacks remained with Butler who continued to fight the Swedes and Saxons. Some of them joined Pappenheim's cavalry and took part in the disastrous battle at Breitenfeld.

The Empire suffered without Wallenstein. The army of the Catholic League under Tilly was destroyed at Breitenfeld by Gustavus Adolphus. The Swedes advanced into Bavaria while the Saxons under Arnim entered Bohemia and captured Prague.⁶⁰ Ferdinand's situation was critical and the only salvation lay in reappointing Wallenstein.

It took a great deal of negotiating to persuade Wallenstein to reassume command of the Imperial Army. He agreed on the last days of 1631, although officially it was not proclaimed until four months later.⁶¹ In the meantime he began recruiting Cossacks. To encourage them to enlist in large numbers he offered a daily ration of 2 lbs. of bread, 1 lb. of meat, 2 beers, a bottle of wine, fifty pounds of oats for each horse and six Rhenish thalers per month.⁶² By July, the Cossacks responded and six quadrons under Jan Victor enlisted.⁶³ This was not enough and Wallenstein asked Di Dohna in August to bring an additional 3,000 for his cavalry.⁶⁴ His efforts were unsuccessful. The new king of Poland, Wladislaw IV, at the time of his coronation signed an agreement with the nobility where all recruitments of mercenaries to fight in foreign territories was forbidden within the lands of the Polish Crown.⁶⁵

⁵⁷ Wedgwood, p. 253-258.

⁵⁸ Dzieduszycki, vol. II, p. 468.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ Rezek A., *Dějiny Saského vpádu do Čech*, Praha: Kober, 1889, p. 64-139; Wedgwood, p. 306-309.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² Dvořák R., *Dějiny Moravy*, Brno: Ak, Knih., 1899, vol. III, p. 597; Dzieduszycki, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 471.

⁶³ Dzieduszycki, vol. II, p. 471.

⁶⁴ Welykyi, *op. cit.*, vol. V, p. 110.

⁶⁵ Dzieduszycki, vol. II, p. 474; Baran A., "The Imperial Invitation to the Cossacks to Participate in the Thirty Years War (1632)," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, vol. I, No. 3, p. 330-346.

Wallenstein needed Cossacks desperately because his tactics called for wearing the enemy down and outmanoeuvring him. From July until November the armies of Wallenstein and Gustavus marched and countermarched against each other, occupying strategic military and economic bases of the enemy.⁶⁶ In such warfare a large body of light cavalry was indispensable and Wallenstein's agents persisted in recruiting Cossacks despite the royal prohibition.⁶⁷

The Cossacks of Victor and Butler which were with Wallenstein, proved their value by destroying the Swedish lines of communication, attacking supply depots, skirmishing with smaller enemy detachments, and keeping the Swedish army in constant alarm.⁶⁸

At the decisive battle of Lutzen (16.XI.1632) the Cossack regiments of Victor, Butler and mixed squadrons of Cossacks and Croatians under Holk and Pappenheim participated. All Imperial cavalry was placed under Pappenheim's command and he tried vainly to stem the Swedish attack with desperate charges. In one of these actions Pappenheim lost his life.⁶⁹ This was a tragic loss for the Empire since Pappenheim was a great cavalry leader.

Wallenstein lost the battle of Lutzen but the Swedes were unable to pursue their victory since Gustavus was killed.⁷⁰ The Imperial army withdrew to Halle and returned to Bohemia.⁷¹ There it was joined by another 1,000 Cossacks. This was a regiment under Virutsky commanded by captains Iaroshevsky, Dubycky, Stash, Sierakowsky, Dembinsky and Czarnecky.⁷²

Even though Wallenstein remained inactive in Bohemia throughout the winter, he sent the Cossack regiments of Virutsky and Victor and the Croatians to Saxony under generals Di Dohna and Gallas to raid enemy bases and destroy their communications.⁷³ The Cossacks, accustomed to rapidly executed winter raids in the Ukrainian steppes, penetrated deeply and successfully the Electorate of Saxony and staged

⁶⁶ Wedgwood, p. 308-316.

⁶⁷ Haus-Hof-Staats Archiv, Polen I, Karton 56, Conv. 1632, sec. B, s.d. fol. 73. See the decisions "Ex Protocollis Mensis Aprilis 1632 - No. 7-8."

⁶⁸ Dzieduszycki, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 454-489.

⁶⁹ Polišenský, *op. cit.*, p. 211; Wedgwood, p. 317.

⁷⁰ Wedgwood, p. 328.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² Dzieduszycki, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 475.

⁷³ Koci J. F al., *Documenta Bohemica Bellum Tricennale Illustrantia*, Praha, 1977, vol. V, p. 123; Dzieduszycki, vol. II, p. 475.

an ambush on the Saxon Elector himself.⁷⁴ After this successful raid the Cossacks returned to Silesia. Along with the Grentzers they patrolled eastern Saxony under Di Dohna's command. They were also joined by a further 2,000 Cossacks under the direct command of Colonels Stephen Virutsky and Andrew Morsky and their Captains Slavinsky and Cilinsky.⁷⁵

However, Colonel Virutsky did not want to fight without a formal contract and demanded a written agreement to enter into service.⁷⁶ His demands concerning the contract were based on the following conditions:

a) that the Emperor would settle with the Polish King the issue of their recruitment, in order that Virutsky's Cossacks would not be considered illegal mercenaries within the Polish State;

b) that the Emperor would approve all the provisional agreements of the Cossacks contracted previously with Colonel Di Dohna;

c) that the Cossack regiments would be responsible directly to the Supreme Commander — Wallenstein — and that only he could assign them to particular divisions;

d) that the Cossacks would not receive the same salary as their predecessors in the Thirty Years War, but payment equal to that of the German mercenaries in Poland;

e) that those who were wounded or sustained disabilities in battles would receive special compensation;

f) that in the event any unsettled issue should come to the fore, the Cossacks could negotiate directly with Colonel Gotz, the Emperor's representative.⁷⁷

The Emperor officially accepted and approved all these conditions. As to Cossack salaries, he equalized their payment with that of the other mercenaries in the Imperial army.⁷⁸ The contracts were signed

⁷⁴ Welykyi, *op. cit.*, vol. V, p. 131.


⁷⁵ Koci, *Documenta Bohemica*, vol. V, p. 130; Dzieduszycki, vol. II, p. 478. Haus-Hof-Staats Archiv, Polen I, Karton 56, Conv. 1633, fol. 52-53, 79.

⁷⁶ Koci, *op. cit.*, p. 134-136; Dzieduszycki, vol. II, p. 478.

⁷⁷ Haus-Hof-Staats Archiv, Polen I, Karton 56, Conv. 1633, fol. 52-53.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, fol. 52: "Sacra Caesarea Maestas, Dominus Noster Clementissimus benigne perceptis illis, quae sibi nomine duorum Legionum Polonicarum sub ductu Dominorum Colonellorum Stephani Wieruski et Andreae Morski fuerunt proposita clementer sese resolvit."

Ibid., fol. 53: "Quod porro meliorationem salarii eorundem concernet, con-



Map I: COSSACK CAMPAIGNS IN SILESIA

of January 18, 1633,⁷⁹ and the reinforced Cossack army advanced north under Count Merode's command.⁸⁰ Very soon a misfortune occurred at Strehlen. They met a superior Swedish corps under General Duval. In the ensuing battle, on January 23, the Cossacks were encircled and massacred. Over 500 losses were sustained.⁸¹

Despite their losses there were still about 6,000 Cossacks in Silesia.⁸² But neither the Cossacks nor the Grentzers were able to stop the Swedish-Saxon advance. The Imperial troops left Silesia. Further difficulties were encountered. Di Dohna was unable to make monthly payments to his troops and the Cossacks began rebelling against further service.⁸³ Also, the Polish government recalled Dembinsky and Stash with several hundred troops.⁸⁴ The remaining 5,000 were pacified with promises and threats. Finally, General Gallas, the supreme commander of this front, decided not to maintain a separate Cossack regiment in his army, but to disperse them among all the divisions just as he had dispersed all the other mercenary light cavalry forces. Colonel Virutsky and the newlyelected Colonel Charnetsky strongly opposed this action, basing their protest on the contract they had signed with the Imperial army.⁸⁵ Their protest was unsuccessful; they were released with one month's pay and sent home.⁸⁶ Three thousand Cossacks left with them, as did the majority of officers.⁸⁷ Of Virutsky's regiment only two companies under the command of Andrew Morsky remained in imperial service.⁸⁸

From this time on there are only sporadic reports of the Cossacks' activities. In March 1633, along with the Croats they took part in Werth's military operations. In April the Cossacks of Gallas made successful raids in enemy territories. Next month they were sent to Zittau by their general to block the Saxon advance.⁸⁹

fidit Sacra Caesarea Maestas Dominos Polonos se caeterae exercitus parti conformaturos, et iuxta capitulata cum ipsis facta omnino militaturos esse."

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, fol. 79-79v.

⁸⁰ Dzieduszycki, vol. II, p. 478.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² *Ibid.*; Koci, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

⁸³ Welykyi, *op. cit.*, vol. V, p. 133.

⁸⁴ Koci, *op. cit.*, p. 135, 136, 139.

⁸⁵ Dzieduszycki, vol. II, p. 479.

⁸⁶ Koci, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 139-142.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 147, 177.

In June, five regiments of Cossacks and Croats defended the town of Pappenheim. A minor skirmish occurred at Hilpoltheim. Over 300 Cossacks and Captain Shabrovsky lost their lives there.⁹⁰

The year 1634 saw the end of the career of Wallenstein. At the end of 1633, disillusioned, he began negotiations with the enemy and in February 1634, he was to cross over to the Swedes. His plan was discovered by officers loyal to the Emperor and on February 25, 1634, he was assassinated.

Thus ended Wallenstein's career. However, his strategic genius and the introduction of light cavalry formations, with the help of the Cossacks, into the military system became a basis of military tactics for many years.

⁹⁰ Dzieduszycki, vol. II, p. 481-482.

CHAPTER II

CAMPAIGN OF 1635-1636

The year 1635 brought many changes in the conduct of the Thirty Years War. After the Battle of Nordlingen, the Protestant rulers saw that it was impossible to completely destroy the Hapsburg armies and that further attempts at the destruction of Germany were futile. The Elector of Saxony started negotiations with the Emperor in 1634, which ended with the Peace of Prague, signed on May 30, 1635, by most of the princes of Germany except the outlawed Elector of Palatinate and lesser Calvinist rulers.¹

The Swedish Chancellor Oxentierna, who became the leader of the anti-Hapsburg coalition after the death of Gustavus Adolphus, turned to France for aid and a commitment to enter the war. France concluded a military alliance with the United Provinces on February 25² and renewed its treaty with Sweden at Compiègne on April 30, 1635.³ On the basis of this treaty France was to declare war on Spain and receive the left bank of the Rhine as its possession.⁴ Thus the religious ideology of the war disappeared and the conflict continued as a struggle for the political hegemony of Europe.

War was declared by France on May 21, 1635. In early June, French troops entered Belgium and besieged Louvain, by June 26. Ferdinand of Toledo, — the Cardinal Infante, — commander of the Spanish army asked General Gallas for aid. Although Gallas was far from Louvain, he dispatched his Cossack and Croatian cavalry to raid the French supply and communication lines. This assignment was effectively fulfilled by the cavalry detachments and soon the besieging French troops were hungry and deprived of intelligence about the Hapsburg

¹ Wedgwood, *op. cit.*, p. 383-4.

² *Ibid.*, p. 380.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 381.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Dzieduszycki, *op. cit.*, v. II, p. 504.

armies.⁵ The Spanish and Imperial forces, under Cardinal Infante and General Piccolomini, united and expelled the French army from Belgium.⁶

The Cossack detachment returned to Gallas and campaigned successfully against the French under La Vallette. In September, the latter were forced to retreat from the Rhine.⁷

In 1635 a new Cossack expedition was organized and sent into the Hapsburg Empire. This corps was recruited with Poland's consent, where many Zaporozhians as well as other Cossacks took part. Action began when the Emperor learned of negotiations between the French and United Provinces (in February 1635) and foresaw the entry of France into the war. To strengthen his army he asked his ambassador in Warsaw, Matthew Arnoldini of Clarstein, to recruit Cossacks in Poland. On February 28, 1635 Arnoldini petitioned the King and Diet of Poland to permit the organization of a large contingent of Cossacks for the Emperor.⁸ In addition, the Emperor wrote personally to several prominent magnates, Stanislaw Lubomirski, Stanislaw Koniecpolski, Luke Opalinski, and the Primate of Poland, and asked them to support Arnoldini's plea for recruitment of Cossacks into the Imperial army.

The official reply came on March 20, from the royal secretary, Yves Lipski. The Diet and the King allowed the Emperor to recruit and take out Cossacks into Imperial service, but Lipski warned that this mercenary corps was not to cause any harm in Poland during its recruitment and transportation into the Empire.¹⁰

The Poles wanted the Hapsburgs to defeat the Swedes which would facilitate Poland's regaining sovereignty over Eastern Prussia and Pomerania. They also calculated that by extending these favours the Emperor would allow Poland to gain greater influence in the Silesian province. However, the Polish Commonwealth did not intend to participate directly in the unpopular Thirty Years War. They were exhausted by the Swedish and Muscovite Wars and the state treasury was empty. Therefore, the recruitment of Cossack mercenaries was considered the Emperor's private act and not binding upon the Polish state.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 504-5.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 505-6.

⁸ Haus-Hof-Staats Archiv, Polen I, Karton 57, Conv. 1635 Febr., fol. 75-81.

⁹ *Ibid.*, fol. 8-10; See Appendix, doc.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Conv. 1635 Martii, fol. 165-166v. "Exempla enim anteacti temporis terrent Reipublicam, quando antea sit tumultarii magis licentiosi, quam milites educebantur, ut gravibus incolae Regni incommodis afficerentur."

Even though Arnoldini received permission to recruit mercenary troops, the difficult problems of summoning and organizing the command structure and transporting them to the main Imperial army were still to be resolved. On April 23, Arnoldini related to the Emperor that he had negotiated with the Palatine of Ruthenia, Stanislaw Lubomirski, and his adjutant, Dworzianski, along with the *Castellan* of Cracow, L. Opalinski. These conversations were fruitless, however, since the Polish methods of recruitment proved impractical.¹¹ We also learn from this letter that Lubomirski wanted to lead 8,000 Cossacks in person to the Emperor, but was forbidden by the Constitution of 1624, the law abolishing the Lisowchyk Cossack organization.¹² Despite this, Arnoldini assured the Emperor that he had the King's and Diet's permission for recruitment and that he would obtain the best soldiers for the Imperial army.¹³

Arnoldini's greatest problem was the transportation of the Cossack corps through Polish territory to Austria. The King and nobility recalled the earlier tumultuous passages of Lisowchyks and distrusted the Cossacks. Thus, they counselled the transference of command over the Cossack mercenaries to two Crown officers, Colonels Mocharski and Lashch¹⁴ who previously commanded Cossack detachments in the conflicts of Eastern Europe.¹⁵ In order to gain the confidence of the Poles, an able commander and lieutenants had to be commissioned for this task. King Wladislaw also recognized the problem and was further pressured by his brother, Charles Ferdinand, viceroy of Silesia, to facilitate the arrival of the expedition to aid the Emperor.¹⁶ Therefore, on April 25 the King appointed Lashch and Mocharski as joint commanders of the Cossack expeditions, with the consent of the Crown commander of the Polish army, S. Koniecpolski.¹⁷

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Conv. 1635 Aprilis, fol. 33.

¹² *Ibid.*, fol. 33v.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, fol. 34-34v. Mocharski commanded Cossack expeditions to the West in the years 1624-1626.

¹⁵ Tselevych O., "Uchast Kozakiv v Smolenskii Viini 1633-1634," *Zapysky NTSh*, vol. 28 (1899), p. 4; Dzieduszycki, v. II, p. 293.

¹⁶ Haus-Hof-Staats Archiv, Polen I, Karton 57, Conv. Maii 1635, fol. 70.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, Conv. 1635 Aprilis, fol. 44-44v. "Verum etsi tanta interposita mora rem difficiliorem fore praevideamus, nam miles et praesertim in eo numero non tam facile colligi potest, tamen testari cupientes sincerum erga Caesaream Maestatem, Dominum Avunculum, uti Parentem Nostrum Carissimum studium

The project seemed to be moving towards a successful conclusion. Lubomirski was to oversee the recruitment while Lashch and Mocharski were to lead the Cossack corps to the Silesian border towns of Bytum and Psejnam, their temporary quarters and launching camps.¹⁸ However, on the 28 of April, unpleasant news reached Arnoldini. Lashch and Mocharski had refused their appointment.¹⁹ Lashch declined because he was taking his regular command to Prussia where preparations for renewing the war against Sweden were being made.²⁰ Mocharski, who had some anxious moments during his last expedition with the Cossacks in the Emperor's service (1626), refused outright to command the Cossacks.²¹

Arnoldini wrote a desperate letter to Lubomirski that neither the troops nor the commanders were available. From the promised 8,000, only 2,000 were recruited, and of those, only 1,300 were available and he asked for Lubomirski's help in this difficult situation.²² In Vienna, the Emperor realized the gravity of the situation and on June 8 wrote a personal letter to the King in which he asked for the promised Cossack army.²³ The King was amenable to the Emperor's request, but a great part of the Polish nobility, including the royal secretary Malachowski, were against sending military aid to the Hapsburgs. Instead, they requested the resumption of the war with Sweden to drive them out of Prussia.²⁴

The envoy, Arnoldini, sent his propositions (*media*) to the King to assist him in solving the many difficult and controversial points of this expedition,²⁵ and made a number of recommendations. He recommended that the Austrian recruiting expert, General Griffenclau, should meet with Malachowski and the royal equerry Zaslawski, to

lubentes annuimus, ut Generosus Samuel Laszcz Excubitor finium Regni Nostri Poloniae et Generosus Moczarski Tribunus militum, quantumvis illi iam assignatas habebant turmas et cohortes pro expeditione Nostra Pruthenica."

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Conv. 1635 Maii, fol. 91-91v, 121-123.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, fol. 115-116. "...retulit Dominus Moczarski excusare, se non posse servire Imperatori cum implicatus sit Bello Pruthenico, Laszcz etiam se excusat per litteras quod sit 'Lands-bostalter,' sic nihil erit ex istis duobus..."

²⁰ *Ibid.*, Conv. 1635 Julii, fol. 33-33v.

²¹ *Ibid.*, Karton 54, Conv. 1624, fol. 1-6v; See Appendix, doc. I.

²² *Ibid.*, Karton 57, Conv. 1635 Junii, fol. 19-22.

²³ *Ibid.*, fol. 27-27v.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, Karton 58, Conv. 1635 Julii, fol. 66.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, Karton 57, Conv. 1635 Junii, fol. 35-36v.

decide when and how many Cossacks could be recruited. He suggested that they should approve the pay and other Cossack demands and send out to all volunteers royal letters of approval. Furthermore, it was to be understood that the Cossacks would be fighting for their King and fatherland, and that the King ought to appoint the main leader of the expedition who would be approved by the Emperor, and who would command in accordance with the Polish military customs. Captain Sieracky, the temporary commander at the mustering camp and other captains of separate detachments were to recognize the sovereignty of the commander-in-chief. Finally, it was suggested that the Palatine of Ruthenia, or his son, help in gathering the 8,000 Cossacks for the Emperor.²⁶

The King responded in an affirmative note to Arnoldini (July 5, 1635) and advised him to have the money ready for the troops, since no Cossacks would assemble without it.²⁷ Meanwhile, the Viennese government kept prodding, since the French had renewed their attack in mid-June against the Cardinal-Infante in Belgium, and the Cossack reinforcements were urgently needed.

In mid-July Arnoldini wrote a long report to the Emperor in which he advised him that the first 2,000 Cossacks had left Poland and others, up to 8,000, would follow. The recruitments were centered around Lublin and the "Ruthenian" Lviv, where the adjutant of Lubomirski, Dworzianski, was accepting Cossacks from Ukraine. He related that he was unable to make regular payments, but he granted an advance against their wages, so that Cossacks arriving from great distances could reach the Silesian mustering camp with ease.²⁸

²⁶ *Ibid.*, "...sed nunc tantum petivimus, ut autoritate sua, qua prae ceteris in Regno Palatinatus pollet, adiuvet, ut desiderata 8000 Cosaggorum conscribi et e Regno ad sua quartiria iuxta constitutionis praescriptum educi queant."

²⁷ *Ibid.*, Karton 58, Conv. 1635 Julii, fol. 5; See also in: *Listy Wladislawa IV*, Krakow, 1845, p. 129. "Accepimus litteras a Duce Wisniewiecki, quibus nobis perscribit se iussu Nostro promptum esse ad colligenda aliquot millia militum, et e Regno Nostro in usum et obsequium Serenissimi Imperatoris educenda, cumque complurae centenna stipendiis Caesareis addixisse et brevi maiorum numerum collecturum, expeditionemque hanc e re et commodo publico maturaturam. Veretur tamen ne defectus pecuniae impedimento illi sit..."

²⁸ Haus-Hof-Staats Archiv, Polen I, Karton 58, Conv. 1635 Julii, fol. 63-70v. This letter was written in German and some places are very confusing, because Arnoldini's German was far from perfect. Nevertheless, he discusses in this letter all the problems of Cossack recruitment.

Arnoldini also wrote to Lubomirski asking him to advise Captain Sieracki at Lublin to keep the troops in order and to send 2,000 Cossacks to Bytum in Silesia where their quarters and training awaited them. He also requested that he ascertain that the Cossacks would not demand an increase in pay and would not rebel until their commanding general arrived at the mustering camp.²⁹

The Cossacks, however, were not used to inactive waiting in the launching camps and neither Sieracki's disciplinary actions nor Lubomirski's letter had the desired effect. On August 6, Arnoldini addressed them in a stern letter, warning that they would be punished if they did not desist from their illegal attacks on the countryside.³⁰ This letter would have been fruitless if it was not for the intervention of one of their officers, Captain Paul Noskowsky, from Sambir (Sambor).

Beginning in June separate Cossack squadrons began crossing from Lublin and Lviv to the Silesian camp at Bytum. These were detachments of Wegel and Noskowsky which included many Zaporozhians and other veterans.³¹ The initial crossings were the best propaganda for the intensification of recruitment. The interested Polish officers saw that the expedition had become a reality and that nobody wanted to be excluded. Therefore, each officer recruited several hundred Cossacks, and reported to the treasurer for the Austrian embassy, Matthew Sturani, for an advance payment on their wages and travelled with their detachments to Silesia.³²

The first gathering place in Silesia was Bytum. It served as a transit point from which large groups of Cossacks left for Briga, where permanent quarters and training facilities were prepared for them.³³ The first group of 1,500 reached Briga by the end of August and the Emperor appointed John Kilman as the Chief Commissioner in charge of the training camp at Briga.³⁴ Kilman had served as commissioner

²⁹ *Ibid.*, fol. 221-222v.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, Conv. 1635 Augusti, fol. 31-32v.

³¹ *Ibid.*, fol. 27-27v. "Dominus Starosta Noskowski iam collectos misit cosacos Bituminum, et plures sequentur, erunt uti sperat Dominus Malakoski ad 1500, certitudinem vero intra triduum nescimus..."

³² *Ibid.*, fol. 94-94v, 107-107v.

³³ *Ibid.*, Conv. 1635 Septembris, fol. 7-10v. "respondi ad suas exoptatissimas litteras locum pro futuro Armilustrio nominatum hanc civitatem Brigentem ... quartiria mutanda locandaque ad vicina huic civitati loca, pecuniam pro solvendo trimestri stipendio paratam hic conservari..." (From Arnoldini's letter to Noskowsky).

³⁴ *Ibid.*, Conv. 1635 Augusti, fol. 117.

in 1633 when he was attached to Colonel Virutsky. Upon arrival at Briga, each Cossack received three months pay.³⁵

All the problems were being resolved. Only the appointment of the chief commander of this expedition remained. Lashch, who originally rejected the appointment, now wished to assume command.³⁶ He was backed by Bishop Suffragan of Breslau,³⁷ but King Wladislaw did not concur in the light of Lashch's initial refusal. Indeed, he had his eye on another candidate, the captain of Sambir, Paul Noskowsky. Noskowsky was very active in the recruitment, organization and transportation of Cossacks for this expedition. He protested to Arnoldini about the poor state of quarters and non-payment of the promised monies and appeared to be generally concerned about the welfare of his men.³⁸ In this way Noskowsky had made himself known to Arnoldini, General Griffenclau, Kilman, and other Imperial agents in Poland and Silesia.

Arnoldini acknowledged Noskowsky's complaints in a letter of September 2, 1635, and appointed him commander of the 2,000 Cossacks who went to Silesia.³⁹ There they received their three months pay. In a letter two days later, Arnoldini announced the commencement of training in Briga. He asked all squadron commanders to meet to work out a final draft of their contract with the Austrian representatives.⁴⁰ Nobody was surprised, therefore, when Noskowsky disclosed on September 14, 1635, that he had been appointed commander-in-chief of the expedition.⁴²

Nine days later the service contract between the Hapsburg representatives and the Cossack officers was signed. Arnoldini and Colonel Vinz signed for the Emperor and Noskowsky for the Cossack expeditionary corps.⁴³ The agreement reached was as follows:

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*, fol. 170-170v. "... il Signore Lascz vuolentieri anderà al questo servitio di sua Cesarea Maestà, et si accorderà in tutti quelli punti ..."

³⁷ *Ibid.*, Conv. 1635 Septembris, fol. 1-1v. "Dominus Lasch mire laudatur, si convenire cum ipso potuisset, non fuisset malum ..."

³⁸ *Ibid.*, Conv. 1635 Augusti, fol. 164-167v.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, Conv. 1635 Septembris, fol. 7-8v.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, fol. 9-10v.

⁴¹ Szelagowski, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

⁴² Haus-Hof-Staats Archiv, Polen I, Karton 58, Conv. 1635 Septembris, fol. 62-62v.; See Appendix, doc. XI.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, fol. 127-131; See Appendix, doc. XII.

1) Noskowsky was appointed commander-in-chief of the expedition and approved by the King of Poland and the Emperor;

2) the Commissioners approved a high remuneration to Noskowsky for his activities and endeavours;

3) the following monthly pay scale was approved by the Commissioners (in *reichsthalers*):

Colonel	200 RT.
Captain	100 RT.
Lieutenant	50 RT.
Flag bearer	30 RT.
Quartermaster	50 RT.
Each squadron	30 RT.
Each Cossack	6 RT.

4) payment would be made every three months; the first instalment would be at Briga, at the beginning of a training session;

5) everybody was to be satisfied with his pay; any increases would come from the Imperial Commander-in-chief, King Ferdinand of Hungary, with Imperial approval;

6) the soldiers would be governed according to their customs and privileges, which they enjoyed in the Polish state;

7) enemy prisoners would be kept for ransom with the exception of generals and other high ranking officers who would be surrendered to Imperial officers;

8) if anyone joined some other detachment (German, Hungarian, or Croat), he would be returned to his former unit;

9) the commissioners promised to give Cossacks precedence over other units and to provide good quarters during the crossing (into Germany);

10) the commander of the expedition was subordinated only to the Imperial commander-in-chief and his deputy.

11) the commissioners would provide Imperial decrees for all colonels and captains;

12) one month's notice was to be given before the termination of service or resignation from it. The commissioners would accompany the troops to the border and provide one month's pay;

13) if Poland should be threatened by war, this army could be recalled;

14) all quarters and provisions were guaranteed during the term of service;

15) one month's extra pay would be given to those who exhibited outstanding valor and for victorious combat; the wounded would be given extra assistance;

16) in the case of death of a commanding officer, the expedition would elect a new commander, subject to royal and imperial approval;

17) cancelled;

18) all troops coming from Poland would obey their chief commander, subject to the Imperial commander-in-chief's wishes;

19) all dragoons who serve as their commander's guard or as military police were subject to the Imperial commander-in-chief;

20) the commissioners were to assure the colonels, officers, and the men that these points would remain unchanged;

21) on the other hand, the commanding officer would always lead his troops in the Imperial service and would keep his men in order and good discipline to avoid damage and destruction in Imperial provinces. All soldiers were to conduct themselves as noble and proper persons, based on the Polish constitution.

Two copies of this document were signed and sealed by both parties.⁴⁴ The contract was approved, with small changes, by the whole Cossack corps and training commenced on September 25.⁴⁵ The Cossacks were divided into twenty-seven squadrons under the following commanders: the Red and Black squadrons under Noskowsky personally, Zaremba, Czeglinsky, Wegel, Gotkowsky, Sieracky, Kempinsky, Makowiecky, Czarnecky, Sulinsky, Moshcherowsky, Strzatkowsky, Zakrzewsky, Jedlecky, Hryva, Dembinsky, Prakowsky, Khrystolinsky, Waskiewicz, Kuratkowsky, Wojnarowsky, Bilytsky, Rodacky, Feketi, Brogniewsky, and Zagorsky.⁴⁶ In early October, at Briga, the first official count showed 4,007 Cossacks,⁴⁷ but within three weeks, 2,000 more had joined.⁴⁸

The training period was scheduled to last one month, but was extended for ten days due to late arrivals. Simultaneously, preparations

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, fol. 140-143v.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, Karton 59, Conv. s.d., fol. 28-28v.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ Dzieduszycki, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 512-3.

began to transport the Cossacks to the main Imperial army. Ferdinand of Hungary, the commander-in-chief, proclaimed in September that the Cossacks would cross Bohemia and ordered a bridge erected at Mělník across the Elbe River.⁴⁹ A month later, Ferdinand wrote to the Bohemian Viceregency Council informing them that the Cossacks would cross Bohemia on their way to Germany and ordered them to provide: 1) provisions, 2) authorized personnel to accompany the Cossacks, and 3) one or two officers from the Prague garrison of General Marradas.⁵⁰

The original route which the Cossacks were to follow to the battlefields of Germany was the following: they were to cross Silesia and eastern Saxony to the town of Němetský Iablunov, enter Bohemia and the advance through Mělník and Cheb into Germany.⁵¹ In Germany, the planned route went through Eshenbach, Wilseck, Hersburg, Altdorf, Schwabach, Rothenberg, Jagsthausen, Mechemuhl, Mosbach, Erbach, Heidelberg, and Phillipsburg.⁵² This plan, however, was impossible to complete since the Elector of Saxony would not allow any Cossacks to cross his territory. Therefore, the Bohemian Council changed the proposed route somewhat; Cossacks were to march from Silesia to Bohemia near Trutnov, then to Mladá Boleslav, and then to Mělník and Cheb.⁵³ Count Zdeněk of Kolovrat was appointed chief commissioner for the Cossacks in Bohemia with others to help him: Andrew Leibhold, Jan Wildhart, Marco Ciochi, Jonas Paust, and a liaison officer from Marradas. They were to lead the Cossacks and to provide them with quarters and provisions during their stay in Bohemia.⁵⁴ Count Kolovrat accepted the post and left for Trutnov on October 18 to meet the advancing Cossack corps.⁵⁵

Cossacks left Briga at the end of September or beginning of October and reached the Bohemian border at Liegnitz. Their crossing through Silesia was described by a Silesian chronicler, Luke: "The cossacks did not burn any villages during their passage but trounced the peasants who assembled at Tsopelwitz and Neudorf, and killed a number of

⁴⁹ Liva V., *Prameny k Dějinám Třicetileté Války*, Praha: Naše Vojsko, 1952, vol. IV, p. 377.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 380; Koci, *Documenta Bohemica...*, vol. VI, p. 68.

⁵¹ Liva, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, p. 382.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 384.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 382.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 383.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 384.

them."⁵⁶ It seems that the Silesians did not allow the Cossacks to cross their province unpunished and they gathered in groups to defend their villages and possessions with mixed success. Silesians were accustomed to Cossack crossings and depredations and formed defensive leagues to prevent their maraudings.

The Bohemians, however, panicked at the news of another Cossack expedition passing through their province. They recalled the bloody excesses and pacifications of various Cossack groups after the Battle of White Mountain (1620) and in subsequent years. Nevertheless, this time the Cossack corps marched through with fewer incidents of plunder than in previous times.

Count Kolovrat took command over the Cossacks at Trutnov and began crossing Bohemia on October 20, 1635.⁵⁷ The Cossacks proceeded in an orderly fashion in regiments and squadrons rather than in groups, but their passage took several days and frightened the local populace.⁵⁸ There was less plundering as the logistics and the commissariat were better organized, and so the Cossacks were ready ahead of time.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, incidents occurred. Near the small town of Schönfeld, the Commissioners divided the available provisions among the officers, leaving the troops to find for themselves, and the hungry and angry soldiers plundered the townspeople of Schönfeld, Litrbach, and Horní Slavka.⁶⁰ Other minor incidents occurred elsewhere, but on the whole this passage was calmer than others. Often the excesses of the Cossacks or other troops were provoked by an incompetent or venal commissariat department which failed to provide adequate provisions and quarters for the soldiers and their mounts, and thus aroused their ire, which in turn found expression in violence against an innocent populace.

On the whole, Count Kolovrat was satisfied with Cossack progress. On October 28, he wrote from Mělník, where most of the corps was located, that the provisioning was adequate. He had some acid remarks about the conduct of the Cossacks who often demanded the impossible; one such demand was for fresh plums at the end of October.⁶² Never-

⁵⁶ *Dzieduszycki*, v. II, p. 513.

⁵⁷ *Liva*, v. IV, pp. 384-5.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 383-85.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 385.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 387.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 389.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 385.

theless, Kolovrat led the Cossacks out of Bohemia by November 19.⁶³ His letter of that date stated that his job was done, since the badly disciplined Cossacks were in Germany. He blamed their commander, Noskowsky, who left his troops, went to Prague and only rejoined them in Cheb.⁶⁴

Only 1,000 Cossacks remained behind in Silesia. These were almost all Zaporozhians who formed four squadrons under the command of Captain Jaroszewsky. They reached the Bohemian frontier on November 9.⁶⁵ Commissioner Vildhart led them through Bohemia in a disciplined fashion and they rejoined the main army at Cheb before January 10, 1636.⁶⁶

The Cossacks were to cross the Upper Palatinate before reaching Imperial possessions in Germany. Upper Palatinate belonged to the Elector of Bavaria, Maximilian, who would not allow Cossacks to cross his domains. He relented only under Ferdinand of Hungary's pressure, but demanded that the Cossacks cross his territory with no delays. Thus Ferdinand on October 15, ordered that Bavarian holdings were to be spared and Cossacks rushed through that province.⁶⁷ The German Commissioners, who took over the Cossack corps at Cheb, pushed them swiftly through the province and stopped only in Nürnberg for several days rest. This delay was a mistake. The army lost all semblance of discipline and in groups began robbing and terrorizing the town and surrounding countryside. The Commissioners were powerless to stop the excesses. Finally, a group attacked a convoy of 100 wagons carrying provisions and other supplies from Hertzburg to Nürnberg, unyoked the oxen and horses pulling the carts and led them away leaving the convoy stranded. When Noskowsky heard of this, he investigated the matter, found the culprits, hanged them, and returned the animals to their owners.⁶⁸ This punishment brought the army back to order and they continued their march without further incident. They left Nürnberg for Franconia and reached the Rhine at Worms.⁶⁹

At that time, the Imperialists controlled the upper portion of the Rhine, while Gallas occupied part of Lorraine. The French were in

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 389.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 387-88.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. V, p. 18.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, vol. IV, p. 384.

⁶⁸ *Dzieduszycki*, vol. II, p. 514.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 514.

a defensive posture, expecting a general attack from the Imperialists, which became a certainty with the arrival of the Cossack corps.⁷⁰ To protect themselves from this new danger, Cardinal Richelieu, the Chancellor of France, began a diplomatic offensive even before their arrival. He sent Count d'Avaux to Gdansk to persuade the Polish government to recall the Cossacks from the front. On Richelieu's instructions, Count d'Avaux sent a long letter to the Polish government, which was read at the Diet in Warsaw on December 2, 1634.⁷¹ The letter recalled that Poland had concluded a peace treaty with Sweden, with French mediation, and that the Poles should remember this service gratefully. However, the opposite occurred, since Polish mercenary troops were fighting the French and plundering French provinces. Therefore, d'Avaux demanded in the name of his King Louis XIII, that the Cossacks be recalled by the Polish government.⁷² The Diet was powerless to recall them since it was not the Polish army but legally recruited mercenaries who fought in the Imperial army and they could only be recalled when the country was threatened by foreign invasion.⁷³ Nevertheless, a strong pro-French and anti-Hapsburg sentiment sprang up among of the nobility at the Diet and the pressure for recalling the Cossacks increased.⁷⁴ Some of them, like Leszczyński, even sent envoys to the Cossacks who urged them to return home.⁷⁵

Meanwhile, at the front, bickering ensued between Bernard of Saxe-Weimar and Cardinal La Vallette over winter quarters. The former had to encamp his army on the northern borders of France between the rivers Moselle and Maas. Noskowsky was ordered by Gallas to reinforce Prince Francis of Lorraine. His Cossacks crossed the Lower Palatinate and the Rhine at Treves, entered Luxembourg, and joined Prince Francis at Andrech. Daily, Cossack squadrons attacked Bernard's troops in their winter quarters, regardless of snow or weather conditions. Under Thionville, a small battle took place. Bernard moved his headquarters first to D'Estaing and on January 10, 1636, to Fresne. The Cossack and Croat cavalry continued to harass him

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 516.


⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 516-7.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 517.

⁷³ Haus-Hof-Staats Archiv. Polen I, Karton 58, Conv. 1635, Septembris, fol. 127-131.

⁷⁴ Dzieduszycki, v. II, pp. 517-519.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 519.



Map II: THE COSSACK ROUTES 1635-36

and set up temporary quarters near Metz. Near Conflans, one Cossack detachment attacked a Swedish formation, forced them to flee and captured three flags and other booty. Under these incessant attacks and an advance by General Colloredo from the north, Bernard retreated to Verdun and Toul. Here he was reinforced by the garrison of Maintz and Count Louis of Soisson and assumed a better defensive posture.⁷⁶

A typical Cossack trick in the clashes with an enemy behind walls was to provoke them into leaving their fortress to fight in the open. At Pont-a-Mousson on the Moselle River, a small Cossack detachment advanced to the city gates. The garrison left the town walls and pursued them. At some distance from the town, another Cossack squadron sat in ambush. The French soldiers were surrounded, many were killed, and the rest were held for ransom.⁷⁷

During this campaign Noskowsky disciplined his troops with extremely harsh measures. Three Cossacks caught plundering a church were burned alive and a nobleman hanged for rapine.⁷⁸ Nevertheless, the troops were effective and the most active element on the northern French front during the month of January, 1636. At the end of January, the Cossacks were recalled to Luxembourg and their officers went to Brussels to receive their orders for a general offensive against the armies of La Vallette and Bernard of Saxe-Weimar.⁷⁹ Only a small detachment remained near the town of Esten.⁷⁹

The Cossack withdrawal was the occasion for Bernard to advance. On January 28, he moved his army northward and began harassing the retreating Imperial cavalry. Near Richecoeur, by Longeville, he defeated a Croat and a Hungarian regiment and advanced northward. La Vallette launched his army at the same time to relieve cities and towns besieged by Imperial troops. He relieved Epinal, defeated a 6,000 man cavalry corps of the Imperialists and reached Strasbourg and Hagenau.⁸⁰ He then joined the main French army under King Louis XIII and Bernard followed suit, leaving only small detachments to protect against the raiding Imperial cavalry.⁸¹ Meanwhile, in Luxem-

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 521-2; *Gazette de France*, 1636, nos. 7, 11, 21.

⁷⁷ Dzieduszycki, v. II, p. 522.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 522-523.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 523.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 523-524; *Gazette de France*, 1636, nos. 23, 37.

⁸¹ Dzieduszycki, v. II, p. 524.

bourg, the Imperial General Piccolomini was organizing a major expedition into France.

At that time, General Piccolomini was preparing a general offensive against France to be launched from Luxembourg by the spring of 1636. The successes of Bernard and La Vallette changed his mind. Also, Gallas withdrew his army to Kronweissenburg and Landau for winter quarters due to an epidemic and the general fatigue of his troops.

The plans were changed and a mobile cavalry corps was organized to raid northern France from Luxembourg. Prince Francis of Lorraine was appointed its commander and his force numbered 15,000 cavalry and 6,000 infantry. The main fighting units were Noskowsky's Cossacks and Isolani's Croats. In late February they crossed the Maas River near Verdun, entered the province of Champagne, and began terrorizing the whole area. Simultaneously, a Spanish force under Pedro de Villenor invaded Picardy. These were not conventional military movements, but rather punitive raids which destroyed communications and military storage magazines, terrified the civil population and disorganized French military operations. These raids were characterized by wholesale plunder, destruction, burning, and general mayhem. All the mercenary troops during the Thirty Years War were experts in the perpetration of such atrocities and the Cossacks were no exception. Contemporary sources show that Imperial troops burned and devastated over sixteen villages and several towns, defeated three sizeable French detachments and took much booty. Isolani's Croats and Noskowsky's Cossacks were the most active.⁸²

In March 1636, a division of light cavalry under the younger Colloredo was sent by Gallas to reinforce the raiding army of Prince Francis of Lorraine. On March 18, the French under General La Force met Colloredo and destroyed his command. Over 1,000 Cossacks were with Colloredo, but most of them escaped death or captivity.⁸³ Other Cossack detachments, some of which fought with General Werth from 1632-1633, were engaged for three months in the fruitless siege of Liege.⁸⁴

The raiding army of the Prince of Lorraine returned to Luxembourg for a period of rest. The Cossacks, however, accustomed to winter fighting, continued to raid on their own, in small detachments. This private war enriched many of them so that they refused to fight

⁸² *Ibid.*, pp. 524-525; Koci, *Documenta Bohemica...*, vol. VI, p. 99.

⁸³ Dzieduszycki, v. II, p. 525-526; *Gazette de France*, 1636, no. 45.

⁸⁴ Dzieduszycki, v. II, p. 526-527.

in April and some were agitating to return home. Also, their pay was in arrears. Cardinal Infante, to quiet their demands, sent them to Lesser Brabant. The province paid 60,000 francs in ransom to the Cossacks to desist from plunder and destruction. The Cossacks remained in Brabant throughout April and most of May before returning to Luxembourg.⁸⁵ During their return march, the Cossacks were attacked by French cavalry under Count Soissons, and at Ivoi, on May 31, a battle ensued. A French victory seemed inevitable, but the Cossacks managed to hold them off.⁸⁶ However, the Cossacks lost a part of their booty and several hundred horses. Captain Tarasko's company suffered the most.⁸⁷ The Cossacks were enraged at this but Soissons's cavalry effectively blocked the Cossack assault and the latter returned to Luxembourg.⁸⁸

The Imperial army was at a standstill in June of 1636. The French regrouped their forces and began a general offensive. La Vallette left Epinal and on June 12, freed Hagenau, while Bernard of Saxe-Weimar advanced to the Saar River, occupying Saarbrücken and Pfalzburg. The Imperial army under Gallas began retreating and used the Cossack and Croat light cavalry as a screen. Under General Mercy, the light cavalry re-crossed the Moselle, arrived at Landau, and attacked the divisions of Bernard on the 19th and 23rd of June.⁸⁹ Their assaults held Weimar and allowed Gallas to organize an efficient defense against the French advance.

In early July new problems arose. The Cossacks rebelled and would not fight. Their refusal was attributed to: *a*) the recent defeats of the Imperial army, *b*) the instigation of the pro-French agents to stop fighting, and *c*) the failure to receive their pay. The last reason was most important. Cossacks had been without regular pay for over six months. The first three-month installment they had received at Briga was their only payment.⁹⁰ While other troops were resting and getting regular pay, the Cossacks received nothing. The question was: who was to pay them during the campaign? They were recruited by the Emperor and his son, Ferdinand of Hungary, on condition

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 528-529.

⁸⁶ Dzieduszycki, v. II, pp. 530-531.

⁸⁷ *Gazette de France*, 1636, no. 81, 86.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*; Dzieduszycki, v. II, pp. 536-538.

⁸⁹ Dzieduszycki, v. II, pp. 540-541; *Gazette de France*, 1636, nos. 88, 101.

⁹⁰ Dzieduszycki, v. II, p. 543; Koci, *op. cit.*, v. VI, p. 105.

that the Spanish commander, Cardinal Infante, would place them on his payroll while they were on the battlefield. The Spaniard did not have enough money to cover his expenses and shrugged off the burden of paying the Cossacks.

Thus, the Cossacks had not been paid for six months. Their situation became desperate and only the payment of their arrears would satisfy them. They distrusted all promises and refused to obey their commissioners; even Imperial envoys who arrived in camp were reviled, since they brought no money. Finally, the Cossack general council decided to break their contract with the Emperor and return home. They abandoned the front and crossed the Rhine River between Worms and Pappenheim. They set up camps near Frankfurt and harrassed the populace in surrounding villages and towns, while awaiting their pay.⁹¹

Ferdinand of Hungary wrote a long and disagreeable letter to the Polish envoy at Vienna, George Ossolinski, declaring that the Cossacks had discredited the Polish military tradition since they had abandoned the front and requested that the Cossacks be sent back to the front.⁹² Ossolinski realized the danger to friendly relations between the Hapsburgs and Poland and immediately (July 7, 1636) wrote one letter to Noskowsky⁹³ and another to his "brother Cossacks,"⁹⁴ requesting that they return to the Imperial service and not disgrace their good name and the Polish state. He also assured the Crown Prince, Ferdinand, that he would do everything in his power to return the Cossacks to service.⁹⁵ However, he explained that the Cossacks were not Polish soldiers and did not represent the Polish military tradition.⁹⁶

Ossolinski's letters had their effect on the Cossacks and they agreed to negotiate new terms. With General Mercy arrived with their long-awaited pay, and most of the Cossacks renewed their contract. The new terms were ratified on July 21, 1636. Noskowsky and 3,000 Cossacks returned to serve the Emperor but with the reservation that they would not have to fight in Luxembourg but would be attached to the

⁹¹ Liva, v. V, pp. 53-55; *Dzieduszycki*, v. II, pp. 543-545.

⁹² *Dzieduszycki*, v. II, pp. 546-548.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 549-552.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 552-554.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 548-549.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 554-555; see also a letter of Wladyslaw IV addressed to them dated September 15, 1636. *Listy Wladyslawa IV*, pp. 220-221.

army of General Goetz under Gallas's over-all command.⁹⁷ The remaining 1,400 Cossacks, mostly wounded and sickly, were allowed to return home.⁹⁸ They returned home via the same route they came into the Empire through Nürnberg, Upper Palatinate, and Bohemia and plundered everywhere.¹⁰⁰ After a longer stay in the Loketsko Country in Bohemia, they left the province by September 18, 1636.¹⁰¹

During the early summer months, while Noskowsky's Cossacks were rebelling and negotiating, other Cossack detachments were fighting in France. These were units which had served under General Werth since 1633. Maximilian proposed an Imperial offensive against Paris to force the French to abandon the war. This daring plan captivated the Cardinal Infante who borrowed Maximilian's cavalry under Werth and invaded Picardy. Gallas occupied Franch-Comté and advanced into Burgundy in a diversionary manoeuvre.¹⁰²

Werth's command included 2,000 Cossacks and Croats of Isolani, which gave the whole cavalry corps unusual mobility and manoeuvrability in military operations. Werth and the Cardinal occupied the territory between the Somme and the Oise Rivers and captured the fortress Courbi, near Amiens, by August 14. The Cardinal remained to strengthen his holding but Werth moved further, occupying Rua, Modidier, and advancing to Compiègne.¹⁰³ The Cossacks and Croats played a decisive role in their raiding expedition, since their mobility proved to be a scourge to the French.¹⁰⁴ The offensive was abruptly terminated. Bernard of Weimar stopped Gallas in Burgundy. Werth was recalled by Maximilian of Bavaria to meet the advancing Swedes under Baner from the north and William of Hesse from the west.¹⁰⁵ Cardinal Infante was unable to attack Paris by himself and the Hapsburg armies retreated from France.

Meanwhile, Noskowsky's squadrons joined General Goetz in Hesse, after their contract. In late July, they defeated the enemy under

⁹⁷ Liva, v. V, pp. 60-61, 65-66; Dzieduszycki, v. II, pp. 556-557; Koci, *op. cit.*, v. VI, p. 115.

⁹⁸ Dzieduszycki, v. II, p. 557.

⁹⁹ Liva, v. V, pp. 61-71.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 68-69, 71.

¹⁰² Wedgwood, pp. 393-394.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 394.

¹⁰⁴ Dzieduszycki, v. II, pp. 560-567.

¹⁰⁵ Wedgwood, p. 394.

General Peter Melander and occupied Warburg and Padeborn.¹⁰⁶ They were recalled in mid-September to clear the banks of the Lippe River.¹⁰⁷ Melander gathered 5,000 troops and embarked on a siege of Arnsberg on the Ruhr River. He had planned to unite with Baner and the army of Lower Hesse and open a new front in Germany. But this plan was aborted by the presence of General Goetz who occupied the vicinity of Soest. The Hessian cavalry began harrasing Goetz's forces and attacked the Cossacks. The Cossacks led the Hessians into an ambush, destroyed them and captured their colonel, Oppten with his officers and baggage trains.¹⁰⁸ This battle decided the campaign. The Hessians retreated and Goetz occupied Soest in July 27, and then Dortmund, Veil and Hamm.¹⁰⁹ Contemporary sources attribute this victory to the Cossacks and Goetz sent them a special citation for their valiant efforts.¹¹⁰

After this victory the Cossacks definitely abandoned their service with the Emperor. The lack of payments and letters of pro-French agitators, like the nobleman Leszczynski, led the Cossacks to ask for a termination. They sent their messengers to Ossolinski and Ferdinand of Hungary and began their return journey.¹¹¹ Ferdinand received the Cossack envoys favourably and promised that their arrears in pay would be settled before they left the Empire.¹¹²

Their return was leisurely. Each squadron went separately; some reached Bohemia at the end of August, while others did not leave Bohemia until November.¹¹³ Not all of them went through Bohemia, since some crossed through Lusatia or Saxony,¹¹⁴ but they all met near the city of Greifenberg in Silesia, where they encamped awaiting the last installments of their pay. The money did not arrive and the Cossacks rebelled anew, plundering and destroying the countryside. Anarchy reigned until the Moravian and Silesian provinces sent their levies under General Mansfeld, whose army destroyed the ill-prepared

¹⁰⁶ Dzieduszycki, v. II, p. 568.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 569.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 569-570.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 571.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 570.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 571-572.

¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹³ Liva, v. V, pp. 74-77, 79.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 76-77.

Cossacks, killing several hundred of them and expelling the rest from the Empire.¹¹⁵ Thus ended the last major Cossack expedition in the Imperial service during the Thirty Years War.

That year the Cossacks serving in Werth's cavalry declared that they did not wish to return to Poland and were accepted into the regular Imperial army.

¹¹⁵ Dzieduszycki, v. II, pp. 573-579.

CHAPTER III

COSSACKS IN THE FRENCH SERVICE

As we have indicated in Volume I of this study, Ukrainian historians have shown little interest in Cossack mercenaries on Imperial service. On the other hand, they have overemphasized the Cossack expedition to France in 1646 and relied more on legend than fact to represent this event. Actually, the legend was generated in the book *Histoire de la guerre des Cosaques contre la Pologne* (1663) by Pierre Chevalier, the councillor of the French king, Louis XIII. There he states that the Cossack expedition to France was commanded by Bohdan Khmelnytsky, who later established the independent Cossack state.¹ By his statement Chevalier elevated this campaign to an extraordinary event. In turn, A. Polovtsov,² I. Borshchak,³ and I. Krypiakevych,⁴ expanded upon Chevalier's comments, perpetuating the mythological proportions of the expedition. Recently, however, a distinguished Polish historian, Zbigniew Wojcik,⁵ has attempted to separate historical fact from legend and has proved that Bohdan Khmelnytsky was not in France and that his Cossack expedition was in reality just another mercenary campaign.

Another question to be considered is why the Cossacks in the latter years of the Thirty Years War abandoned service in the Imperial ranks and accepted service with the French king. The answer to this question will be found in analyzing the shift in the political alliance of the Polish state upon which the Cossacks in some measure depended.

¹ Chevalier P.P., *Histoire de la guerre des Cosaques contre la Pologne*, Paris, 1663.

² Polovtsov A., "O Malorossiiskikh Kozakakh na Frantsuzkoi Sluzhbe v 1646 g.", *Trudy XI Arkheologicheskogo S'ezda v Kieve*, 1889, Pt. II, Moscow, 1902.

³ Borshchak I., "Frantsia i Ukraina. Kozaky Khmelnytskoho pid Dunkerkhom (1645)," *Ukrainska Trybuna*, Warszawa, 1922, no. 5 (203).

⁴ Krypiakevych I., *Bohdan Khmelnytskyi*, Kyiv: AN URSS, 1954, pp. 75-76.

⁵ Wojcik Z., "Czy Kozacy Zaporoscy byli na sluzbie Mazarina," *Przeglad Historyczny*, vol. LXIV, no. 3, 1(973), pp. 575-585.

In the same way France, having recognized the great potential of the Cossacks, was more and more intent on hiring them.

The French government became interested in engaging mercenary Cossacks in the Thirty Years War when French troops encountered them on the battlefields of Germany. Occasional confrontations occurred in 1622 and 1623 when Cossacks raided the eastern part of Alsace and Luxembourg.⁶ French diplomats heard of Imperial plans to send Cossacks to ravage eastern and northern France in 1626 and 1627.⁷ This information was supplied by friendly Bavarian officials in Maximilian's court. The Austrophile feeling of King Sigismund III and the higher clergy and officials prevented the French from establishing a stronger pro-French policy in the Polish Commonwealth.

The pro-Hapsburg policy changed with the accession of King Wladyslaw IV in 1632. Wladyslaw was incensed with the Hapsburg Emperor, Ferdinand II, who had dragged his feet on the return of several Silesian duchies that were to revert to Poland.⁸ The King was also offended that he had not been appointed admiral of the Baltic fleet in 1628. This had been promised to him by Baron d'Auchy, the Spanish envoy and tacitly agreed upon by the Emperor.⁹ The subsequent appointment of Wallenstein, as Admiral of the Baltic to the exclusion of Wladyslaw, was considered by the latter as a breach of promise and a personal insult.¹⁰ Nevertheless, Wladyslaw maintained friendly relations with the Hapsburgs and allowed Cossack expeditions to be organized and enter the Imperial service in 1632 and 1635.

French diplomacy became very active in 1635, when the Cossack corps under Noskowski joined the Cardinal Infante's army and fought against the French in Luxembourg, Belgium, and northern France. Cardinal Richelieu sent a special envoy, Count d'Avaux, to Poland in December 1635, to obtain the recall of the Cossack expeditionary corps.¹¹ As mentioned in the last chapter, d'Avaux's instructions included a formal protest against the presence of Cossacks in the war and the demand for their recall. Furthermore, he was to influence the anti-

⁶ See: vol. I, pp. 72-75.

⁷ Welykyi, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, pp. 175-176.

⁸ Czaplinski W., "Polska a Śląsk w pierwszych latach wojny trzydziestoletniej (1618-20)," *Sobotka*, v. II (1947), pp. 141-181.

⁹ Szelagowski A., *Rozhled Rzechy i Polske za panowania Wladyslawa IV*, Krakow: Akad. Umiejtnosci, 1907, p. 21.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 164.

Hapsburg Diet to change its foreign policy, abandon the Hapsburgs, and engage actively on the French side.

Following his arrival in Warsaw in December 1635, Claude de Mesmes, Comte d'Avaux (later French Ambassador at the Treaty of Westphalia) began his difficult assignment. He delivered his protestations, to which the King replied that the Cossacks were not part of the Polish army, but free men fighting as mercenaries in the Imperial army and that he was powerless to recall them.¹² The Frenchman countered with a proposal to send an expeditionary corps of 10,000 cavalry and 10,000 infantry to occupy Silesia, which he recalled, was promised to Poland in 1619, as a reward for sending Cossacks against Bethlen Gabor and the Bohemian rebels. France was willing to finance this expedition for the benefit of Poland to the sum of one to three million livres.¹³

D'Avaux's proposal, which was circulated among the Polish nobility, found eager supporters with some of the lesser nobility who had always been opposed to the Hapsburg alliance. A French party existed among them throughout the entire conflict and pamphleteers like Rafael Leszynski pointed out the dangerous entanglements of the Hapsburg alliance.¹⁴ This vociferous minority opposed the granting of recruiting rights to Imperial officers and generally made things difficult for the royal court at the Diet. D'Avaux met with Leszynski and others of the French party to assure Richelieu and Louis XIII that the Poles were not anti-French but that the King's Austrian policy was inherited from his father.¹⁵ Some nobles sent inflammatory letters to Noskowsky and other officers of the Cossack expeditionary corps urged them to abandon the Emperor's service and return home. These epistles had some effect in the Cossack revolt and abandonment of the front in Germany in June, 1636.¹⁶ The French envoy also asked the king to recall his brother, John Casimir, who was enjoying a semi-official stay in Vienna and whose intense pro-Hapsburg sentiments were recorded by French spies at the Hapsburg court.¹⁷ Again, the

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 186; See: Chapter II.

¹³ Szlagowski, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

¹⁴ Kwiatkowski K., *Dzieje Naroda Polskiego za Panowania Wladyslawa IV*, Warszawa: Goluchberg, 1877, p.

¹⁵ Szlagowski, *op. cit.*, p. 187. Quotation from d'Avaux' letter of 17.1.1636.

¹⁶ See: Chapter II; Cf. Kwiatkowski, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

¹⁷ Szlagowski, p. 186-7.

King replied that his brother's stay was a private matter and not an official visit.

The Viennese court regarded these French overtures with a great deal of suspicion and took vigorous countermeasures. The Emperor's ambassador, Count Arnoldini, was directed to neutralize the French envoy's activities and retain the good will of the King. Furthermore, the King's envoy, Waleryan Magni, was treated with all respect and Hapsburg help was promised in obtaining a Cardinal's hat for John Casimir in Rome. It was also pointed out that the French were allied with Sweden, Poland's great enemy, and that continued good relations between Poland and the Hapsburgs were essential for both parties.¹⁸ The results were discouraging for the French and d'Avaux left Poland with the promise that an envoy would be sent to France to discuss all outstanding differences.

Wladyslaw sent an envoy, Zawadski, to Paris in 1636¹⁹ but continued to negotiate for a Hapsburg marital alliance which was arranged and consummated in September, 1638. Wladyslaw married the Emperor Ferdinand III's sister, Cecelia Renata and until her death in 1644, the Polish-Hapsburg alliance continued in a passive rather than an active form. The King was dissatisfied with the slow payment of the dowry, and the non-transfer of the duchies of Opole (Troppau) and Ratibor which had been part of the marriage agreement, and other differences in financial and foreign policy. Nevertheless, political good sense dictated the continuation of the unpopular Hapsburg alliance.

The first attempt to detach Wladyslaw IV from the Empire failed. Nevertheless, Richelieu persisted and sent Baron de Rorte next year with a new proposal to Poland. Arriving at Warsaw, Rorte presented special "Royal articles of capitulation" to secure 4,000 Cossack cavalry for French service. The French offered mercenaries pay, free lodgings, provisions and naval transports to France and back. The monetary remuneration was very tempting: 15 golden florins per month plus an advance of 18 to 20 florins to volunteers that gathered at the mustering place, where they would be paid for the first three months. The Cossacks were to retain their customary military law, maintain discipline, and desist from arson, pillage and from the harrassing of friendly populations. The French government would provide commissioners to

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 216.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 217.

guide them to their destination. Rorte stressed that by allowing Cossacks to be recruited for French service, friendly bonds would be forged.²⁰

Why did the French make such a generous proposal to obtain Cossack aid? The answer lies in the campaign of 1636. The French had learned then that they needed light cavalry to defend themselves from the incursions of Cossack and Croat squadrons which overran and pillaged northern France. That year the French army began experimenting with light cavalry formations²¹ and they soon realized that they needed trained professional light cavalymen to show them elements of battle tactics and manoeuvres. It was this necessity which prompted their generous offer to the Cossacks. But even these terms were unable to sway the Polish king to grant France permission to recruit Cossacks since the time was not ripe.

While the French were manoeuvring to secure Polish or Cossack troops for their army, the Spaniards likewise became interested in obtaining Cossacks for their service.²²

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* * *

The reputation of Cossacks as reliable mercenary troops able to cope with any situation spread. In 1640 the Spanish minister, Olivarez considered employing them in subduing the Catalan Uprising; the Catalans revolted against the growing centralization of the Madrid government, greater taxes and the continuing disregard of their autonomy.²³ The Catalan leaders requested French aid and Richelieu sent a French army into Roussillon and Catalonia to contend with a substantial number of Spanish troops in the Iberian Peninsula.

The Spanish needed to reinforce their armies in Catalonia to subdue the revolt but they were unable to raise another army and their thoughts

²⁰ Vincennes (France), Archives du Service Historique de Armee, 1636, Cote A' 32, fol. 235/3. See: Appendix, Doc. XIII.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 1636, Cote A' 32, fol. 125, 209, 266.

²² The Spanish Hapsburgs were financing Cossacks who served the Emperor during the early years of the war. See: Meysztoicz V., *Elementa ad Fontium Editiones*, Roma: Inst. Hist. Pol., 1970, vol. XXI, p. 72-75.

²³ Elliott J.H., *Imperial Spain 1469-1716*, New York: Martin's Press, 1964, pp. 339-346. For a detailed discussion of the Catalan Revolt, see: Elliott J.H., *Revolt of the Catalans, a study in the decline of Spain, 1598-1640*, Cambridge: Camb. Univ. Press, 1963.

turned to the recruitment of Cossacks. The Viceroy of Naples wrote Olivarez (letters of 7 and 9, September 1641) to consider the Cossacks; "their method of campaigns is irregular, they leave no fortified camps, do not construct bridges for fording rivers nor do they act as other armies do." He proposed to have the Cossacks go through southern France devastating Languedoc in the process. This would oblige the French to leave Catalonia and Roussillon and return to France to protect their provinces from the Cossacks. Then the Catalans, deprived of French support, would surrender and beg for clemency.²⁴

This project of employing Cossacks was of great interest also to Cardinal Infante, commanding Spanish troops in Flanders. He had experience with the Cossacks in previous years (1636-1637), when they fought under his command. In his letter to the Viceroy of Milan²⁵ he wrote: "If the arrival of these people were certain and their employment were assured, it would be most unfortunate for France." He suggested that the Austrian Hapsburg Court be contacted and permission secured for the passage of Cossacks through their lands. The force he envisioned should be composed of 3,000 regular lancers and 6,000 Cossacks (Cossacos). They should be commissioned for the duration of the campaign which he felt would last five months and he agreed to pay their wages and to supply them with provisions for that time. He particularly stressed the importance of keeping them paid regularly since they would turn against their employers otherwise, and stated that if punctual payments could be maintained, it would result in the most effective ruin for France.²⁶

It seems however, that nothing substantial came of this project. The Hapsburg influence at the Polish Court was waning and Olivarez himself was over-thrown in 1643. That year, the envoy of Emperor Ferdinand III, Count of Starenberg asked for 6,000 troops, but was curtly refused.²⁷ His successor, Czahi, presented a similar request the next year and was met with the same response.²⁸

²⁴ Meysztowicz, *op. cit.*, p. 72 (Concerning the letter of 9.11.1641).

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 73-75. (Letter of 26.9.1641).

²⁶ When he speaks about the revolt of the mercenaries because of irregular payments, he refers to his experience with the Cossacks in 1636, when they rebelled after not being paid for six months. See our previous chapter, p. 42.

²⁷ Kwiatkowski, *op. cit.*, p. 269.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 287.

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This Spanish interest made the French most anxious to hire some Cossack mercenaries for the war.

The Polish-Hapsburg alliance dissolved in 1644, after the death of Queen Cecilia Renata.²⁹ The last few years were strained due to the reluctance of Emperor Ferdinand III to turn over the dowry of his sister, which consisted of the three Silesian duchies of Opole, Těšín and Ratibor, to Wladyslaw of Poland. Wladyslaw resolved the matter by occupying them by force.³⁰

In the meantime, the skillful French ambassador, Nicolas de Flecelles, Comte de Bregy,³¹ continued to press King Wladyslaw to change his pro-Hapsburg policy. However, his continued promises of French money and aid achieved no tangible results. The turning point came with the marriage of King Wladyslaw to the French princess of Nevers, Maria de Gonzague, in 1645.

The French envoy was continually pressing for a commitment of troops, recruited in Poland, to fight on the French side. He found a powerful ally in Queen Maria. After the nuptials, the new "queen of Poland exerted her influence to supply a *corps d'elite* of her subjects, nearly three thousand strong."³² De Bregy, in the meantime, was negotiating for the recruitment of mercenaries with various Polish and Cossack leaders.^{32a} In his messages to Cardinal Mazarin, de Bregy pointed out that there was a possibility of taking the Zaporozhian Cossacks into French service. He characterized them as good horsemen, first rate cavalry and excellent for the protection of fortresses.³³

²⁹ Szelagowski, p. 219. (She died on March 21, 1644).

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 219-222.

³¹ Farge L., *Recueil des instructions données aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France*, Pologne, vol. I (1648-1729), Paris: Lib. Baillière, 1888, p. 9. Nicolas de Flecelles, Comte de Bregy served in his office from 1644 through 1649.

³² Godley E., *The Great Condé, Life of Louis II de Bourbon, Prince of Condé*, London: Murray, 1915, p. 169.

^{32a} His meticulous care and efforts are well documented by voluminous reports that he sent to France regarding the progress of his negotiations and are stored in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See: *Quai d'Orsay* (France), Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Correspondence Politique, Pologne, (Mémoires pour les affaires de Pologne, Vicomte de Sieur de Bregy, 1645), Pars VI (1645), fol. 72-79.

³³ Krypiakevych I., *Bohdan Khmelnytskyi*, Kyiv: AN URSR, 1954, pp. 75-76. This author chooses the dates 1644-45, which should be 1645-46.

Bregy's negotiations bore fruit when he met the Cossack leader Bohdan Khmelnytsky in September 1645, in Warsaw:

"These days there was in Warsaw an officer of the Cossack nation, Colonel Khmelnytsky, about whom I have written your Eminence before, I met him and had two discussions with him. He is an educated and intelligent person, well versed in the Latin tongue. Khmelnytsky is ready to aid me in securing Cossacks for our service, if the war with the Turks will not take place."³⁴

Securing his promise of help, Bregy continued negotiating with Khmelnytsky. Finally, an agreement was reached. Khmelnytsky was to recruit 1,800 Cossack infantry and 800 cavalry. Each man was to be paid 12 *reichsthallers* and their officers to receive 120 thallers.³⁵ In reading this document one may ask: Who was Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and why was it his decision to recruit Cossack mercenaries for France?

In the 1630's Bohdan Khmelnytsky was the General Chancellor of the Registered Cossack Army. He was released from this position due to the insurrections in 1638-39. Since that time he had tried to find a new appointment for himself. In his search, he often visited Warsaw where he became the official promotor of the Cossack cause. In this capacity Khmelnytsky was met by Bregy and was asked to recruit Cossack mercenaries for France.³⁶

The recruitment of mercenaries by French agents in Poland soon became known to the envoys of the Holy Roman Emperor. They protested vigorously about these unfriendly acts of King Wladyslaw. Emperor Ferdinand III sent Wladyslaw a sharp letter reminding him of the friendship between their dynasties and warning him that sending a trained force of soldiers from the Prussian ports to France would mean an end of amicable relations between the Empire and Poland, since the king willingly sends soldiers who will fight the Empire, despite assurances to the contrary.³⁷ The pro-Hapsburg faction in the Polish Court and among the nobility delayed the expedition and the king himself was hardly an enthusiast, since he was preparing an army

³⁴ *Ibid.*, Message of Bregy to Mazarin, dated September 21, 1645.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, Negotiations were concluded at Fontainbleu, April 19, 1645.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ Haus-Hof-Staats Archiv, Wien, Polonica, Karton 61, fol. 56-58v. Letter of the Austrian Ambassador, dated June 30, 1646; See: Appendix, doc. XIV.

for a new campaign against the Ottoman Porte. Nevertheless, Bregy persuaded the Polish government to let the expedition go. He recruited, organized and accompanied the troops to its embarkation point.^{37a}

The expedition assembled in Danzig, despite these problems, boarded Dutch ships and sailed for Flanders. On August 3, 1646, Cardinal Mazarin notified his army-commander Condé that reinforcements numbering 8,000 or 9,000 men and consisting of French, German, English, Polish and Scottish troops were being assembled and would be sent to him.³⁸ The Cossack contingent arrived at Calais by September 17, 1646, under its Colonels Ivan Sirko and Soltenko.³⁹ The force consisted of 2,000 to 2,500 men, in 10 companies.⁴⁰ They arrived just in time to participate in one of the major battles of the Thirty Years War.

In 1646 the French fought on several fronts against the Austrian and Spanish Hapsburgs. One French army was in control of Catalonia, another under Turenne fought on the Rhine. A third, army under the Duke of Orleans and the Duc d'Enghien, battled with Spaniards in the Spanish Netherlands.

In the spring of that year the Duc d'Enghien, the Great Condé, began a special campaign for the conquest of the Law Countries. He assembled a force of 25 battalions of infantry and 56 squadrons of cavalry before Courtrai. There he met the Imperial and Spanish forces under the over-all command of the Duke of Lorraine, with 24

^{37a} His great efforts are voluminously documented at the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the National Archives. See: Quai d'Orsay, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Correspondence Politique, Pologne, Pars VII (1646), fol. 12-377. Bibliothèque Nationale, MSS Nouvelles Acquisitions Français, (Ambassade du Vicomte de Bregy en Pologne - 1644-49), MS 21096, fol. 61-128, 630-653.

³⁸ *Lettres du Cardinal Mazarin*, vol. VII-XII (1644-1747), Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1879, p. 309.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, Mazarin's letter to Condé, dated 17.9.1646; The names of the Cossack colonels: Cfr. Krypiakievych, p. 77, and Polovtsov, p. 123 ... If these names are not invented (as Wojcik thinks, *op. cit.*, p. 583), the name Soltenko is probably a misspelling of Ivan Zolotarenko, the later brother-in-law of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, a brave warrior and an independent leader. In 1654-55 Zolotarenko commanded a Cossack expeditionary corps into Belorussia and established there a Cossack administrative unit that survived until 1659. Cfr. Hrushevskyi vol. IX, p. 929; G. Gajecy, *The Cossack Administration of the Hetmanate*, Cambridge: HURI, 1978, vol. II, p. 645-6.

⁴⁰ Krypiakievych, p. 77.

battalions of infantry and 56 cavalry squadrons.⁴¹ Condé took Courtrai, Mardick and Furnes and engaged in several smaller battles with the enemy. In these battles his army was reduced to 9,000 men and urgently needed new reinforcements. Cardinal Mazarin quickly sent him all the available troops, numbering 8,000 men, with the specific order to take Dunkirk.⁴²

The reinforcements arrived before Dunkirk separately: Marquis de Ferte-Senneterre brought 4,000 men, Duc de Chatillon, Marquis de Villequio, Vidame d'Amiens sent parts of their commands, and Baron de Sirot came with 2,000 newly arrived Cossacks (Poles).⁴³ At this time the appearance, mode of operation and military customs of the Cossacks were a source of comment and amusement to their allies:

"Sirot had charge of these valiant but half-savage warriors, whose barbarous habits caused no small amusement; they camped not in tents, but in holes, which they dug like rabbits in the sand."⁴⁴

The siege of Dunkirk lasted from September 19 until October 11, 1646, when its Spanish garrison, commanded by Guillaume de Lede surrendered to Condé. The Cossack force took part in the entire siege of Dunkirk,⁴⁵ in which their role was to secure the blockade of the city. The Cossack encampment was located on the northern flank of the besieging army, where they constructed dugouts in the sandy soil and extended their picket-line all the way to the channel. Their keen eyes occasionally sighted small relief boats laden with provisions and ammunition. Fierce fights took place in the rushes between Cossack pickets and small blockade runners.⁴⁶

On September 26 a general storming was ordered by Condé, who tried to force the surrender of the fortress. The Cossacks attacked the northwest wall and the gate leading to Artois Road. But their assault was just a diversion for the main attack which was directed at the southeast wall. A powder mine was exploded there and one of the bastions

⁴¹ D'Aumale D., *Histoire de Princes de Condé*, Paris: C. Levy, 1889, vol. 5, p. 72.


⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ Desormeaux M., *Histoire de Louis de Bourbon, Prince de Condé*, Paris: Chez Saillart, 1766, vol. III, pp. 352-3.

⁴⁴ Godley, *op. cit.*, p. 169; D'Aumale, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

⁴⁵ Sarrazin J.F., *Histoire du siege de Dunkerque*, in *Les Oeuvres du M. Sarrazin*, Paris: Chez A. Combe, 1656, p. 15; Cfr. *Relation de ce qui s'est passé en Flandre durant la campagne de l'Année 1646*, Paris: J. Camusat F P. Le Petit, 1647, p. 43-49.

⁴⁶ Aumale, p. 93.



Map III: DUNKIRK 1646

Descried. For content of the C.A.S. from the 18th century.

caved in. The Spaniards, however, were prepared and met the French advance resolutely and repelled the attack in the breach.⁴⁷

The attack was called off and preparations for a long siege began. The Cossacks were not very useful in siege operations and began complaining of forced inactivity. Sirot organized cavalry parties to scour the countryside for provisions. Inevitably the plundering began by starved troops and complaints were registered in Condé's headquarters against the Cossacks.⁴⁸ Several marauders were hung and discipline was restored. To be more useful, the Cossacks volunteered for convoy duties and several detachments were sent to neighboring towns to supplement their garrisons.⁴⁹

Whatever their role during the siege, at the fall of Durkirk, the Cossacks marched in the victory parade.⁵⁰

After the conclusion of the campaign in Flanders, the Cossacks were sent to Lorraine where their depredations were recorded with sorrow: "The Polish troops and those of other nationalities whom Mazarin brought to torment the good and faithful subjects of the King ... perpetrated cruelties without end ..." ⁵¹

In Lorraine the Cossack army underwent a new crisis. Part of the Cossack force became disenchanted with French service, since the articles of agreement were changed, and they went over to the Spaniards,⁵² for whom they were later active in the province of Catalonia. After that loyalty-crisis, the French military command cancelled the remaining privileges of the Cossacks and integrated them into their light cavalry. It is not known what became of the Cossacks remaining in the French service.⁵³

In evaluating this campaign we can see that for the French the Cossacks were not an exclusively military advantage. Rather, it was the sensational presence of the Cossacks which the French used for propaganda effect, demonstrating to the Europeans that "the fearful Cossacks" ⁵⁴ were their allies and not the Emperor's.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*; Sarrazin, p.

⁴⁸ Aumale, p. 93. "... These Poles more fighters than soldiers, intrepid cavaliers, unable to use pick or shovel ..."

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*; Sarrazin, p. 38, 81.

⁵⁰ Krypiakevych, p. 77.

⁵¹ Sarrazin, p. 81.

⁵² Krypiakevych, p. 77.

⁵³ We can see the general attitude of the French command toward the Cossacks in a letter, written in 1649 and published by Sarrazin, p. 81.

⁵⁴ *See*: vol. I, pp. 38-88.

CHAPTER IV
THE COSSACK IMPACT ON WESTERN EUROPEAN WARFARE

The arrival of Cossacks in western Europe in the seventeenth century produced a shock among the Europeans. Their exotic appearance, on small steppe horses, in colorful clothes and with unusual weapons and accoutrements must have amazed their allies and dismayed their enemies. The notoriety of their exploits and their reputation for ferocity preceded them and Cossacks were received with a mixture of awe and mistrust by their employers. The appearance of the Cossack mercenary is depicted in the famous portrait by Rembrandt called the "Polish Rider."¹

These differences deepen when the Cossack mode of fighting is compared with the prevalent customs in western Europe. Cossacks rode and fought on small, fast, steppe horses. They were unencumbered by large artillery and supply trains. During the campaigns they lived off the land, foraging for provisions and fodder as they moved. In friendly territory they relied on the provisions supplied by the commissariat of their allies and if these were insufficient, they helped themselves by plundering the countryside. Cossacks relied on speed and surprise as military tactics. They avoided well-fortified towns or castles, but brought panic and havoc to the enemy by lightning raids and full scale destruction of villages or campgrounds of enemy soldiers. In this they were well versed, fighting for more than a century with the Tatars on the steppes. To be successful, such warfare depended on the initiative of junior commanders and also on the shrewdness of individual Cossacks. Such qualities also discouraged strong discipline in the ranks, and Cossacks were often described as undisciplined and unruly troops.

But these criticisms were often levelled by commanders who had no idea of the Cossack military tactics and their effectiveness in war. For the Cossacks were not merely mercenaries banded together for occasional service under one sovereign or another. They were members

¹ Now on display at the Frick Gallery in New York City.

of a highly sophisticated military society which had evolved for over a century into a cohesive group, the kernel of which were the Zaporozhian Cossacks.² The Zaporozhians were professional warriors who spent their lives in constant running battles and skirmishes with the Tatar light horsemen on the uncharted steppes north of the Black Sea. The main ingredients of success in such fighting were speed and manoeuvrability of the mounts and the personal bravery and initiative of the horsemen. Not the calculated charge of massed cavalry squadrons but the feint, thrust and ambush usually brought victory in these steppe encounters.

However, the Cossacks of Ukraine were not instituted as a cavalry force, and one may justly ask when and how the Zaporozhian Cossacks became an army of "light cavalry."

As mentioned in the introduction to volume one, in the beginning the Zaporozhian Cossacks were not an aggressive force; therefore, they relied more on infantry formations and defensive tactics. Horses were primarily used for transport and supply. However, with the increase of the Cossack population and the intensification of their aggressive steppe activities they were compelled to form small detachments of cavalry which patrolled and scouted the steppe frontier and constantly skirmished with groups of nomadic Tatars. Later, the Zaporozhians specially trained their recruits in cavalry tactics along with infantry drill and thus had a large number of brave and skilled horsemen ready for dashing raids. A contemporary witness, Pietro della Valle, writes that the Zaporozhian Cossack had mastered all military skills, and the same Cossack could become a first-rate infantryman, horseman, cannoner and a sailor.³

At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Cossacks were forced by circumstances to depend more and more on cavalry formations. During the Muscovite Campaign, Cossacks had to cover and occupy an immense territory. For this occupation they needed special speed

² Evarnitskii D., *Istoria Zaporozhskikh Kozakov*, vol. I-III, St. Petersburg: Skorokhodov, 1892. This author in his volume one describes the customs, mores and tactics of the Zaporozhians.

³ Valle P., *Viaggi di Pietro della Valle il Pellegrino*, Venetia: P. Baglioni, 1661, (La Persia) vol. I, p. 310. "i quali sono non solo soldati, ma anco ciurma e marinari: non havendo huomo fra di loro, che non serve a molte cose."

Gamberini said the same thing in his description of the Cossacks: "They are agile on foot and on horseback..." See: Wynar, L.R., *Hapsburgs and Zaporozhian Cossacks*, Littleton: Ukr. Hist. Association, 1975, p. 117.

and mobility which could not be achieved without an active cavalry force. Also, in this war an independent Cossack cavalry, the "Lisovchyk detachment," was formed by the "Ruthenian" nobleman, Alexander Lisovsky. This detachment never belonged to the Zaporoshian Cossack society, but fighting on the same side, popularized the cavalry formations among all the Cossacks of Ukraine. Therefore, in 1619, when the Hapsburg Emperor needed light horsemen against the *hussars* of Bethlen Gabor, the recruited Cossack mercenaries became his new light cavalry.

What were the main tactics of this light cavalry? The Cossack cavalrymen were mounted troops that moved quickly and used no armour, not even helmets. Their arms consisted of a rifle or pistol, sabre, lance and a bow with arrows. Neither man nor horse was protected and they rode in a light saddle with stirrups.⁴ The small horses were trained to respond to sudden changes of position and movement, and were smaller in size than the western European horses and thus easier to manoeuvre. The celerity of these mounts was of central importance to the light cavalry tactics.⁵ If they acted as auxiliaries to their infantry force, then the Cossack horsemen attacked the enemy flanks to disturb their order and confuse their orientation. When the Cossacks themselves attacked they used the form of a long line, called "lava." They attacked at a gallop, engaged the enemy quickly and furiously and, if not decisively then the line turned, withdrew, reorganized and attacked again and again until victory or enemy withdrawal was assured. Against enemy cavalry, especially light cavalry,

⁴ Chandler D., *The Art of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough*, New York: Hippocrene, 1976, p. 37. In his opinion the light cavalry was brought into Europe by the Cossacks in the XVIIth century. He describes the original Cossack cavalry as follows: "Coming from a hardy, warlike and wiry race of skilled horsemen, the Cossacks under their Hetman or leader were well suited for reconnaissance, outpost and raiding work. On the other hand, their notorious indiscipline and treacherous tendencies largely precluded their suitability for inclusion in the formal line of battle. By the late seventeenth century their armament included sabres, lances, pistols and carbines, while their "uniform" comprises fur caps, voluminous cloth or animal-skin coats, baggy breeches and soft leather boots."

⁵ Barker T.M., *The Military Intellectual and Battle - Raimondo Montecucoli and the Thirty Years War*, Albany: N.Y. State Univ. Press, 1975, p. 98. In words of General Montecucoli: "the natural lightness and rapidity of the horses used by these nationalities, the character of their saddles, bridles and clothing are ideal features."

they used the ambush or the tactic of the "sack." Usually, part of the cavalry attacked, pretended to flee after a few minutes of combat, drew the enemy horsemen into an ambush where the rest of the Cossack force awaited them and easily annihilated them. As well as engaging in active battle, the task of the Cossack cavalry was to patrol and scout behind the enemy-lines, and above all constantly harass the enemy formations and their supply columns.⁶

Such were the warriors who came into western Europe to fight on the battlegrounds where massed infantry *tercios* and large bodies of armoured cavalry dominated the battlefield. Not only were the Cossacks able to fight such foes successfully, but indeed their presence profoundly affected the organization of arms in the following years. The Cossacks demonstrated successfully the need for a light cavalry arm in the European armies and as a result, in the latter part of the seventeenth century, light cavalry formations appeared in most European forces. Light cavalry tactics began to be studied and manuals written for the organization, training and deployment of light troops in the field.⁷

The reason for the absence of light cavalry lay in the tradition of western armies. Heavy cavalry, raised from landed nobility with full armor that won the battle by a heavy charge, was the backbone of the feudal army. Later, this method was modified and augmented by the introduction of artillery and infantry formations of pikemen and arquebusiers. These were the elements in all western European armies. Campaigns were launched against predetermined targets, usually important cities and a year's fighting would end with one army besieging a stronghold while another army would march to its relief. Battles were staged with elaborate ceremony and according to traditional patterns. The cavalry arm included heavy armoured cuirassiers and light armoured arquebusiers or carabineers. There was some experi-

⁶ Longworth Ph., *The Cossacks*, New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1970, p. 31-2; Evarnitskii, *ox. cit.*, v. I, p. 249-270, 439-463.

⁷ Denison G., *History of Cavalry*. London, 1913, p. 23-7; Wimmer J., *Wojsko Polskie w drugiej polowinie XVII st.* Warszawa: Min. Obrony, 1965, p. 11. This is an example how Polish historians falsely deny Cossack contribution to the western practices of war: "niektore przemiany w organizacji i taktyce armii zachodnich dokonane w toku wojny trzydziestoletniej powstaly pod wplywem uprzedniego zetkniecia sie tych armii z wojskiem polskim. Wzory polskie, przyjete w instytucjach wojskowych i sztuce wojennej panstw obcych, nieraz odleglych, stanowia wklad polski w rozwoj wojskowosci ogolnoeuropejskiej."

mentation with transporting infantry detachments on horseback to battle where they fought on foot (the dragoons),⁸ but there were no lancers. During battle the cavalry approached in squadron formation at a trot (*caracolles*), first ranks fired their pistols and retreated to reload while subsequent ranks fired and returned to the rear to reload. After all ranks discharged their weapons they rode in a wedge against the enemy and tried to crush it with the weight of their armed horses and bodies. Their mission was to disperse the enemy, but if the cavalry was stopped it was hacked to pieces.

Some innovations came in the first half of the seventeenth century and were introduced by the Dutch general, Maurice of Nassau, and the king of Sweden, Gustavus Adolphus. They reduced the number of soldiers in each squadron and battalion, integrated cavalry, infantry and artillery into independent brigades and introduced new tactics for their armies.⁹ Gustavus changed the cavalry tactics and made his horsemen charge the enemy with swords after unloading their pistols.

These, however, were not light cavalry tactics and none existed, for the western Europeans had engaged no Asiatic foes since the time of the Huns. Even the Mongol invasion, in the thirteenth century, concerned only the East Europeans since they had never penetrated as far as Germany. Therefore, the use of light cavalry was retained only by those societies who engaged the nomadic Tatars and the irregular Turkish horsemen in the Balkan peninsula and on the steppes of Eastern Europe.

On the Balkan peninsula, at the beginning of the sixteenth century a society of military settlers was formed (mostly from the Serbian refugees) who protected Croatia from marauding Turkish bands. Members of this society were called "Granichary" or commonly known as "Grentzers." They successfully adapted Turkish light cavalry tactics of speed and manoeuvrability, but unfortunately they never grew into a large army, and therefore could not be used in large military formations at the beginning of the Thirty Years War. Only the lack of Cossack detachments in the late 1620's, resulted in the Grentzer participation in the armies of the Empire. These Grentzers fought in larger numbers, mostly in General Ludovico Isolani's corps.¹⁰

⁸ Wijn J., "Military Forces and Warfare 1610-1645," *The New Cambridge Modern History*, Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1970, vol. 4, pp. 202-225. Montgomery B., *A History of Warfare*, Cleveland: World Publ., 1968, pp. 266-269.

⁹ Wijn, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

¹⁰ Bauer E., *Hrvati u Tridesetgodisnjim Ratu*, Zagreb: Matice Hrvatska, 1941, p. 107.

Another light cavalry group of this region were the Hungarian *Hussars*, formed in the sixteenth century against the Turkish invasion, who fought constantly on the unsettled frontiers of Hungary.¹¹ They also served in large numbers in the armies of the Transylvanian rulers and fought against the Hapsburgs in the forces of Bethlen Gabor. Bethlen's light cavalry was the scourge of Imperial generals for their columns penetrated deeply into Hapsburg territory in Bohemian lands and even approached Vienna. They brought ruin and destruction to the Imperial subjects and also by swift attacks destroyed small Austrian military formations.

By 1619 Bethlen's hussars had brought the Empire to a desperate situation. There was no army which could effectively stop them. The only valuable force in the service of the Empire was the enlisted Cossack host. Vienna turned to these newly recruited mercenaries to save the Empire and the Cossacks responded favourably. They successfully stopped the Transylvanian hussars and proved their worth to the Imperial War Ministry.¹² From then on, despite the problems of their plundering, the Hapsburg commanders insisted on having Cossack light cavalry formations in their commands.

Albert von Wallenstein was the first to integrate his Cossack detachments with other smaller cavalry units and placed Colonel Walter Butler in overall command of his light cavalry corps.¹³ This was the first official introduction of the light cavalry into western military strategy. In the words of F. Martinek, Wallenstein's success lay in his tactical reforms. One of the most important reforms, in Martinek's opinion, was the introduction of the light cavalry formation into his Imperial host:

“He utilized his military knowledge, which he had acquired in Hungary in his youth, by introducing light cavalry regiments of — so called — Croats and Poles into his army, who previously had been hired to fight only in minor wars against the Turks. He used them successfully in scouting activities and as messengers, but mainly in harrasing the enemy and his camps.

¹¹ *Révai Nagy Lexikona*, Budapest: Révai Irod. Intézet, 1914, vol. X, p. 411-2.

¹² Volume One, pp. 35-37, 50-54.

¹³ *Dzieduszycki, op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 569-570.

In battle he sent them to attack the weaker positions of the enemy to create havoc.”¹⁴

After Wallenstein's tactical reforms all the other Imperial commanders introduced some light cavalry formations into their armies. Finally, in the 1630's an independent light cavalry regiment "of Cossacks and Croats" was formed under General Isolani's command. This regiment actively participated in all major battles in the second half of the Thirty Years War.¹⁵ Although many different nationalities were hired as light cavalymen during the Thirty Years War, none were so successful as the Cossacks, who created a legend with their participation in this conflict.

The reasons for Cossack success were manifold. The Cossacks, because of their background, were equally skilled in every kind of fighting and could survive in extremely difficult circumstances. They applied their traditional steppe tactics on western battlefields and succeeded in confounding their foes who were unfamiliar with such manoeuvres. The most important Cossack battle-manoeuve was the "sack" – tactic formation which never failed through the entire war. In 1619 that formation drew the whole army of George Rakoczy in northern Hungary into ambush.¹⁶ The Cossacks used this stratagem successfully at the Battle of Sinzendorf (1620)¹⁷ and at Soest (1636) against the Hessians.¹⁸ Sometimes these tactics were employed by the Cossacks to entice a garrison of a city to leave the protection of its walls and pursue them in hopes of victory. This occurred at Pont-a-Monissons, on the Moselle River (1636). The French garrison troops were lured out of town and drawn into ambush and destruction.¹⁹

¹⁴ Martinek F., "Valdštejn – Voják," *Doba Bělohorská a Albrecht z Valdštejna*, (ed. J. Prokeš) Praha, 1934, p. 165:

"Svych poznatku, jež si osvojil v časném mládí v Uhrach, využil velmi vhodně tím, že zavedl do své armády lehké jezdeckto, pluky t. zv. Chorvatu a Poláku, najímány až dosud jen pro drobné války s Turky; upotřebil jich s úspěchem pro službu vyzvědnou, spojovací a zejména pro stále znepokojování nepřitele v jeho táborech, v boji pak pro útok na jeho oslabená místa, aby tam způsobil zmatek."

¹⁵ Dzieduszycki, *op. cit.*, v. II, pp.

¹⁶ Volume One, pp. 34-37.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

¹⁸ Dzieduszycki, v. II, p. 569-570.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 522.

The usefulness of Cossacks as scouts and cavalry screen was often demonstrated during the various campaigns of the war. In 1630, Cossacks acted as a screen guarding the eastern borders of the Hapsburg Empire against possible Transylvanian attacks.²⁰ During the northern Italian campaign of 1626, Cossacks under Pappenheim provided protection for the Hapsburg forces in Lombardy from French attempts to reinforce Genoa.²¹ At the siege of Dunkirk (1646), Cossacks were given responsibility for stopping the infiltration of Spaniards into the city and taking prisoners for interrogation by the French command.²²

The Cossack specialty became the long range penetration raids into enemy territory. They used guerrilla tactics of engaging and disappearing before superior forces could assemble to destroy them. In the winter of 1632, they raided Saxony, under Gallas and almost captured the Elector of Saxony himself.²³ Three years later, also in the winter, Cossacks penetrated into Luxembourg in the rear of Bernard of Weimar's positions and began destroying his supply depots, attacked his troops in their winter quarters, harassed his lines of communication and forced Bernard to withdraw to Verdun.²⁴ Another famous raid occurred in early spring of 1636, when a large raiding cavalry corps under Francis of Lorraine advanced in Champagne and successfully terrorized the province. The Cossacks and Croats were the most active of all participants because they were accustomed to winter warfare.²⁵

Some raids became punitive expeditions used selectively by the Hapsburg administration to discipline recalcitrant rulers and to terrorize populations hostile to the Emperor. The Cossacks, along with the others, were used in the pacification of Moravia after the Battle of White Mountain.²⁶ In 1634, under Werth and Isolani, Cossacks were engaged in a similar devastation of Würtemberg.²⁷ The Cossacks were used for these missions because their name alone brought panic to the people and they lived up to their reputation.

²⁰ Welykyi, *op. cit.*, v. V, p. 55.

²¹ Khevenhiller, *op. cit.*, v. X, p. 969.

²² Aumale, *op. cit.*, v. VII, p. 231.

²³ Welykyi, v. V, p. 131.

²⁴ *Gazette de France*, 1636, no. 7.

²⁵ Dzieduszycki, v. II, pp. 522-523.

²⁶ Volume One, p. 56.

²⁷ Dzieduszycki, v. II, pp. 495-6.

The Cossacks also participated in pitched battles and often contributed to Hapsburg victories. They fought at Lutzen under Pappenheim's command and after the battle covered the retreat of Wallenstein's army. At Nordlingen (1634), Cossacks under Werth's command mauled Bernard of Weimar's force which attempted to cover the Protestant retreat and thus won the victory. The Cossack furious charge gained the day for the Imperial cause.²⁸

However, Cossacks disliked engaging in pitched battle with heavy cavalry according to European battle order, because the charge of armoured cavalry dispersed the lightly armed Cossacks. They were defeated several times in such encounters and suffered heavy casualties. This occurred at Strehlen (1633) when Cossacks engaged a Swedish cavalry corps²⁹ and also at Ivoi (1636) where the French cavalry severely mauled them.³⁰

These few examples of Cossack tactics illustrate the uniqueness of Cossack military accomplishments as light cavalry. Summarizing the Cossack involvement in the Thirty Years War, it is clear that their participation was not merely an isolated episode, but one which influenced the direction of military practice in subsequent years. Indeed, through their involvement in the war, the Cossacks introduced a new strategic arm into the western European warfare of the seventeenth century. Count Raimondo Montecuccoli, the prominent Hapsburg strategist and field marshal, noted this phenomenon in his famous military treatise "Sulla Battaglia" and assigned a prominent role to the light cavalry in all future campaigns.³¹

²⁸ Ward A., "Wallenstein and Bernard of Weimar," p. 245; Bauer, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

²⁹ Dzieduszycki, v. II, p. 478.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 530-1.

³¹ Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 98, 104, 108-110.

CHAPTER V

THE SOCIAL, NATIONAL, AND MILITARY INFLUENCE OF THE WESTERN COSSACK MERCENARIES IN UKRAINE

Historians of the Ukrainian Cossacks — Hrushevsky,¹ Krypiakievych,² Iavornytsky,³ Holobutsky,⁴ and others — have been uninterested in Cossack mercenaries of the Thirty Years War and have generally ignored the possibility of their influence on the development of Cossack society in Ukraine. We felt, however, the importance of studying and analyzing the history, existence and ideology of these mercenaries in greater detail and our efforts have been justified, since they have led to new conclusions, hitherto completely unknown in Ukrainian historiography. On the basis of these conclusions we may state unequivocally that the Cossack mercenaries in the Thirty Years War had a direct and even decisive influence not only on the evolution of the Cossack society and its organization, but also on the cultural and national development of the Ukrainian people as a whole.⁵

As we have seen, these mercenaries, through their military successes in the West, gained the respect of all the military and political authorities throughout Europe⁶ and the Middle East,⁷ and as a result, they became conscious of their power and their international reputation.

¹ Hrushevsky M., *Istoria Ukrainy-Rusy*, New York: Knyhospilka, 1955-6, v. VI-VIII.

² Krypiakievych I., *Bohdan Khmelnytskyi*, p. 7-85; Also in: *Kozachchyna v Politychnykh Kombinatsiakh*, p. 65-114.

³ Evarnitskii D.A., *Istoria Zaporozhskikh Kozakov*, S. Petersburg, 1892-3, v. I-III.

⁴ Golobutskii B.A., *op. cit.*, p. 3-249.

⁵ Baran A., "The Kievan Mohyla-Mazepa Academy and the Zaporozhian Cossacks," *Ukrainskyi Istoryk*, v. 45-46 (1975), p. 70-75.

⁶ See the II, VIII, XI documents of our first volume.

⁷ Baran A., "Shahin Girai of the Crimea and the Zaporozhian Cossacks," *Jubilee Collection of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Canada*, Winnipeg: UVAN, 1976, p. 15-35; Baran A., "Kozaky v opysakh Pietra della Valle z XVII st.," *Ukrainskyi Istoryk*, v. 65-68 (1980), p. 95-103.

They were no longer just "Defenders of Christian Lands" from the Moslems, but had become an articulate military force which demanded rights, privileges and freedoms.⁸ Instead of depending on the commands and favors of the Polish Commonwealth, they began to contract their own military employment⁹ and sought service with different foreign authorities.¹⁰ In foreign services the Cossacks were always successful and their problems started only when they were dismissed from their mercenary service, and had to return home. There was no place for them in their homeland since they were not colonizers like their contemporary brothers in Ukraine, who had settled down in the southern crown-lands and became free homesteaders. Nor could these mercenaries join the "Registered Cossacks," for they were adventurous characters,¹¹ who would not serve any lengthy time in the auxiliary detachments of the Polish administration. As professional warriors, their life purpose was war, and this aggressive and indomitable posture could not easily be crushed or compromised. They sought only two things, freedom and constant war, which could be found only within the Zaporozhian Host. Therefore, at the end of their western campaigns, following the demobilization of their mercenary units, they went to Zaporozhe and mixed with the local garrisons.¹²

The Zaporozhians, however, together with all the lower Cossack classes, were undergoing a difficult crisis of their own during the 1620's. Their existence and especially their social status were in constant conflict with the political and administrative structure of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This feudal state with its closed society could not accept a free Cossack class, and so tried to put an end to Cossack freedom, or at least to limit their rights and privileges. The tension between the Commonwealth and the free Cossack class often led to bloody conflicts and military uprisings, in which the Cossack mercenaries played a decisive role.

The situation became desperate only after 1622. While Hetman Peter Konashevych-Sahaidachny (1616-22) lived, the Cossacks in Ukraine were well provisioned and organized. The hetman maintained discipline and order in his army and negotiated skillfully with the Polish govern-

⁸ *Istoria URSS*, Kiev: AN URSS, 1979, v. 1/2, p. 237-272.

⁹ Baran, "Kozaky v opysakh P. della Valle," p. 99-102.

¹⁰ Baran, "Shahin Girai," p. 19; See also our first volume, p. 41-44.

¹¹ See vol. I, p. 114-5, 119-125.

¹² Welykyi, *op. cit.*, v. IV, p. 7-9, 17-20; See also vol. I, p. 88.

ment. He tolerated no Cossack rebellions against the nobility, but also guarded the independence and immunities of the Zaporozhian Host.¹³ Because Sahaidachny did not allow for any official register,¹⁴ he was able to maintain a potentially large army that, if necessary, could quickly expand to 30,000 or 40,000 men. His Cossacks were not constantly under arms, but lived for the most part in villages and towns on the crown lands as free yeomen.¹⁵ The Polish Commonwealth was not overly concerned about the Cossacks because it felt protected by Sahaidachny's command. For that reason the local administration did not force the Cossacks into a limited register and did not insist on returning the non-registered Cossacks into serfdom.

However, this quiet situation could not last long since after the Khotyn War (1621) the number of Cossacks increased to dangerous proportions. The increase was initially due to the return of 6,000 Cossack mercenaries from the western fronts of the Thirty Years War. This unexpected influx became a sufficient factor to tilt the balance in Cossack society. Rejected by the state and feudal armies of the Commonwealth, the returning 6,000 mercenaries went in search of new adventures and military service among the Zaporozhians,¹⁶ but the Zaporozhian Host was unable to absorb or maintain such a large group. Thus, most of the Cossack returnees went on to inaugurate the era of the most active land and naval campaigns against the Turkish and Tatar lands.¹⁷ The success of their raids and their freedom from Polish control attracted large numbers of runaway serfs to join the Cossack adventurers.¹⁸ As a result, the Zaporozhian Host tripled in number during the year of 1622. During the summer there was no problem with them, because the Cossacks were involved in very intensive campaigns against the Turkish and Tatar territories. However, returning from their summer raids with booty, they made winter quarters not only in the free dominions of the crown, but also on the estates of the nobility, without any concern for private property.¹⁹ This new Cossack willfulness created a difficult social crisis in southern Ukraine.

¹³ Kholmskyi I., *Istoria Ukrainy*, München: NTSh, 1949, p. 188.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 186-190; Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, v. VII, p. 367-386.

¹⁶ See vol. I, p. 103-104; Welykyi, vol. IV, p. 7-20.

¹⁷ Golobutskii, *op. cit.*, p. 186-188; Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, v. VII, p. 495-6.

¹⁸ *Istoria URSR*, v. I/2, p. 252-253.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*; Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, v. VII, p. 491-492.

During this critical time Sahaidachny died (April 10, 1622).²⁰ With his death, the Cossacks' undisciplined conduct increased, and Polish anxiety mounted. Cossacks began to take control of villages and towns, to direct the local administration and to establish their own laws.²¹

The Polish regime had foreseen this situation, and immediately after the Khotyn War (October 1621) had decreed the reduction of the Cossacks to a register of 3,000 and the return of all non-registered Cossacks to peasant status.²² After Sahaidachny's death the government decided to enforce that decree. However, the appointed commissioners, though empowered to use extreme measures, were unable to impose the registration upon the Zaporozhians or even to attempt the return of Cossacks to peasant status.²³ The effort actually backfired, for even formally registered Cossacks, enthusiastic about Cossack freedom, joined the Zaporozhians in defying the Polish regime.²⁴

The outcome of this situation depended upon who would be elected as the new hetman. The Poles had their own candidate, but the Cossacks forced through their favorite, Colonel Oliver Holub, a landowner but also a supporter of the rights and privileges of the Zaporozhian Host.²⁵ Following Holub's election, the Polish Diet decided to compromise. They increased the Cossack register to 5,000 men and approved some rights and privileges for the Zaporozhians, so as to remove them from the crown lands. However, these half-measures proved unacceptable. The power of the Cossacks was steadily rising, and nobody except some Cossack leaders wanted to accept any compromise with the Polish government. A contemporary royal instruction described the situation thus:

“The Cossacks are creating a separate Republic, and impinge upon the lives and property of innocent people. All Ukraine is under their control, a nobleman is not free in his home, and in the cities and towns of His Royal Majesty all government and power is in the hands of the Cossacks... They institute their own laws.”²⁶

²⁰ Hrushevsky, v. VII, p. 489-491.

²¹ *Istoria URSS*, v. I/2, p. 253.

²² Golobutskii, *op. cit.*, p. 194.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 195.

²⁴ *Istoria URSS*, v. I/2, p. 253.

²⁵ Golobutskii, p. 195-6.

²⁶ *Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiey* – Dokumenty i Materialy v trekh tomakh, Moskva: AN SSSR, 1954, v. I, p. 63.

Beset by the outcries of the local nobility, the Polish government planned to use military force to pacify the Cossacks. The military confrontation did not actually take place however until 1625, when it was sparked by the return of a large group of Cossack mercenaries from the Thirty Years War.²⁷

At the end of 1624, the most desperate of Cossack mercenaries, called Lisowchyks, returned from the battlefields of the Thirty Years War. Before entering Poland, their organization was disbanded by a royal decree of King Sigismund III. Some of these Lisowchyks subsequently entered various private detachments of the nobility, but most set out in small bands for Zaporozhe, where they became the most dangerous element at the Sich.²⁸

Poland could tolerate Cossack arrogance no longer. In the summer of 1625, the Polish Crown Hetman Stanislaw Koniecpolski gathered an army of 30,000 men, including militia detachments from the Ukrainian palatinates, and reinforced by private units of many Polish and Ukrainian magnates. With this force, he was determined to crush the Cossacks and restore feudal order in the Commonwealth.²⁹

Threatened by such an army, the Cossack groups had to unite to survive. Altogether the Cossacks numbered approximately 20,000 men. They entrenched themselves at Taborshche, by the town of Kryliv. On October 25, 1625, the first armed conflicts took place, and the battle was soon transferred to Lake Kurukiv. Despite all efforts, Koniecpolski and his forces could not vanquish the Cossack army.

As winter approached, the Poles were ready to negotiate. Concessions were made, and the Cossack register was increased to 6,000. The Cossack leaders, desiring peace, took the hetman's mace from the radical Marko Zhmailo and gave it to the colonel of the registered Cossacks, Mykhailo Doroshenko, who signed the agreement at Lake Kurukiv. Pay was increased for the Cossack officers, who pledged "not to allow armed assemblies and to keep away the radical Cossacks from the Register and to quash any resistance." The registered Cossacks who lived on nobles' domains were to transfer to the crown lands within twelve weeks.³⁰

²⁷ Dzeduszycki, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 360-361.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 348-361.

²⁹ Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, v. VII, p. 537-543; Rudnytskyi S., "Kozatsko-Polska viyna r. 1625," *Zapysky NTSh*, v. XVII (1897), p. 1-19.

³⁰ Rudnytskyi, *op. cit.*, p. 20-42; Golobutskii, *op. cit.*, p. 197-203.

The register was completed in 1626, and six Cossack regiments were stationed in towns of Kiev Palatinate (Pereiaslav, Bila Tserkva, Kaniv, Korsun, Cherkasy, and Chyhyryn). However, over 10,000 non-registered Cossacks (*vyypyschyky*) were left off the official rolls. Harassed by Polish officials to an extreme, these Cossacks left the royal domains and rejoined the Zaporozhians. Many registered Cossacks, subjected to constant pressure by their commissioners, deserted and also set out for Zaporozhe. In 1629, the commissioner of the Cossack register, Stefan Chmielewski, wrote to the king: "There gathered in Zaporozhe as many Cossacks as served under Khotyn or even more."³¹

Among the Zaporozhians, at that time, officers of the former western mercenaries took charge. When the hetman of the registered Cossacks, Hryhorii Chorny (1628-29), began to oppose the spread of Cossack "freedom," the non-registered Cossacks elected a new hetman. Chosen in March of 1630, was the renowned colonel of the western mercenary troops, Taras Fedorovych.³²

Who was this Taras Fedorovych? In Cossack history he became an almost legendary figure under the name Taras Triasylo. Though much has been written about his leadership and military successes, historians have long been unable to determine his real name or descent. Some evidence was first found in a royal charter from 1647, where it was stated that he was a Tatar (Tartar) from Crimea named Isain or Hassan.³³ It was also written that later, probably during the Moscow Campaign, he became a Cossack and was baptized in the Orthodox faith with the name Taras.³⁴ He must have gained fame among the Cossacks, for on July 20, 1620, the Viennese Nuncio wrote that "5,000 Cossacks came from the Black Sea, crossed the Hungarian frontier and entered the Emperor's service under the command of a very famous captain, Hasan Tarasa."³⁵ He could not have been a Lisowchyk, since they already

³¹ Golobutskii, p. 203.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 204-5; Rudnytskyi S., "Ukrainski Kozaky v 1625-30 rr.," *Zapysky NTSh*, v. 30-31 (1899), p. 61-62.

³³ Ohievskiy P., "Stoletnii Starets Ioann Andreevich Tarasevich," *Chernigovskia Gubernskia Vedomosti*, Chernigov. 1853, no. 18-19; Gajecky G., "Origins of Taras Triasylo," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, vol. 5/3, p. 354-7.

³⁴ Gajecky, *op. cit.*, p. 355-6.

³⁵ Welykyi, *op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 257. "altri m/5 dalla parte del Mar Maggiore ali confini d'Ungheria passati sotto il commando di un Capitano di molto valore nominato Assan Trasso per andare in servizio dell'Imperatore ..."

reached Vienna in 1619 through Silesia and Moravia. Consequently, he contracted his own mercenary service with the Emperor, and became undoubtedly a renowned Cossack mercenary leader of the Thirty Years War under the new name of Taras Triasylo.³⁶

Following his return to Zaporozhe, Taras Triasylo became a leader of the most radical element of the Ukrainian Cossacks, and in the crisis of 1630, only he could be elected the hetman of the Zaporozhian Host.³⁷ Even though years had elapsed since the western European battles, Cossack cavalry maneuvers from the Thirty Years War could be detected in his military campaigns in Ukraine. Triasylo avoided pitched battles; instead he outmaneuvered the enemy, destroyed supply lines and depots, and thus weakened the enemy's lines. Finally, he introduced light cavalry as a major component of Cossack warfare.³⁸

As is generally known, the Ukrainian Cossacks had fought mostly on foot, using horses primarily for transport and supply. However, during Triasylo's hetmanate a Cossack cavalry suddenly appeared and began to assume a decisive role in Cossack warfare. Even the official name of Triasylo's army was changed to "Cossack cavalry and infantry."³⁹

Triasylo's tactics were wholly successful. In March 1630, he began an anti-Polish uprising with 10,000 Cossacks in his command. After preliminary skirmishes and engagements, his army entrenched itself at Pereiaslav. From that base Triasylo sent Cossack detachments on lightning raids against the numerically superior Polish forces of Stanislaw Koniecpolski, harassing their marching columns, destroying small detachments, plundering supply trains, cutting off access to fords, and generally causing delays and vexation among the enemy. In May 1630, after an inconclusive pitched battle, Koniecpolski asked for negotiations, which led to new compromises between the Cossacks and the Polish government.⁴⁰

During the Smolensk War (1633-34), Triasylo, now an ally of

³⁶ *Ibid.* "Capitano di molto valore."

³⁷ *Istoria URSR*, v. 1/2, p. 256.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 257-258.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 256; Golobutskii, *op. cit.*, p. 204; *Istoria Ukrainshoho Viiska*, Ed. M. Levytskyi, Winnipeg: Tyktor, 1953, p. 269-270. Describes the first information about the Zaporozhian cavalry in 1628.

⁴⁰ Antonovych M., "Pereislavska Kampania 1630 r.," *Pratsi Ukrainshoho Istorychno-Filolohichnoho Tovarystva v Prazi*, v. V (1944), p. 5-41; Golobutskii, p. 206-9.

Poland, led a large Cossack cavalry corps which raided extensively in the Muscovite territory and took part in the battle of Shchelkanov (April 10, 1634). At that battle, a Cossack cavalry detachment under Triasylo's command left the camp, rode around behind the Russian army under Bunakov, and attacked it from the rear, routing the enemy.⁴¹ This duplicated a manoeuvre which had been favored by Cossack mercenaries during the Thirty Years War.

In the 1630's Cossack veterans of western campaigns were also instrumental in the cultural and intellectual rebirth taking place in Kiev. The cultural rebirth of Ukraine came after the advance of the Reformation and the Catholic Counter-Reformation in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In the sixteenth century Protestant reformers — Lutherans, Arians, Anti-Trinitarians, Bohemian Brethren, Calvinists — poured into Ukraine and spread their teachings among townspeople and the nobility.⁴² During the Counter-Reformation, Catholics responded by upgrading and spreading their own religious and humanistic education. The new Jesuit colleges, with highly qualified teachers, attracted the youth of the noble and burgher classes.⁴³ These Jesuit colleges began to convert to Roman Catholicism not only Protestants, but also the children of the Orthodox, who had not joined the church union with Rome.⁴⁴ This advance of Polish Catholicism caused a strong reaction among the Orthodox elite. In the larger towns of Ukraine, Orthodox church brotherhoods were organized to restore and renew the educational environment in Ukraine.⁴⁵ Elementary schools had existed from ancient times, but it was important to establish an institution of higher learning which could counter the influence of the Jesuits. It was planned that the new college would be based on the seven liberal arts, teach Latin and the Classics and provide general literary erudition.

The nucleus of the Ukrainian cultural rebirth was the Kiev Brotherhood (*Bratstvo*), established in 1615. Its members were clergy,

⁴¹ Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, v. VIII, p. 202; Antonovych, *op. cit.*, p. 35-36.

⁴² Halecki O., *A History of Poland*, Chicago: Regnery Co., 1966, p. 123-4.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 125-7.

⁴⁴ Kholmskyi, *op. cit.*, p. 154-156; Doroshenko D., *A Survey of Ukrainian History*, (Edited and updated by O.W. Gerus), Winnipeg: Trident, 1975, p. 159-160. Isaevych I.D., *Bratstva ta ikh rol' v rozvytku Ukrainskoi Kultury XVI-XVIII st.*, Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1966, p. 10-42.

⁴⁵ Isaevych, *op. cit.*, p. 127-172.

Orthodox nobility, townsmen and the whole Zaporozhian Host under the command of Hetman Petro Sahaidachny.⁴⁶ At first, the school established by the brotherhood was Graeco-Slavonic⁴⁷ in character, since the conservative opposition would not allow Western influences. The leader of the conservative party and the greatest enemy of Western influence was a monk from Athos, Ivan Vyshensky, who saw the Orthodox renewal as a return to ancient customs rather than as a Western-style reform.⁴⁸

It was not until 1631 that the new archimandrite of the Pechersk Monastery, later metropolitan of Kiev, Petro Mohyla, established a Western system of instruction at the Kiev College (Academy). To accomplish such a bold act Mohyla needed the consent of the whole Orthodox population of the Kiev palatinate. The Zaporozhian Cossacks, under the influence of Taras Triasylo and the veterans of the Western campaigns, upheld Mohyla's authority in the brotherhood and approved his introduction of the Western educational system in the Kiev College.⁴⁹

The whole Zaporozhian Host expressed its unanimous support in a charter of March 12, 1632: "The hetman, osauls, colonels, and all the Zaporozhian Host," considering this to be a "holy endeavor, very necessary and beneficial for the entire Orthodox Church," as members of the Brotherhood, gave their approval for Mohyla to become the "life-long overseer, protector and defender" of the Brotherhood, and instructed the Kievan Otaman and all the Cossacks to provide him with their aid and protection.⁵⁰

Five days later, Taras Triasylo's successor, hetman Ivan K. Petrazhytsky, issued a special charter, which stated:

"The Zaporozhian Host, which always, even in ancestral times, strove to do something good and beneficial for the Holy

⁴⁶ Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, v. VII, p. 412-413.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 414-415.

⁴⁸ Pinchuk S.P., *Ivan Vyshenskyi - Tvorchist' i Zhyttia*, Kiev: Radianska shkola, 1968, p. 44-102.

⁴⁹ We do not have an explicit statement from hetman Taras Triasylo, but the change in Cossack ideology occurred under his rule. In the previous years the Cossacks always supported the conservative clerics (Vyshynskyi, Kopystenskyi). After the 1630's they are unanimously enthusiastic about Mohyla's cultural and educational program.

⁵⁰ *Pamiatniki Izdannye Kievskoi Komissiei dla Razbora Drevnykh Aktov*, Kiev, (ed. II) 1898, vol. I, p. 418-21.

Church, all the more now sees the sign of the Holy Spirit's will and the unanimous action of the Ruthenian people, clerical and lay, the nobility and the entire community, that learning and education in the Holy Scriptures for the support of our religion at the Brotherhood Church of the Epiphany be renewed through the endeavors, cost, and supervision of the Reverend Petro Mohyla; thus, seeing this truly worthwhile and beneficial endeavor for the Holy Church, we join in this, assent and pledge to support this Brotherhood Church and school, and to defend them with our heads."⁵¹

Without a doubt, the Cossacks' support greatly aided in the founding of the Kievan College and in the subsequent introduction of a Western-style system of education. Thanks to the support and protection of the Ukrainian Cossacks this College, the later Kievan Mohyla Academy, was to spread western influence during the whole period of the Ukrainian Renaissance, which flourished for over a century and a half.⁵²

During the 1630s the western mercenaries integrated within the general body of Cossacks and no longer was there a distinct group of mercenaries among the Zaporozhians. In 1635, at the beginning of the next campaign of the Thirty Years War, the Zaporozhians themselves joined the new mercenary detachments going to serve the Hapsburg Empire.⁵³

Thus far we have discussed the military, social, and cultural influences of the Cossack mercenaries who returned to Ukraine in the 1620s. Consideration must also be given to the impact of the Thirty Years War on the political consciousness of the Ukrainian Cossacks.

The political impact of the Thirty Years War on the Ukrainian Cossacks was overwhelming. A comparison of Cossack self-consciousness and political ideology at the time of the Muscovite campaigns, (before 1616), with the Cossack identity during the Khmelnytsky uprising, reveals a profound change. The former freebooters had been transformed into a nation-building force. Bohdan Khmelnytsky and his Cossacks not only destroyed the Polish army, but also organized

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 421-22; Baran, "The Kievan Mohyla-Mazepa Academy ...," p. 71.

⁵² Baran, *The Kievan ...*, p. 71-75.

⁵³ See Chapter II.

a unique Cossack state and an administrative elite that survived until 1782.⁵⁴

The idea of a new Ukrainian state began germinating at the end of the sixteenth century, when Ukrainian Cossacks established their rule over the wide steppe frontier and founded, as the Poles said, an unofficial "state within a state."⁵⁵ Subsequently, they developed an independent policy toward foreign powers.⁵⁶ Representatives from European and Middle Eastern states sought ways to establish relations with the Cossack "steppe republic." The anti-Turkish powers in Crimea,⁵⁷ Georgia,⁵⁸ and Persia⁵⁹ attempted to secure Cossack military and political support against the Ottomans, but their negotiations were never wholly successful. However, the European nations — the Germans, Spaniards, Swedes, and French, that is, the most effective powers during the Thirty Years War — not only engaged in serious negotiations, but often concluded military agreements with the Cossacks, choosing to simply ignore the Cossacks' formal allegiance to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.⁶⁰

Documents of the time show that to the Western powers the Cossacks were a separate nation, having the right to an independent existence.⁶¹ Respectful treatment by Western diplomats enhanced the Cossacks' self-esteem and boosted not only the Cossack mercenaries, but also the Cossack masses into an independent stance. The Cos-

⁵⁴ Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 212-484; Kholmskyi, *op. cit.*, pp. 195-300; Gajecky G., *The Cossack Administration of the Hetmanate*, 2 vols., Cambridge: Harvard, 1978.

⁵⁵ Golobutskii, *op. cit.*, p. 195-6.

⁵⁶ Kholmskyi, p. 195-6.

⁵⁷ Baran, "Shahin Girai ...," p. 30-33.

⁵⁸ Baran, "Kozaky v opysakh P. della Valle," p. 95-100.

⁵⁹ Dashkevych I.R., "Ukrainsko-Iranski perehovory naperedodni Khotynskoi Viiny," *Ukrainskyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal*, r. 1971, fasc. 9, p. 129-131, Baran A., "Shah Abbas Velykyi i Zaporozhtsi," *Ukrainskyi Istoryk*, v. 53-4, p. 50-55.

⁶⁰ See vol. I, p. 64-88. In the years 1622-24 the Cossacks were hired by the Empire against the will of the Polish State.

⁶¹ Baran, "Kozaky v opysakh...," p. 101. The original text of della Valle is this: "... tengo per certo, che si habbiano da fare un giorno una Republica potentissima; perché, non con dissimili principii cominciarono già i famosi Spartani, o Lacedemonii; come anche i Siciliani, i Cartaginesi, e fin gli stessi Romani; e in questi nostri tempi, gli Hollandesi ..." Cfr. *Viaggi di Pietro della Valle il Pellegrino*, Venetia: P. Baglioni, 1661, pars I, p. 308.

sacks, holding weapons on the ready, followed the will to form an independent government. Their struggle was protracted and frustrating, as uprising after uprising ended in cheap compromise,⁶² but at each juncture the struggle renewed with increased intensity. Finally, an ideal, separate state became the fixed goal of all Cossacks, who awaited only a leader to seek it in earnest. That leader was to be Bohdan Khmelnytsky.⁶³

At the very end of the Thirty Years War, in 1648, the final successful battle for an independent Cossack state began. One might conclude that having been tempered in the heat of Western military service, the Cossacks turned to do battle for their own future and their own state.

⁶² Golobutskii, *op. cit.*, 194-221.

⁶³ Hruschevsky, v. VIII, p.

CONCLUSION

We conclude our work with several reflections that may be considered revolutionary in Cossack historiography. Until recently, usually only Ukrainian, Polish, and Russian historians have examined the history of Ukrainian Cossacks in any depth and have, unfortunately, limited the sphere of their investigation of the Cossacks to Ukraine and passed over in silence Cossack mercenary activities outside their fatherland. This seems to have been the case for several reasons.

Ukrainian historians have looked upon the Cossacks, especially the Zaporozhians, as creators of a new Cossack society and idealized them as fathers of the modern Ukrainian nation. In their eyes, the greatest achievement of the Ukrainian Cossacks was the formation of the Cossack state, the Hetmanate. They mistakenly assumed that beyond this there was no need to investigate other aspects of Cossack activities.

The Polish historians, meanwhile, have claimed without solid foundation that those troops who fought in the Thirty Years War were exclusively commanded by Polish officers. According to them, this was a Polish corps that used Cossack arms and tactics in battle. If there were any real Cossacks among them, they played only secondary roles. In their opinion the real Ukrainian Cossacks were at the Sich, where they planned naval campaigns against Turkey and anti-Polish insurrections.

Finally the Russian historians have attempted to prove that Ukrainian Cossacks always gravitated towards Moscow and that mercenary activity in the West was a betrayal of real Zaporozhian ideals. (This is also the interpretation of the "official" Soviet historiography).

These historians have not wanted to understand that the history of any nation or any society should not be approached from narrow "a priori" categories. It is true that Ukrainian Cossacks from the beginning attempted to attain their rights and privileges and an autonomous existence in their fatherland. But this was done in various ways and not before passing through several ideological phases.

Historians usually divide Cossack history into the pre-Khmel-

nytsky period (c. 1500-1648) and the Hetmanate (1649-1782). In our view, the former era consisted of many complex and multifaceted parts. Here we find the pioneer-defensive state (*ukhodnyky*) and later the aggressive-mercenary phase of Cossack life. In the first phase of the earlier period Cossack society evolved, but its ideological crystallization came only in the latter phase.

By the end of the sixteenth century, the Cossack defensive mode ended. The aggressive stage was forced upon them by various circumstances. There were so many Cossacks and they became so powerful that the Zaporozhian Sich could not contain them all; they either had to become settlers or go into permanent military service. A portion of them did settle on the land in southern Kievshchyna and became tillers of the soil, but most transformed themselves into professional soldiers who fought for pay. Already at the end of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth century, they fought as mercenaries for the Hapsburg Emperor (1590), the Pope (1593) and the rulers of Transylvania (1603-4). As professional soldiers they fought for the Polish King in the Moldavian (1600), Livonian (1601-02), and Muscovite (1609-16) Wars.

In comparison with the period of the Thirty Years War, these earlier mercenary ventures were of short duration and of limited significance. They had little influence on the Cossack mentality and did not change the traditions of Ukrainian people. However, mercenary service in the Thirty Years War gave the Cossacks more scope than all such previous services, as this conflict lasted longer and many more Cossacks than before participated in its intensive campaigns. But more significantly, all segments of the Cossack society — from Lisowchyks to Zaporozhians — in one way or another were connected with mercenary activities in this first all-European war. Furthermore, the western influences brought back by the Cossack mercenaries were absorbed not only by the Cossack society but by the entire populace of Ukraine.

At that time, Ukrainians were at an ideological crossroads; they could separate themselves from western influences by isolation, as Muscovy did, or allow themselves to be assimilated with the Poles into a western mainstream as the Lithuanians did. Neither occurred. Thanks to their newly established ties with the West, Ukraine made its compromise, took the middle road and ignored the extreme solutions of its neighbors. Ukrainians became familiar with the West and did not spurn it. They adopted cultural, social, and political ideas from

the West and combined them with the eastern tradition of Ukrainian spirituality.

This compromise is evident in the writings of various ecclesiastical leaders of contemporary Ukraine, such as Petro Mohyla and Veliamyn Rutsky. But these leaders would not have been able to disseminate their ideas without the constant support of the Cossacks in the 1630's and 1640's. In this support lies the value of the Cossack veterans of the western campaigns, who were exposed to the West and transmitted many of its concepts to the populace of Ukraine. Only this interpretation can adequately determine why the trend of the "Cossack baroque" took hold in the 17th century Ukraine, while the other Orthodox countries of Eastern Europe did not achieve a similar cultural peak until later. Only by taking into account the western experiences of the Cossacks can we explain why in Kyiv there appeared the greatest cultural and educational institution of the contemporary Orthodox East, the Mohyla-Mazepa Academy.

In this study we have focused our attention on these important moments in the cultural and social history of Ukraine and of the same time consciously avoided an interpretation based on the kind of "a priori" assumptions which have coloured previous work in this area. We have attempted to open the archival material in the West, let the documents speak for themselves and show as objectively as possible the history of Cossack mercenaries in the western campaigns of the Thirty Years War. These documents show how Hrushevsky and his school have mistakenly led Ukrainian historiography down a blind alley by ignoring or passing over in silence the existence and activities of Cossack mercenaries in the West. These documents also disprove the contention of some Polish historians that Cossack mercenaries were just a subservient element under the command of Polish officers in the war. On the contrary, these documents clearly demonstrate that the western Cossack veterans were the prime movers in all the 17th century insurrections against the oppression of the Polish feudal state in Ukraine.

Finally, the archival material proves, contrary to the Russian historians, that not the Union of Brest, or the Polonophile sympathies of Ukrainian Orthodox clergy opposed to Muscovite influence and rule in Ukraine, but the western sympathies of Cossackdom which were the primary influence on Ukrainian society in subsequent centuries.

APPENDIX

DOCUMENT I

Warsaw, March 7, 1626.

SUMMARY: *The Imperial envoy remains the Polish Senate of the many ties which join their respective countries. Among other matters, Arnoldini asks for permission from the Senate to allow the exiled Cossack Captains N. Mocharski & I. Kalinowski to enter the Polish Kingdom, after their service in the Empire.*

HAUS-HOF-STAATS ARCHIV, WIEN: *Polen I, Karton 54, Conv. 1626, fol. 4-7v.*

Serenissime, Potentissime atque Invictissime Rev.,
Domine benignissime.

Reverendissimi, Excellentissimi et Illustrissimi admodum quoque
Reverendi, Illustres, Magnifici et Generosi Domini.

.....
Postremo quemadmodum saepememorata Maestas Caesarea minime immemor insignium nationis Poloniae meritorum et servitiorum sibi et Augustissimae Domui Suae fortiter, saepe et praeclare praestitorum, adhuc in superioribus Comitibus pro quibusdam Nobilibus Capitaneis et militibus, qui certis de causis dulcissima Patria exclusi duorum tunc annorum exilium dolenter tulerunt, signanter vero pro Nicolo Mocziayski (sic) Dapifero suo, tam apud S. Maestatem Vestram, quam amplissimos Incltyi Regni Ordines pro venia et gratia perbenigne intercessit, gratum et eidem accidit, ubi intellexit eandem intercessionem tantum ponderis habuisse, ut dictis Nobilibus via patefacta sit ad gratiam; ita quorundam et imprimis dicti Mocziayski nec non adaucti Konayewski (sic) duorum strenuorum Capitaneorum precibus permota Maestas sua mihi abeunti, denuo iniunxit, (f 7) ut nomine suo iam dictas personas, quippe de Christiana Republica benemeritas, Maestati Vestrae et amplissimis Ordinibus iterum atque iterum commendare, quo tandem gratiam plenariam et honoris pristini restitutionem impetrare possint. Et sane hac de causa Maestas Sua Caesarea dictum Mocziayski sine literis suis ex Austria abire et in Polonia comparere voluit, quas ego supremo Regni Cancellario, simul praesento, eumque praelibatae Maestatis

Suae nomine maximopere commendo. Addo et literas incolarum Comitatus Sepusiensis, quibus petant, ut certus dies praefigatur Commissariis utrinque deputatis ad controversias quasdam nomine finium motas amice componendas, quae petitio cum et honesta et Regiis decretis ex ipso Senatus consulto emanatis consentanea sit, non ausim de exoptata et celeri expeditione dubitare.

(f. 7v.) 7 Martii 1626.

Propositio D. Arnoldini ad Senatum Regni Poloniae

Propositio in Comitibus Warsaviae celebratis 7 Martii praesentis anni 1626 publice facta.

DOCUMENT II

Warsaw, after June 1631.

SUMMARY: Arnoldini notifies the Emperor that the Swedes attempted to persuade the Zaporozhian Cossacks to transfer their allegiance from the Polish to the Swedish throne. The official Swedish letters were read and torn up by the members of the Polish Senate. Further investigation was launched to uncover other Swedish intrigues in the Kingdom.

HAUS-HOF-STAATS ARCHIV, WIEN: *Polen I, Karton 55, fasc. Martz 1(632) fol. 13-13v.*

Allerdurchleuchtigster Großmechtigster
Unüberwindlichster Römischer Kayser

Allergst. Herr Eur Röm: Kays My. sein meine gehorsamb; und Treuiste Dienst, allzeit bauen Und berichte dieselbe hiermit gehorsamist, das Ich und der Rußer vorgestern den 11. dieses alhier glücklich angelangt, und woll empfangen und loggirt worden verhoffe heut oder morgen Audienz zuerlangen Gestern ist die Khönigl.

Propositur in Gegenwart aller Senatorum und Nuntiorum Geristrium beschehen, deren Puncta ungefehr hierbei Sub Litera A. begriffen sei und dieweil bei dem Articul des Schweden Progreß und dieses Khönigreichs Securitet betrefs eines lästerlichen Scripti so hierbei beide Litera B und dann der Cosackhen Saborowsky, welche d Schwed Zue Defectur zubewegen sich understanden meldung gethan worden, Ich (f. 13v) gestern es von Ihr Myst: und seinen Diener Obazki berichtet worden daß angeregt Famos Livel (: so wider Eur My. und dero hochlobliches Hauß vornemblich angesehen :) von den bei

den Provincial Jüngsthin gehaltenen engen Conventiba versambleten Stenden theils in gegenwart des Schwed: Currirs zerrissen und zur Erden geworffen von Theilß Ihrer Khönigl: My. Originaliter zugeschickt worden, und daß es gestern eiffrig von dieser Sachen gerredet, und geschlossen worden seye, fleißige Inquisition in Toto Regno anzustellen ob sich einer od. der andre dieser Schwedischen Machination theilhaftig machen werde, und dan werde dieselbe mit unnachleßlichen Leib und Lebensstraff zuverfahren sey

Alß will Ich der genzlichen Hofnung geloben, Meine Actionis werden

DOCUMENT III

Warsaw, March 22, 1632.

SUMMARY: *Arnoldini describes the grave situation of the Empire and the Polish Kingdom and asks for a united defence from the Polish Senate. In his opinion, there is a great danger that during the summer 1632 Tatars and Turks will invade Hungary or Moravia through Wallachia, Moldavia or Poland to draw off Imperial troops from the Swedish front. The Emperor, therefore, asks that the Zaporozhian Cossacks be permitted to intercede, since they alone can block the passage of these barbarians. If there are insufficient numbers of Cossacks to do this, let their number be increased.*

HAUS-HOF-STAATS ARCHIV, WIEN: *Polen I, Karton 55, Konv. Martz 1(632), fol. 119-122v.*

Sacratissime, Potentissime, atque Invictissime Rex,
Domine Benignissime. Reverendissimi itidem, atque
Illustrissimi, Illustres ac Generosi Domini Senatores,
Magnates ac Proceres Inclyti Poloniae Regni, Domini
pariter Observandissimi.

.....
Praevideant et considerent iam pericula quae hoc Regnum et
Republicam olim haud dubie incurrere possit, si quando hic hostis
(quod Deus avertat) suppressis in Imperio Catholicis Statibus et fractis
discipatisque Serenissimae Domus Austriacae viribus triumphaturus
esset; perpendant et quidem serio perpendant, an tum etiam armis
eiusdem tot accessibus adauctis Regnum Poloniae et Magnus Ducatus

Lithuaniae ad resistendum par viribus esse queat, hoc vero unicum saltem pro certo sibi persuasum habeant, satius et melius esse, iam in tempore de futuris malis avertendis sollicitum esse, sibi que praesidium una cum Domo Austriaca, quo in hostem suo tempore utantur, Regnumque ac Provincias suas amplissimas securas reddant, proinde comparare, quam esse spectatores nostrae ruinae, et maiori postea eiusdem hostis adeo potentis et maxima meditantis crudelitate obruantur.

Ad haec, cum hostis Serenissimae Domus Austriacae per Ministros ac Legatos suos ubique terrarum ac gentium atque adeo ab ipsa porta Otthomanica et populo Tartarorum, inclyti huius Regni abiuratis et infestissimis Nationibus auxilia, eruptiones, et incursus in vicina Regna Christiana continuo et indesinenter sollicitare non desistat, (f. 122) ideoque S. Maestas non immerito pertimescat, ne Tartari adhuc proxima aestate vel per Walachiam vel Moldaviam aut certe minorem Poloniam impetu in Hungariam vel Moraviam facto exercitum Caesareum ab intentione sua alio divertat, et cogat, ut, dum ei a fronte cum hoste pugnandum erit, hoc uno eodemque tempore a tergo de Christianorum Regnorum et Ditionum haereditariarum magis necessaria defensione simul occupari et paratus esse debeat.

Itaque perquam sollicita S. Maestas Maestatem Vestram Regiam Regnique Ordines pro suo affectu et solita fiducia maiorem in modum requirit et hortatur, ut in hoc praesertim periculo toti Christianitati imminente inprimis et quam impense curent, ut, siquidem hoc tempore maiores quam unquam Cosaccorum Zaporoviensium copias ad reprimendos horum Barbarorum impetus et cohibendas, quas timemus invasiones, ad manum paratissimas teneant, per Generalem suum Campiductorem diligenter providere et ordinare velint, ut horum Cosaccorum saepius exercitata et probata fortitudine a finibus Christianorum longe repellantur.

Et si forsan Copiae Cosaccorum ad vim hanc eruptionemque Tartarorum praecavendam fortasse numero impares non sufficiant, eas suo sumptu aliis copiis, prout tamen necessitates hoc postulaverint, tempestive adaugere velint.

Quo ipso profecto hanc immortalem praeclari nominis gloriam merebuntur, et hoc insigne decus ad posteros transmittent, Germanicum videlicet Imperium, quod ultra octingentos annos stetit et floruit, et potentissimis Barbarorum Regibus semper terrori fuit, iam ab hostibus undique impetitum dissensionibusque dolis et fraudibus in se divisum et oppressum fere, virtute tandem Polonicae Nationis a praesentissimo interitu vindicatum et praeservatum fuisse.

Maestas Sua Caesarea non committet, ut ipsos Regni Status huius quod modo sperat nec aliorum ei saepe fortiter praestitorum officiorum paeniteat.

Et haec fere erant quae etc...

(f. 122v) Propositio 22 Martii 1632
in Comitiis Varsaviensibus
A.

DOCUMENT IV

Wittgenstein, January 19, 1633.

SUMMARY: *Charles Hannibal, Burggrave and Count of Thonau (di Dona) notifies the authorities that according to the Emperor's decree, he recruited from Poland a light cavalry regiment under Colonel Stephan Virusky. He paid them one month salary and to assure their future payments, he placed his possessions as guarantee.*

HAUS-HOF-STAATS ARCHIV, WIEN: *Polen I, Karton 56, conv. 1633, f. 79-79v.*

Carolus Annibal Burggravius et Comes Donensis, Wartenbergae, Praelini et Goschitii Dominus, Sacrae Caesareae Maestatis Consiliarius intimus, Camerarius, Camerae Silesiae Praeses, Superioris Marchionatus Lusatae Praefectus et belli Dux etc. Notum facimus universis ac singulis praesentes litteras nostras visuris lecturis, auditoris, quod postquam Sacra Caesarea Maestas Dominus noster Clementissimus aliquod regimina Equitatus Polonici ex inclito Poloniae Regno congregata, conscribere nobis demandasset nos iniunctum Nobis Caesareum Mandatum fideliter exsequentes, inter caeteras legiones Magnifici et Generosi Domini Stephani Veruzky ex duobus milibus legionem constantem conscripsimus, eiusdemque lustrationem die decima octava Januarii conferimus. Cum autem eiusdem diei conscriptionis Mensis primus iisdem expiraverit, praedictus Colonellus et eius Officiales solutionem Secundi Mensis, quam iam a die conscriptionis inchoarunt, stipendiis instanter urgebant, Nos nullo ad hoc adhibito medio assecraverimus, assecramusque (f. 79v.) per praesentes, promittentes, tam Colonello huius legionis, quam Officialibus et gregariis equitibus secundi mensis stipendium intra unam et alteram septimanam non modo soluturos, verum etiam ut praedictus Colonellus, eiusque Officiales caeterique

milites futurae solutionis stipendiorum ulteriorum certi sint, procuraturos, Nos illis omnia bona et possessiones nostras praesentibus hisce oppignoramus, totalemque satisfactionem eisdem promittimus. Dabantur in arce Wagstadiensi die decima nona Mensis Januarii AD 1633.

Burgravius et Comes Tonensis L.S.

DOCUMENT V

Vienna, February 15, 1633.

SUMMARY: Commissioner Kielman from the Imperial War Council describes Colonel Virusky's hiring and his demands. Virusky demanded extraordinary salaries, compensation for the wounded soldiers, possibility of negotiations with the Emperor's representative, and clearing their status with the Polish government. The Emperor accepted all his conditions except the extraordinary salaries. He equalized their pay with the other mercenaries.

HAUS-HOF-STAATS ARCHIV, WIEN: *Polen I, Karton 56, Conv. 1633, fol. 52-53.*

Sacra Caesarea Maestas Dominus Noster Clementissimus benigne perceptis illis, quae sibi nomine duorum Legionum Polonicarum sub ductu Minorum Colonellorum Stephani Wieruski et Andreae Morski fuerunt proposita clementer sese resolvit.

Primum est, quod cum praefata Caesarea Maestas ob prolatam militis Poloni virtutem ac animi robur ipsorum tam promptum adventum gratum et acceptum habeat; Exinde non de futura eas, quas ad Serenissimum Poloniae Regem et Regni Proceres litteras expediri rogant, ne scilicet illis egressio e Regno vitio vertatur, aut dehinc damnosa sit, emanari facere, ut eatenus nil quicquam adversi ex hac parte Domini Poloni metuendum habeant.

2) Ad ratihibitionem illius cum Domino Burggravio de Thonau innovati contractus quod attinet, cum nulla eiusdem notitia ad Aulam hucusque pertigerit, merito ad tenorem confirmatae Capitulationis anteaetae remittuntur, donec a praefato Burggravio, prouti per speciales requiri curabitur, informatio plenior hac in re subsequatur, et sic quod tunc expediens futurum sit Maestas Caesarea desuper decernere possit. (f. 52v)

3) Dependuntiam item habebunt Domini Poloni a Supremo Exercitus Imperialis Praefecto Megapoleos et Fridlandiae Duce et reliquis secundum consuetum militiae ordinem ipsis de tempore in tempus praefixis aut praefigendis, idque ne inverso militiae ordine enascantur confusiones aut dissidia.

4) Circa exsolvendum residuum stipendium Polonis militibus ante annum in servitiis constitutis dispari allegato exemplo a copiis germanicis in subsidium ante hac Poloniae Regno submissis, quibus stipendia, aliqua licet interventa mora, exacte tamen soluta fuerint.

Respondetur hos Germanos militari opera in finem deducta et pace cum Gustavo conclusa, rationibus positis bona venia Regis et Regni in patriam rediisse.

Hos vero sua sponte nulla habita licentia quantum suae Maestati constare possit, castra dereliquisse, et post illata subditis innumera in Poloniam recessisse.

5) Si qui viriliter pugnantes membris mutilati aut corpore notabiliter laesi fuerint habebitur Polonorum aequae ac totius exercitus ratio, et conveniens respectus.

6) Ratione praetensionis Domini Palatinidis Massoviae, cum facti species ac conditio non satis liqueat, habita informatione a Domino Colonello Götz, quod aequum et iustum visum (f. 53) fuerit, desuper decernetur, ut querendi causa nulla Dominis Polonis remaneat.

Quod porro meliorationem salarii eorundem concernet, confidi Sacra Caesarea Maestas Dominos Polonos se caeterae exercitus parti conformaturos, et iuxta capitulata cum ipsis facta omnino militaturos esse.

Tandem et pro fine cum praemia subsequi soleant merita Caesarea Maestas pro conditione impensae cuiuscumque virtutis bellicae cum primis praefatos Dominos Colonellos et prae aliis bene merentes officiales et milites gratia Imperiali pro innata sua benignitate, et ante hac usurpata consuetudine renumerare non intermittet.

Quae omnia pro resolutione ipsis ex benigno Maestatis Caesareae mandato intimanda erant, quibus caeterum gratia Imperiali bene manet propensa.

Locus
Imperatorii

Per Imperatorem ex Consilio Bellico
15 Februarii A.D. 1633
Johannes Baptista Kielman

DOCUMENT VI

Vienna, March 3, 1635.

SUMMARY: *The Emperor asks the Ruthenian Palatine, Stanislaw Lubomirski, to aid his envoy Arnoldini in recruiting and organizing Cossack detachments for Imperial service. Arnoldini, who has the Emperor's trust will decide about the leadership of the Cossacks and who will lead them from Poland to the Empire.*

HAUS-HOF-STAATS ARCHIV, WIEN: *Polen I, Karton 57, Conv. 1635, fasc. III, fol. 8-9.*

Ferdinandus

Illustris Princeps, fidelis syncere Nobis dilecte. Peroptime Nobis adhuc ante triennium commendatum fuit a Consiliario nostro Imperiali Aulico et fideli dilecto Matthia Arnoldino a Clarstain, insigne Vestrum erga Nos benemerendi desiderium et oblatio de conscribendo et educendo ad servitia nostra Imperialia certo numero militum, facta quod ipsum singularis officii loco repositum habemus. Quandoquidem autem executio illius negotii subsecuta mox morte Serenissimi Principis ac Domini Sigismundi tertii, Poloniae et Sveciae Regis, Affinis et Fratris nostri dilectissimi, bonae reminiscentiae, impedita fuerit, et nunc pro conditione moderni status bellici Equitatus iste Polonicus Exercitui nostro Caesareo maximo usui et adiumento esse posset. Benigne placuit praedicto Arnoldino idem negotium reassumendum et Vobiscum pertractandum committere firma spe et fiducia freti, ut in quantum hactenus insigne Vestrum erga res nostras studium atque operam crebrius experti sumus, ita et hac occasione non defuturos, quin copiosus numerus Cosaccorum iam ineunte vere ad servitia Nostra Imperialia e Regno Poloniae emitti possit, circa quorum conductionem, etiam quales Cosaccos, et sub cuius directione desideremus, ipsi Arnoldino specialia commissa Vobis explicanda dedimus. Cui proinde ut in omnibus fidem habere et hocce negotium solito zelo, consilio et auxilio promovere velitis, est quod a Vobis gratiose expectamus. Ac de caetero Vos Imperiali ac Regio affectu benigne complectimur. Data Viennae 3 Martii, Anno 1635.

Palatino Russiae Stanislao Lubomirsky.

DOCUMENT VII

Lviv, after March, 1635.

SUMMARY: *Palatine Lubomirski writes to his captain to undertake recruitment in his jurisdiction in a disciplinary fashion. He also underlines that the first 2,000 Cossacks be transferred to their muster place with the help of the Imperial commissioners and that an agreement be drawn up to safeguard their stated financial compensation. Also, the captain is to watch and prevent any opposition from forming against the agreement and their military command.*

HAUS-HOF-STAATS ARCHIV, WIEN: *Polen I, Karton 58, Conv. 1635 Julii, fol. 221-222v.*

Originale Memorialis Domino
Palatino Russiae traditum in
causa conscribendi D. Sieracki

Rogatur Sua Excellentia ut pro augmento Benevolentiae et obligationis Caesareae scribere velit modo quo eidem heri placuit ad D. Capitaneum Siracki:

1) Ut disciplinam militarem observet ipse primus a D. Palatino commendatur ne a Commissariis Caesareis ne a subditis ex saevitiis querelae veniant (contentus portionibus, quae ipsi veluti etiam aliis quotidie porriguntur).

2) Quando completa fuerint 2000 Cosaggorum in stationibus, ut tunc Commissariis Caesareis et praeficiendo illis Colonello pareant necnon acquiescant Capitulationi et interim eis (bona fide) transmittendae lustrationi dent locum et accepta solutione quartualii primi ipse (f. 221v.) sit, qui primas laudes et praemia mereri velit, utpote qui primus ex Polonia Regem Hungariae sequutus sit ad castra et sic locum aliis det in quartiriis.

3) Addita certa securitate, quod si cum Generali futuro de maiori stipendio quo in praedicta ipsi interim transmissa vel transmittenda Capitulatione comprehensum erit convenietur et concludetur, ipsi suique commilitares tunc simul de certa solutione suique quo defuerat securi plane esse debeant.

Moneatur etiam ne ullam tumultuariis concursibus et nec clandestinis nec aptis eiusmodi conventionibus aut consiliis (f. 222) ubi de praetensa assecuratione proximi quartualii solutionis, item de Lauffgele, clam palamque consilia milites. Sed quod verbis Caesareis (et Capi-

tulationi cum futuro Generali concludendae) in hoc contenti acquiescant et elatis signis suis ad servitia Suae Maestati Imperiali properent et Gloriam Nationis Polonicae.

Adiuncta promissione donativi Caesarei si bene de Sua Maestate in his meritis fuerit.

Rogetur Sua Excellentia uti heri pro adiunctione magnae auctoritatis viro, si quando ne Capitulatione cum Generali tractabitur (f. 222v.)

Communicetur copia quietantiarum mihi a Rothmagistris hactenus datarum.

Designatio item Rothmagistrorum et quantasque ceteras promiserit...

Communicetur conceptus literarum ad Regem. Rogetur pro cursore mutuando atque alato cursu ad Regem festinet.

DOCUMENT VIII

Warsaw, May 1635.

SUMMARY: *Arnoldini thanks the Crown-Prince, John Casimir, since his influence over the Polish King and Senate allowed the organization of a mercenary army for the Emperor. This force should consist of 8,000 Cossack light cavalry because the Empire has enough of her soldiers. They still could use 300 Polish hussars. Furthermore, Arnoldini stated that 3,000 recruited Cossacks are in Silesia but further recruitment is necessary to reach the desired number of 7,000. After the completion of their training, in Silesia, they will advance to the Imperial campground where they will obtain their permanent quarters and pay. He also assured the prince that the financial remuneration will be adequate. The leadership of the force will be decided according to the Polish military tradition but the leaders have to subordinate themselves to the Emperor.*

HAUS-HOF-STAATS ARCHIV, WIEN: *Polen I, Karton 59, s.d. 1635, fol. 9-IIIV.*

Declaratio Ablegati Caesarei ad
puncta heri sibi a sua Excellentia exhibita.

Gratulatur sibi ex animo Caesareae Maestatis ablegatus, quod Illustrissimus Princeps and Sacrae Regiae Maestatis Poloniae interpositionem et nominationem suamque instantiam sese resolverit, quod militem contra communem hostem (Svecos videlicet) ex Senatus consulto in Comitibus Regni concessis pro Caesarea Maestate conscribere et

super his copiis Polonicis munus et officium Generalis Capitanei in se suscipere velit; pro hac declaratione gratias maximas more S. Caesareae Maestatis agit, suaeque Maestatis benignam offert gratiam.

Quod porro ad puncta et condiciones ab Illustrissimo Principe propositas et nobis porrectas attinet, super hisce bene consideratis omnibus rationibus et rerum circumstantiis imprimis autem limitibus instructionis sibi a Caesare datis inhaerendum sibi esse perpendens ablegatus, Cathegoricam, eamque realem, Germanis usitatam, hisce annectat declarationem; idque hanc solam ob causam ne ulterioribus, moris et procrastinationibus tempus frustra teratur, et utrique Maestati contra hostem communem male aut sane servis sine fructu et effectu demum provisum sit.

Ac imprimis etsi hic Exercitus absolute et realiter ex levioris Armaturae militibus constare iuxta expressam pertractationem ablegati 8000 Cosaccorum conseriri(?) debeat, Sacrae Caesareae vero Maestatis, diversas, armatas (f. 9v.) reales numero et effectu potentes in Imperio habeat, peditatu Cataphractis Dragonibus et Raytaris sat neque plus Equitibus deficienterque instructis, neque alio Equitatu nisi levioris Armaturae (vulgo volantis Armatae dictae) Sua Maestas Caesarea indigeat, nec ablegat unum iota in sua instructione de hastatis habeat. Considerando tamen statum et conditionem Illustrissimi Principis et (eius) a S(ua) Excell(entia) V(estra) audientia et colloquio allegatus perpendens intentioni eiusdem (aliqua saltem parte) satisfacere queat, ex parte sua consentiet et a Sua Caesarea Maestate id obtentum sperat, ut Equites hastatos Ussaros dictos et honore et reputatione, corporis sui custodia possit sumptibus S. Maestatis Caesareae 300, ad summum 500, conscribere et secum e regno educere

Verum quod attinet ad desideratum numerum Levioris Armaturae milites, vulgo Cossacos (f. 10) hoc expetit Dominus Legatus a Sua Excellentia ut quandoquidem iam ferme 3 millia conscripta sunt et iam sua occupant quartiria in Sylesia, velit Ill.mus Princeps adhuc quatuor conscribere millia, ut Levioris Armatae alias Cosacorum sint 7 millia. Hastatorum vero 300 aut quingenti.

Quod ad pedites et Dragonos attinet, quandoquidem robur totius potentiae Exercitus Caesarei in iis sit situm; imo sint in superabundanti non est quod eosdem pro Servitio Imperatoris, Ill.mus Princeps colligere aut e Regno educere debeat. Quod si vero horum opera pro occasionibus oblatis indiguerit, in his facile ex Armata Imperatoris eius subministrabuntur. Semper iique veterani et assueti bello milites, et quidem tam ad sui corporis custodiam, quam ad alias belli necessitates.

Instrumenta bellica tormenta et alia omnis generis arma majora ex... inveniet Ill.mus Princeps in castris cum ad Ser.mum Hungariae Regem, Caesaris filium Generalissimum, venerit eidemque se coniungent, a confiniis enim Silesiae ubi erit locus Armilustrii usque ad ipsa castra Caesarea nullum hostem habebunt obvium sed in ditionibus Caesareae Maestatis progredientur. Secure Polonicus Exercitus (f. 10v.) Quartiria et stationes pro omni occasione et locorum opportunitate commoda habebunt. Dictante hoc opus belli ratione et de his iampridem provisum est. Quod attinet stipendia pro anno medio, a Sua Excellentia praetensa, hoc nunquam in usu fuit, ut milites pro medio anno praenumerentur stipendia; neque ullum Regnum et Respublica hoc in more unquam habet nec quidem sub sole visum. Itaque pro uno quartuali pecunias omnibus militibus modo infrascripto Dominus Legatus promittit ut est in pagina speciali.

De contentatione extraordinaria Principi, hanc dat Dominus Legatus resolutionem. Nunquam scivisse Caesaream Maestatem negotium sibi cum Principe fore, imo nominatos expectabat, proinde nihil Legato in commissis hac in parte dedisse, neque ipse etiam quisquam (extra hac ratione officii Generalatus) nominare potest. (f. 11.)

Hoc tantum in se recipit *quod obligationem specialem dabit Ill.mo Principi*, quod S. Maestas ad dicti Ablegati instantiam loco talis donativi a Principe desiderati stipendium eis de quo in ulteriori et speciali tractatione hac vice conventum fuerit, sese ita benigne et liberaliter erga Suam Excellentiam declarabit et eo ipso exhibebit quod experietur se contentum fore, vel si placet quod S. Excell. Ablegatus sese obligabitur ipsi dando quod Serenissimus Rex Poloniae decernet. Uti enim contra communem hostem sunt arma, ita et contractus cum Ill.mo Principe initus ab utraque tam Caesarea quam Regis Poloniae Maestate approbabitur et ratificabitur. Proinde hoc in punctum ut aquiescat Princeps et hac vice rogat Dominus Legatus ad ulteriorem tam Caesaream quam Regis Maestatis Resolutionem.

Porro quidquid pecuniarum ad praesens vel in spatio paucorum dierum numerari poterant (sic) id ad rationem futuri stipendii et servitii, quod a die lustrae incipiet computari debet et defalcationi... omnino subiacebit.

Ex ea vero a Caesare accepta extraordinaria contentatione, ceteros omnes officiales Princeps contentare debet.

Exauctoratio militum sit penes Principem uti Generalem. Colonelorum constitutio, et legum, seu Justitiae ad instar militis (f. 11v.) Poloniae in Regno usitatae Judicium et exequutio. Imo hoc insuper

(haud dubie a Rege Generali) offertur Principi, quod omnes Poloni, iam ab aliquot annis Caesari militantes eius imperio subiacebunt. Locus quo confluant milites sunt confinia Sylesiae et quartiria iam ante mensem ad hoc designata; non enim in Regno vigore Resolutionis Comitiorum dari poterunt.

Quod denique Consensus et Subscriptio Senatorum Regni requiratur non ducit Dominus Legatus necessarium siquidem in litteris patentibus ad Ill.num Principem datis Regia Maestas expresse scribit id ex Senatus consulto factum et concessum verbum ante Regium stat pro omni fide (nec temporis ratio sinit, ut ea per Ablegatum impetrent).

Licet D. Legatus intellexerit fore ex more Polonico Hastas et ipsorum ornamenta dari a Rotmagistris, militibus hoc tamen Principis provideat siquidem nullam harum rerum notitiam et experientiam, habeant Germani.

DOCUMENT IX

Briga, August 1635.

SUMMARY: These are the first contemporary statistics of Cossack recruits compiled by company commanders. Presented are the numbers of Cossack horsemen and the expenses of the recruited force. Based on these figures, 5450 Cossacks were recruited and 8,029 RT were payed to them.

HAUS-HOF-STAATS ARCHIV, WIEN: *Polen I, Karton 59, Conv. August 1635, fol. 7-8.*

Ungefährlicher bericht undt Verzeichnung aller undt Jeder Rittmaister so sich in der Röm; Kayl. Maj. Kriegsdienste eingelassen, auch wie viel Volckh gegen gewisse geldt Quittung zuliefere versprochen wie volgt.

	<i>Pferdt</i>	<i>Reichsthale</i>
1) Dom Alexandro Sieraczki zu unterschiedlichen Mahlen nach undt nach gegeben laut Quittung de dato 24 Maii. 1635 – 1000 undt versprochen zu liefern den Pferden	500 darauf	1500
item seinen Diener		530
2) Herrn Nicolao Karas laut seiner Quittung sub dato 28 Maii, 1635, zum		200

Innerhalb ellichen Wochen zu liefern versprochen an Cossaggen	100	
3) Herrn Martino Alexandro Zaremba, auf abschlag seiner besoldung laut seiner Quittung, undt datis 5 und 25 Julii, Unterschiedlichen mahlen		760
Innerhalb 2 od(er) 3 wochen so beschlossen zuliefern	300	
4) H. Stanisla0 Czarnieczki, zu unterschiedlichen datis alss 23 Junii, 14 und 23 Julii a.d. 1635 geben		1161. fl. 1
dem Ich noch gegen völliger anzahl der Cossaggen	300	
mehr versprach und stündlich bezahlen soll 200 Reishsthaler (RT) so Er veroligirt zu liefern		
5) H. Paulo Noskowski zu Worschan den 16 Junii den 13 undt 27 Julii 1635 gegen Lieferung zu unterschiedlichen mahlen erlegt ..		1626. fl. 1
Cossaggen	2000	
6) H. Martino Alexandro Zakrzewski zu unterschiedlichen mahlen den 29 Junii, 4 undt 26 Julii in Abschlag seiner Besoldung laut Quittung		1200
Cosaggen zu liefern inner 8 Wochen	400	
7) N. Nicolao Broniewski den 5 Julii geben ..		800
Cosaggen zu liefern inner 4 od. 5 Wochen ..	600	
8) H. Martino Jedliecki den 26. 29. Junii und 10. Julii, laut Quittung zu Warschau geben ..		686. fl. 1
Cosaggen zuliefern Inner 3 Wochen	200	
9) H. Erasmo Dembinski und seiner Stallmeister zu unterschiedlichen datis laut Quittung den 12. 19. 20. und 29. Julii in Abschlag geben ..		1100
Cosaggen zu liefern Inner 4 Wochen	700	
und so viel er würde darüber haben.		
10) H. Laurentio Feketi laut seiner Quittung under under Dato 10. Julii		500
Cosaggen zu liefern versprochen inner 4 Wochen	300	

11) H. Joanni Achatic Rodacki durd dess H. Sierracki recommandation gegen abschlag seiner stipendii, laut seiner Quittung sub dato 25 Julii	100
Cosaggen zulieferrn Inner 3 Wochen	150
Summa der Cossaggen	5450
Summa das Soldtes RT 8029. Fl. 3	

DOCUMENT X

Warsaw, September 2, 1635.

SUMMARY: Arnoldini answers Noskowsky's complaints that several times he urged the Imperial commissioner Falkenberg to improve their quarters but the Cossacks will soon be leaving for the Imperial camp where they will be better situated and will receive their three-month salary. Let Noskowsky direct his detailed inquiries about quarters and routes of transit directly to the Imperial commissioners. Until the commander-in-chief has been designated, let each captain care for his company and its transit.

HAUS-HOF-STAATS ARCHIV, WIEN: *Polen I, Karton 58, Conv. September 1635, fol. 7-8v.*

Responsum ad Dominum
Noskowski ex 2 Septembris 1635.

Illustrissime Domine, Domine Observandissime.

Visis heri traditisque mihi literis Illustrissimae Dominationi Vestrae vehementer laetatus sum, quia ipsius adventum hactenus non minus exoptavi, quam Illustrissima Dominatio Vestra meam praesentiam unquam desiderare potuit. De quartiriis iam pro Dominatione Vestra Illustrissima fui sollicitus hactenus et hac de re ipsi Domino Commissario Caesareo Baron a Frankenberg saepius molestus fui. Iam vero copiae collectae ex antiquis ad nova quartiria deducuntur, locusque pro delectu militis haec civitas denominata est, rogatique omnes Equitum ductores ut certas eligant ipsi personas, quae ad nos de conducenda Cap.ne certa cum plenipotencia sufferent. (f. 7v.) Huc ad nos obligent et facto delectu Militum quantocius ad castra Suae Maestatis prope-

rent, prout Illustrissima Dominatio Vestra ex inclusa copia nostrae regulationis uberius intelliget. Pecunia ad trimestres stipendii solutiones huc eo fine allata conservat parata. Serenissimus Rex Hungariae adventum Polonorum Equitum avide expectat et urget quotidie iam occasiones rei contra hostes bene praeclareque gerendae, dum tempus ad hoc idoneum superest. Quod ne haec damna hostium elabantur Illustrissimam Dominationem Vestram, etiam atque etiam enixe, ut Cpdis Commissariis Caesareis sese accommodet et ad ipsorum instantiam quartiria illa et obtinet (deserat), et ad nova huic civitati, uti loco delectus consecrato cum copiis suis properare velit. (f. 8.) Sique Dominationis Vestrae Illustrissimae commoditas ferat, desiderarem, ut ipsa paucis stipata Comitibus huc ad me accelerare non gravetur. Quantum ad Duces Copiarum attinet, nullum huc usque Colonellum nominavimus, sed singulae cohortes sub singulis Rothmagistris collectae et in quartiria adductae sunt, denominabimus tamen et duo millia Equitum unius principalioris imperio subiiciemus, proutque hac in re convenire poterimus. Ita etiam duo millia a Dominatione Vestra Illustrissima conscripta suae potestatis erunt et manebunt. Desideraremus vero, de his et aliis cum Illustrissima Dominatione Vestra conferre eiusque consilio et (f. 8v.) auxilio autoritateque praevalere et nos consolari.

Cum de pecunia in 1 die et hoc loco Armilustrii persolvenda pro quartriali est hic solutus Caesarea Bellica Expeditione cum certa instructione hunc nobiscum ablegatus, De commoditate Armorum Emen-dorum erit ratio et occasio hic et Wratislaviae iam reconciliatae melior quam Cracoviae. Gratum mihi auditu fuit, quod sub militari disciplina suos compescat prohibeatque iniurias illatas innocentibus. Inaudio, quod omnes officiales et equitum praefecti die 6 Septembris in oppido Ogest (sic) convenire, et suos ad nos huc obligare velint. Vellem ego Illustrissimam Vestram Dominationem solam nobis cum etc... Operam semper dabo diligente, ut Vestra Illustrissima Dominatio intelligat me eidem cupere et desiderare ac ex animo omnia officiorum genera praestare, quam etc...

DOCUMENT XI

Briga, September 14, 1635.

SUMMARY: Noskowsky accepts the post of commander-in-chief of the mercenary force and promises to fulfill his duties that the Cossack cavalry advance in planned stages to the Imperial camp and the front.

HAUS-HOF-STAATS ARCHIV, WIEN: *Polen I, Karton 58, Conv. Septembris 1635, fol. 62-62v.*

Ego Paulus in Srensko Noskowskii, Sacrae Regiae Maestatis Poloniae Aulicus, Locumtenens Colensensis Zambroniensis Capitaneus, faceor quod suscepto in me Supremi Colonelli munere a Sacrae Caesareae Maestatis Commissariis mihi concredito, traditis acceptisque eo fine Caesareis Regiisque litteris in defalcationem stipendiorum ultra summas antehac diversis mihi vicibus missas, acceperim adhuc tria millia Talerorum Imperialium promissione hac annexa, quod in me susceperim, autoritatis meae, qua nunc fungor interpositione supradictos officiales et milites eo me dispositurum esse, ut stipendiis iam oblatis contenti, Armilustrio sese subjicerent, et ad servitia Suae Maestatis accepta trimestri seu quartuali (f. 62v.) solutione sine ulla ulteriori difficultate procedent. In eius rei fidem me subscribo appresso meo solito sigillo.

Dabantur Brigae, die 14, Mensis Septembris, Anno 1635.

DOCUMENT XII

Briga, September 23, 1635.

SUMMARY: *On that day a formal contract was signed by M. Arnoldini, Commissioner J. Winss and Colonel P. Noskowsky.*

a) *Concerning the remuneration of the Cossack army, they accepted the following monthly pay scale:*

<i>colonel</i>	<i>200 RT</i>
<i>captain</i>	<i>100</i>
<i>lieutenant</i>	<i>50</i>
<i>Flag-bearer</i>	<i>30</i>
<i>quartermaster</i>	<i>80</i>
<i>aides-de-camp</i>	<i>50</i>
<i>each detachment</i>	<i>30</i>
<i>individual horseman</i>	<i>6</i>

Wages would be paid every three months and during the war nobody could obtain higher wages unless approved by the Supreme Commander, the King of Hungary.

b) *As for the status of the army, they agreed that the Cossacks would be administered according to their own traditional military law, and they*

would keep their own prisoners, but they could not leave the Cossack army. Anyone who transferred to the German, Hungarian or Croat units would be returned to his own detachment. Colonel Noskowsky would be under the direct command of the King of Hungary or his deputy.

c) About the termination of their service, it was declared that the Cossacks would announce the cut off of their service one month before its term. Likewise the Cossacks would be notified one month before their release. In extreme necessity, the Polish King or the Senate may recall the Cossacks from the Empire.

d) The Commissioners would provide the provisions and quarters for the army, but also would punish the unlawful activities of the troops.

HAUS-HOF-STAATS ARCHIV, WIEN: *Polonica*, Karton 58, an. 1635 Septembris, fol. 127-131.

Inter Magnificos et Generosos Dominos, Matthiam Arnoldinum a Clarstain, et Dominum Joannem Winss Colonellum, Consiliarios et Commissarios a Sacra Caesarea Maestate deputatos, ac Illustrem et Magnificum Dominum Paulum Noskowskii de Srensco, Sacrae Regiae Maestatis Poloniae Aulicum, Lonsensem, Colensem et Zambroniensem Capitaneum pacta est infrascripta Capitulatio.

1) Quandoquidem Illustris ac Magnificus Dominus Paulus Noskowskii ex Sacrae Regiae Maestatis et Senatus consensu, eiusdemque Maestatis speciali recommendatione, servitia sua Sacrae Caesareae Maestati ultro obtulerit, et conscripto milite ipse personaliter huc se in Silesiam cum suis contulerit, ex benignoque favore Regiae Poloniae Maestatis, Supremus Colonellus praevia Caesarea approbatione, totiusque exercitus Polonici consensu electus et nominatus fuerit, uti vir antiquissima prosapia rerumque gerendarum dexteritate Regnique (f. 127v.) officiis publicis gaudeat. Proinde, eidem uti viro Illustri, Domini Commissarii ex parte Sacrae Caesareae Maestatis gubernandum hunc concedunt Militem Polonum, atque de facto eius iurisdictioni subiacerent volunt, idque ad Sacrae Caesareae Regiaeque Poloniae Maestatis beneplacitum et ulteriorem resolutionem. Promittentes eidem omnem gratiam et specialem Sacrae Caesareae Maestatis Clementiam.

2) Et licet constet dominis Commissariis, quales sumptus et expensas praedictus Dominus supremus Colonellus in conscribendo milite fecerit, et in eo retinendo et pacificando ad praesens faciat, imo quae in futurum exponenda erunt, facile considerent necessariumque imo

iustum, et aequissimum ducunt, ut condigno, personae et officio suo stipendio gaudeat. Verum quoniam Dominus Supremus Colonellus illud totum tam videlicet menstruum stipendium ratione sui officii, quam litteras expensas, sumptusque praetextes discretioni Sacrae Caesareae Regiaeque Hungariae commisit Maestati, eundem Domini Commissarii, specialibus recommendabunt ad Suas Maestates (f. 128.) litteris, quod erit in his contentus, quandoquidem toto ferme Orbi constet, Caesaream Maestatem scire velleque sibi adductis, sua praevenire munifica gratia et clementia.

3) Porro quod ad caeteros officiales sub Regimine eiusdem degentes attinet, eisdem infrascriptum assignant Domini Commissarii menstruum stipendium, videlicet:

Colonello cuilibet ratione officii Colonellatus pro mense quolibet Thaleros	200
Capitaneo seu Rottmagistro sub cuius cohorte Ducenti plus minusve erunt menstruatim Thaleros.....	100
Locumtenenti cuiuslibet Rottmagistri Tha- leros	50
Signifero cuilibet Thaleros	30
Excubiorum cuiuslibet legionis praefecto Thal.	80
Quartiriorum Praefecto Thaleros	50
Pro Vexilo quolibet Thaleros	30
Equiti cuilibet bene armato bonoque equo insedenti, viro ad bellandum apto et idoneo pro Mense quolibet Thaleros	6

4) Et licet omnes Poloni, qui antea in servitium Sacrae Caesareae Maestatis ibant, vel sine ulla (f. 128v) pecuniarum receptione, vel ad summum uno tantum mense accepto, alacriter progrediebantur, attamen ut dicti Domini Commissarii affectum Sacrae Caesareae Maestatis erga Gentem Polonam commonstrent, trimestre videlicet unius quartualis stipendium omnibus numerant in loco Armilustrii huc ad Brigam promittunt cum defalcatione Summarum Pecuniarum, quae iuxta quietantias et obligationes ad rationem futuri stipendii datae sunt.

5) Quandoquidem autem tam ipsi officiales, quam et milites ad exemplum aliorum tali stipendio se contentos fore promiserint, pro futuro vero renuant, repugnent, et meliorationem urgeant, Domini vero Commissarii limitatam potestatem nihil plus concedendi et permittendi habeant sua ex parte iam terminos instructionis suae plus

cedendo sint praetergressi, ne negotium totum, vel in parte disrum-
patur, promittunt quod litteras promotionales ad Sacram Regiam
Hungariae et Bohemiae Maestatem, uti Generalissimum, quippe cui
omnia quae rem bellicam tangunt, a Sacra Caesarea Maestate concre-
dita sunt, dabunt serioque intercedent ut posthac vel melioratio sti-
pendiorum ad donarium aliquod condignum illis ex clementia et beni-
gnitate Sacrae Regiae Maestatis concedatur, (f. 129.) tam ipsi Supremo
Colonello et officialibus quam aliisque qui se Suae Regiae Maestati
concredent, benignae discretioni.

6) Promittunt Domini Commissarii, ut etiam iam per litteras
patentes a Sacra Caesarea Maestate est promissum, quod iuribus suis
antiquis et usitatis utantur et fruuntur iuxtaque Suae Patriae iudicem
et separatos habebunt secundum articulos et condiciones in Regno Po-
loniae solitas et usitatas.

7) Captivos quoscumque acquisierint penes se retinebunt, eorumque
cedent commodo, nisi fuerint principales et generales personae, quae
S. Caesareae Maestati vel ejus Generalibus (aequo et decenti praemio
reposito) extradi debebunt.

8) Quodsi aliquis famulorum ex Polonico Exercitu ad Germanos,
Hungaros vel Croatos fugerit, extradi proprio Domino debet sine ulla
tergiversatione et vice versa a Polonis, id quoque praestari debet.

9) In progressu vero totius armatae promittunt Domini Commis-
sarii, quod Poloni (more antiquo et usitato) praecedere debebunt, eisdem
(iuxta possibilitatem locorum) bona quartiria assignabuntur. (f. 129v.)

10) Nullius praeterea mandatis et ordinantiis Dominus Supremus
Colonellus subiacebit, nisi ipsi Serenissimae Hungariae Bohemiaeque
Regiae eiusdem Campi Mareschalis et Locumtenenti.

11) Litteras praeterea patentes a Sacra Caesarea Maestate illi et
omnibus Colonellis et Rottmagistris providebunt Domini Commissarii.

12) Abdicatio seu exauthoratio uno mense antea illis significabitur,
acceptaque sufficiente satisfactione per Commissarios Caesareos ad ipsa
confinia Regni Poloniae deducentur, mensisque abdicationis unius
(praevisis ipsorum praeclaris factis et meritis) quod Sacra Caesarea
Maestate ipsis donabitur, commendabunt Domini Commissarii.

13) Quod si interim (quod Deus avertat) periculum aliquod Regno
et Republicae ab exteris emerit, hicque Exercitus a Serenissimo
Rege vel Republica revocatus fuerit reditus eisdem in Patriam omnino
non denegabitur.

14) Quartiriis et Comeatu pro posse uti desolatio, per tot annos gestorum bellorum continuato permittet accommodari debebunt.

15) Conflictuque campestri inito, reque praeclare (f. 130.) gesta, et victoria virtute ipsorum parta et obtenta, more solito unius mensis stipendio donabitur hic exercitus a Sacra Caesarea Maestate. Vulneratorumque habebitur condigna a Maestate Sua ratio.

16) Morte (quod Deus avertat) e vivis sublato Domino Supremo Colonello, ius alium eligendi esto penes exercitum Polonicum. Id tamen cum praescitu consensu et voluntate Sacrae Caesareae et Regiae Poloniae Maestatum fiat.

17) CANCELATUS.

18) Omnes illi Poloni, qui ab annis aliquot sub auspiciis Caesarei Maestatis militant, etsi aequum esset, ut unius Domini Supremi Colonelli subsint Regimini, tamen cum hac in parte nullum commissum promittendi a Sua Maestate habeant Domini Commissarii, hoc punctum voluntati Sacrae Regiae Maestatis remittunt. (d. 130)

19) Similiter quod ad dragones attinet, tam perpropter custodiam corporis Illustrissimi Domini Supremi Colonelli, quam ad coercendam multorum insolentiam illos iure et merito concedendos esse censent Domini Commissarii, ut Sua Maestas (quae tot millia dragonorum in suo habet exercitu) hic quoties opus fuerit, eidem subveniat.

20) Denique Caesarei Commissarii hisce tam Illustrissimum Dominum Supremum Colonellum, quam et omnes alios officiales et milites praesentibus, nomine et authoritate Sacrae Caesareae Maestatis assureant, quod ea omni suprascripta inviolabiliter tenebuntur, et observabuntur, omni dolo et fraude remotis.

21) Viceversa speramus et promissis Domini Supremi Colonelli fidunt Commissarii quod Colonellus Supremus exercitum hunc ad servitia Sacrae Caesareae Maestatis in omnibus, prout decet, nascentibus occasionibus sit ducturus, eundemque in bona asservaturus, disciplina et ordine, neve iniuriae et damna ab iisdem in ditionibus Suae Maestatis nec etiam Romani Imperatoris inferantur. Milites vero ita iuxta articulos in Constitutionibus Regni Poloniae contentos se gerent prout gentem inclitam, nobilemque, ac generosum decet sanguinem.

In quorum omnium fidem duo huius Capitulationis scripta sunt exemplaria, unius plane tenoris, quae ab utraque parte propriae manus subscriptione et sigillorum impressione confirmata sunt.

Actum Brigae die 23 Septembris anno 1635.

DOCUMENT XIII

Moisy, December 20, 1636.

SUMMARY: *A contract drawn up by the French ambassador, Baron de Rorte on behalf of King Louis XIII of France to employ 4,000 Cossack officers and men.*

The various articles of the contract deal with condition of employment, extract obedience from Cossacks to French field commanders, offer monetary remuneration for their services, grant Cossacks autonomous military formations and show how the Cossacks may expect to be treated by the French military high command.

ARCHIVES DU SERVICE HISTORIQUE DE L'ARMÉE, VINCENNES, FRANCE,
Cote A' 32. 25/3.

20 Decembre, 1636.

Articles de la capitulation que le Roy a commandé au Sieur Baron de Rorté envoyé par Sa Majesté en Allemagne, de passer ent son nom pour la levée de quatre mil hommes à cheval Polonois ou Cosaques pour son service, avec telz cheffz et capitaines de la dite nation qu'il verra estre à vopros.

Les dits cheffz, capitaines et officiers prometront de faire la dite levée au plues tost et de gens agueris bien montéz et arméz selon la façon de leur pays.

Ilz presentont sermon en manier du dit Baron de Rorté de bien et fidelement servir Sa Majesté offensivement et deffensivement envers et contre tous tant dans des armées si esse y en a besoin que dans celles de Ses alliez sans qu'ilz puissent quitter le service quelque commandement quilz en reçoivent ny refuser d'entreprendre uacun voiage dans quelque pays que ce soit ou Sa Majesté leur ordonnera d'aller pour le bien de ses affaires et de celles de ses alliez.

Ils recevront le commandement des generaux des armées de Sa Majesté et de celles de ses alliez ou Ilz serviront et seront tenuz d'y obeir, tant por loger et marcher que pour vivre et en toutes factions de guerre, comme gardes, logements, marches, batailles, rencontres, entreprises, assaultz, passages, retraittes, convoys et autres actions de guerre (fol. 2) quel conques soit que les dits quatre mil hommes se trouvent en corps ou separement.

Moyennant quoy encores que Sa Majesté scache que la solde ordonnees des dits gens de guerre soit de quinze florins ou quatre escus

de seize solz pieces par mois a chaque cavalier. Neatmoins, a cause quilz auront beaucoup de chemin a faire et de despenses a supporter allant servir hors de leur pays elle trouve bon que le dit baron de Rorté leur accorde en son nom jusquea a dix huict ou ving florins a chacun par mois et fasse paier par advence aus dits quatre mil hommes lors quilz sernt rendus a leur place montre trois mois entiers de leur ditte solde. Comme aussi quil leur promettra la continuation du payements d'icelle de trois mois en trois mois. Incontinent iceux expires pour le service quilz auront fait pendant le dit temps et ce sur le pied de leur nombre effectif suivant les montres et revues qui en seront faictes par leur commendant porez ordonnéz.

Ilz auront leur justice ordinaire et les pouvoirs pour la disposition des charges accoustumés en pareilles troupes de la dicte nation.

Ilz ne pourront donner grace pour bruslemens, pillages, d'églises, voilemens des femmes, filles et religieuses mais seront tenuz d'en faire punition exemplaire.

(fol. 3) Ilz seront obligéz de vivre et faire vivre leurs soldats avec discipline et police sans commettre aucun desordre a la foule et oppression au peuple. Or s'il en arrive, les chefs en demeureront responsables, sauf leur recours contre ceux qui l'auront commis.

Lors quil plaira a Sa Majesté de licencier les dittes troupes Ils leur sera payé un mois de montre outre la solde du service fait pour leur donner moyen de retourner en leur pays, et leur sera donné toute la commodité et seurete possible pour cet effect.

Promettant Sa Majesté en foy et parole de Roy d'avoir pour agreable tenir ferme et stable et faire Inviolablement observiv et executer toutes les choses susdictes qui seront (fol. 4) traictées et accordées en son nom par le dit Baron de Rorté avec les chefs, cappitaines et officiers de la ditte nation. Et En Tes moien de ce elle a signé les presens articles de sa propre main.

Faict cy Moissy, le XXème jour de Decembre, 1636.

DOCUMENT XIV

Vienna, April 1646.

SUMMARY: Emperor Ferdinand III writes to the Polish King, Wladyslaw IV, that in the past the Austrian and Polish royal dynasties were bound by mutual pacts of friendship. Recently, however, the French Crown is recruiting an army in Poland against the Empire which contravenes all previous pacts and treaties. Therefore, the Emperor insists

that the old pacts of friendship be honored and the Polish King halt the French recruitment in his country in accordance with the old friendship between the two dynasties.

HAUS-HOF-STAATS ARCHIV, WIEN: *Polonica* 61, a. 1646, fol. 56-58v.

Serenissime ac Potentissime Rex Domine Clementissime.

Begnigne recordabitur sacra Regia Maestas Vestra, quod, cum non ita pridem de delectibus militum in hoc Regno eidemque annexis Provinciis pro Corona Franciae institutis, et quatenus illi pactis ac foederibus inter Serenissimas Austriacam et Jagellonicam Domus, ac utriusque Domus Regna et Provincias iam antiquitus contractis, ac recenter etiam confirmatis adversarentur, ad eandem humillime deferrem, et vigore praedictorum foederum, seriam eorundem inhibitionem nomine Sacrae Caesareae Maestatis Domini mei Clementissimi instanter urgerem, ea me fiducia erectum benigne a se dimiserit, non opus fore amplius eos aliis modis impedire, sed cum Maestas Vestra de huiusmodi delectibus iam ante aliunde edocta esset, et ipsamet in praesenti rerum statu copiis indigeret, iam ultro de sistendis iisdem, et pro tunc iam collecto milite sub stipendium proprium redigendo, emissis, ad quos opus esset, mandatis suis Regiis satis praecavisset ne quid in praeiudicium compactatorum hac in parte fieret. Quo sub benigno responso, merito securior, attentioris in eiusmodi Sacrae Caesareae Maestatis hostium molitiones, (f. 56v.) quae apud Maestatem Vestram tot arctis eidem necessitudinis vinculis coniunctam, ipsamque hanc tam sancto foedere colligatam Rempublicam nimirum effectum ullum sortiri non possent, observationis curam omnino quidem deposueram: Verum, cum vulgo iam notum fiat, nec sit qui, quemadmodum Sacra Caesarea Maestas de benevolo in se affectu Maestatis Vestrae et huius inclitae Reipublicae in observandis cum exteris Coronis et Principibus ictis pactis ac foederibus Religione confidit; ita non palam videat, minus attentis mandatis Maestatis Vestrae, eiusmodi delectus pro Corona Franciae magno concursu continuari, et iam paratum militem e Portibus Borussiae aliisque confiniis huius Regni catervatim educi, vel brevi educendum adeoque eludi mentem et mandata Maestatis Vestrae ut Hostes confederati Amici vel invitis, ut opinor, Ipsamet et hac inclita Republica finem suum se obtinuisse gloriari, et vulgo, quod satagunt, secessionis cuiusdam e veteris amicitiae et bonae vicinitatis limitibus opinionem imprimere possint. Sicut igitur in saepedictis pactis ac foederibus tanta annorum serie feliciter ac firme coalitis expresse cautum

reperitur, non modo quod (uti formalia sonant): « Nos invicem omni honore, fide et amore prosequi et promovere debeamus et velimus in locis omnibus et (f. 57.) temporibus, ubi id faciendi se facultas obtulerit, citra dolum et fraudem aliquam. Praeterea ex illo tempore, perpetuo realiter, et cum effectu, invicem et mutuo obligati, alligati et confoederati simus et erimus, et inter nos et subditos nostros, nec non Regna, Principatus et Dominia quae nunc uterque nostrum possidet et quae Deo concedente in futurum acquiramus constans, perpetua, indissolubilis et Christiana pax esse et servari debeat, et in omnibus, utriusque nostrum honorem, dignitatem, statum, augmentum concernentibus, vel concernere valentibus, mutuo nobis auxiliabimur, consulimus, invicem promovebimus et assistemus, nec alteruter Nostrum quicquam faciet, cupiet, pertractabit, aut molietur quod contra praedicta esse aut tendere possit ».

Verum etiam quoad delectus in specie declaratum hoc sequenti tenore: « Caeterum pro maiore supra dictorum nostrorum foederum declaratione prope tranquilliori subditorum nostrorum statu, quiete, et bonae vicinitatis conservatione ordinamus, statuimus, declaramus et volumus, quod, cum initio scriptum sit, quod mutuo Nobis auxilia ferre debeamus, quomodo alter alteri auxilia ferre velimus, id in arbitrio utriusque Nostrum et ordinum Regnorum nostrorum positum esse debeat »; hoc tamen expresso ut liceat utrique Nostrum (f. F7v.) ex terris et Provinciis alteris voluntarios milites aere suo conductos educere et arma in usum suum exportare. Hactenus tamen milites educere liceat quatenus id sciente fiat altera Nostrum, neque sit alteruter Nostrum bello suo proprio contra hostes aliquos suos impeditus. Hostibus vero ne id liceat neve favor aliis praestetur qui alteri obesse possit, ita tamen, ut nedum iuxta praescripta Maiorum Nostrorum foedera nullus Nostrum alteri vel ipsius Regnis, Principatibus, Dominiis et subditis bellum, damnum aut quodvis aliud nocumentum inferre, sed neque alterius Hostes aut rebelles fovere, protegere, seu eis assistere, vel favorem, consilium aut auxilium quovis modo praestare debeat. Ita cum nemini non notissimum sit quae Hostilitates iam a tot annis a dicta Franciae Corona contra Sacram Caesaream Maestatem et Imperium Romanum, nec non contra Regna et Provincias haereditarias Austriacas exercitae fuerint, atque etiamnum exercentur; neque ullum dubium esse possit quin sicut is delectus in favorem Coronae Franciae ita et in damnum et nocumentum Sacrae Caesareae Maestatis subiectarumque Eidem Provinciarum tam arcto foedere huic Coronae Poloniae coniunctarum cedant. Nec obest dici eas copias non contra Maestatem Suam

Caesaream Eiusque Regna, Provincias, subditosque, aut Imperium Romanum (f. 58.) conscribi vel educendas esse: nam praeterquam quod eiusmodi contestationibus hostium fidem habere futile ac tralatitium est, nemo sane negare poterit, quin in eo consulatur et faveatur hosti et quin si ille aliorum auxilia mittere e re sua fore decreverat, his copiis illa auxilia, aliis exercitibus suis contra foederatos huius inclitae Coronae Poloniae eductis detrahenda suppleantur vel hae in eorum locum succedant. Nec attendendum exiguam fore manum quae his delectibus cogeretur, nec eos palam fieri et quidquid aliorum colonum ad rem per se, vel ipsa etiam confessione plurimum e senatu huius Reipublicae supradicta pacta evidenter infringentem mitigandam praetextitur: cum indubia iam fama Vulgo percrebrescat, frequentissimam iis delectibus, nullo iis posito termino, abduci iuventutem, et quidem non sine prius ad id faciendum pacta licentia cum nescio quibus huius Reipublicae Proceribus. Confidit itaque Sacra Caesarea Maestas Dominus meus Clementissimam Maestatem Vestram serio denuo et efficaciter interdictis huiusmodi delectibus et praeclusa eorundem copiarum educationis via, ut quid in fraudem eorundem pactorum, a Maioribus utriusque Maestatis, tam sancte hactenus servatorum, vel amicitiae et coniunctionis, quae cum utriusque (f. 58v.) partis tam insigni emolimento, tamque feliciter eo-usque constituit, siat, non permissuram, sed potius in his aliisque necessitudinis vinculis sit consentaneum.

Si vero, quod absit, in praeiudicium saepememoratorum foederum quicquam iam admissum esset, doleret sane Sua Maestas Caesarea summopere, id, nulla ex se data occasione, hosti suo non attentis foederibus tributum esse. Id quod vigore annexarum fiduciarum Regiae Maestati Vestrae a me repraesentandum fuit; speratque Sua Caesarea Maestas cum de Regia atque eximia Maestatis Vestrae prudentia tum indubitato in eandem fraternae benevolentiae affectu sat maturum adhuc eiusmodi delectibus remedium adhibitum, et in eos, qui re vel consilio ad eorundem promotionem cooperati sunt, pro merito animadversum iri. Cui omnibus optimi Consobrini, Affinis et amici affectibus officisque respondere nunquam curce fuit et futurum est. De caetero Regiae Maestati Vestrae felicissimos rerum omnium successus ex devotissimo corde apprecatus eiusdem me benignae gratiae humillime commendo.

Eiusdem S. Regiae Maestatis Vestrae etc.

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